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abstract idea absurd acknowledge agree Alciphron angles answer apparent magnitude appear atheist Bermuda Bishop body cause ceived Cloyne colours common conceive connexion consequently consider corporeal substance Crito deny difficulty distance distinct doth Dublin earth effect Euph Euphranor evident external farther figure follows George Berkeley gible greater hath Hylas ideas of sight imagine immediate objects immediately perceived infinite infinite divisibility ject letter Lysicles magnitude mankind manner matter mean mind minute philosophers moon motion Naples nature never nexion objects of sight observed occasion opinion pain particular perceived by sense perceived by sight perception Phil Philonous plain pleasure prejudice principles produce reason retina rience scepticism sect seems sensations sensible qualities sensible things shew shewn sight and touch signified sort soul sound spirit substratum suppose tangible tar-water tell thought tion true truth understand unperceiving unthinking vision wherein whereof words
Pahina 12 - For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult)! for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once.
Pahina 37 - The ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series, the admirable connection whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author.
Pahina 8 - I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and color.
Pahina 24 - But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself.
Pahina 96 - But it will be objected that, if there is no idea signified by the terms soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing — which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance.
Pahina 31 - ... relative notion of its supporting accidents. The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents, this, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common sense of those words ; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the two parts or branches which make the signification of the words material substance, I am convinced there is no distinct...
Pahina 36 - A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being — as it perceives ideas it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the will.
Pahina 26 - ... all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their being (esse) is to be perceived or known ; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit...
Pahina 302 - Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man to be made to see; quaere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube?
From Google Scholar
Rafael Capurro, Birger Hjørland
Charles E Orser - 1998 - American Anthropologist
Peter Ludlow - 1992 - Natural Language & Linguistic Theory
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Patricia Kitcher - 1999 - Philosophical Review
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