Corruption: The Boom and Bust of East Asia
Governance and corruption have finally come to the fore of the development debate. While interest in governance began to surge in the early 1990s, the East Asian crisis has catapulted the issue to prominence. Analysts and academics, in a spate of articles and books, have added their voices to the chorus of criticism of the so-called Asian miracle. Their verdict: Bad governance and corruption did the miracle countries in.Taking a different perspective, this book asks and attempts to answer how these countries were able to attract enormous amounts of investment and enjoy rapid growth over a thirty-year period despite being perceived as hotbeds of corruption.
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STATE CAPITAL AND INVESTMENTS IN KOREA
GOVERNANCE AND INVESTMENT IN CHINA
CENTRALIZATION POLITICAL TURNOVER AND INVESTMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES
GOVERNANCE RENTSEEKING AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN MALAYSIA
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Iba pang mga edisyon - View all
administration agencies argue Asia authoritarian autonomy Bank of Thailand behavior bribery bribes Bumiputera bureaucrats capital flight central chaebols changes Chart Thai party Chatichai checking devices China Chinese commitment competition Constitution costs credible cross-regional decentralization decisions democratic developing countries East Asian economic growth economic policy effective elected electoral elite enforcement enterprises especially ethnic factions factors favor firms foreign important incentives increased independent monopolists Indonesia industries institutional interests intervention investment governance investors Joseph Estrada Korea levels of corruption macroeconomic Mahathir Malay Malaysia ment minister Ministry N/A N/A N/A nomic officials percent period Philippines policy makers politicians predictability Prem Prem Tinsulanonda president private investment problems productivity property rights public sector rates redistribution reduce reforms regime regions regulatory rent-seeking rents result senior leaders Shleifer and Vishny significant SOEs strong structure Suharto technocrats term Thai Thailand tion trade turnover uncertainty variable veto players World Bank