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1849.]

Union of the Divine and Human in Christ.

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finite, is an easy and an empty task. If all that is needed in forming a conception of God, is to do away with all vital relations between the divine and the human, this work has long since been achieved, and the result is, mere abstract being, a notion only one remove from nonentity. An absolutely hidden, unrevealed Deity, is no God at all for us. Atheism would be the next step. And, further, it involves a contradiction to speak of God as absolute, and at the same time to assert that he has no intimate connection with what is finite; for if he have nothing to do with the finite, then the finite exists independently of him, and consequently he is not absolute; he is not absolute, unless the finite be a revelation of himself.

But while all religions necessarily embrace this idea of the union of the human with the divine, the peculiarity of the Christian religion consists in the form in which it is there presented. It is the universal belief of the Christian church, that in Jesus of Nazareth alone, this union of divinity and humanity has appeared in a personal form. It was manifested in him as a fact, a reality; not as a doctrine, but as a person. A common mode of attack against Christianity has been to deny the originality of its doctrines, and to derive them all from heathen or Jewish sources. The attack was plausible only so long as Christianity was considered as a set of doctrines, rather than as a series of divine acts. The real defence against such objections is to show the exact relation of the Christian religion to the antecedent ones; its differences from them as well as its agreement with them. And if it can be proved, that what other religions were striving after in an imperfect or disfigured form, is realized in Christianity in a new and perfect way; if in its fundamental idea of a God-man, we find the key by which we can read more clearly the enigmas and understand the perversions of other forms of faith, then will its true relation to them be detected, and its vindication made triumphant. This we will attempt to do by showing, in the first place, that the fundamental idea of Christianity, the idea of the God-man, cannot be explained as derived either from heathenism or from the Jewish system, while at the same time it is that which they both are seeking after. In the second place, it will be shown that this fundamental idea is original and essential to Christianity, though its full development in all its relations was reserved for subsequent centuries.

Can we then ascribe to the heathen religions, the origin of this idea of the union of the human and divine in one person? It is said that we must look for it there rather than in the Jewish system, because the latter from its strict monotheism was strongly prejudiced against any such dogma, as is proved by the extensive influence of the Ebion

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ites in the early church, by the slight recognition of this doctrine (even if it be found at all) in those books of the New Testament which were composed under Hebrew influences, and by the fact that those apostles who insisted most upon the divinity of Jesus were undeniably most concerned with paganism. Did this idea, then, come from paganism? In answering this question it will be necessary to distinguish between the oriental and the occidental heathenism. As the representation of the former, we will take the Indian religion; of the latter, the Greek. Both confound God and the world; yet in doing this they proceed from opposite extremes. The orient starts from the divine, the occident from the human, and both seek after the union of the two. In the Greek religion men become gods; they rise to Olympus. This is not the idea of Christianity; it is opposed to it. The early disciples of Christ knew nothing of such an apotheosis; man does not rise to God, God descends to man. It was first advocated in the Christian church by Paul of Samosata, and viewed with such abhorrence, that the council of Nice ordered its advocates to be re-baptized. May it not then be found in the theogony of the Greeks, if not in their apotheoses? Still less; for here was polytheism, here the gods are finite, they are national, and above them is a threatening destiny, the only and obscure vestige of monotheism; nor are these many gods essentially united with this all-embracing Fate. But Christianity from the very first was sternly monotheistic; its followers abhorred all polytheism; the God-man stands alone and is not national, and he is in the closest union with the Father.

But if the Greek faith will not give us this idea, may it not be derived from the dreamy and fantastic Orient? There we have the incarnation of the second member of the Trimarti; Vishnu becomes man, God descends to man. But this incarnation is not a real one; it is not a union of the divine and human; for Krishnu lays aside his humanity and returns to heaven. There is a complete and unreconclied dualism, and not a union. The finite and infinite are in an eternal and irreconcilable opposition. No sooner are the two united than one is lost. The finite is swallowed up in the infinite. Matter, too, is evil; the ethical and physical are confounded. So unreconciled are the two extremes, that this religion has been perpetually playing between pantheism and materialism-the elements of both of which it contains. In its latest form, that of Buddhism in the Chinese nation, it is wholly material; this world is all in all, the Chinese empire is also the kingdom of heaven.

But though these religions have not attained the true idea of the

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Qualities of the Hebrew Religion.

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God-man, yet it is that which they are seeking after. The Orient, starting from the notion of universal life is ever striving to realize the personality and presence of God; but its essential dualism prevents this, and it remains hovering in a region of perpetual uncertainty. The Greek religion made the desperate attempt to raise man to the gods, to produce the divine from the human; but when it had reached the highest point to which even philosophy could carry it, it found it had only a world without a God; or, as in New Platonism, only an abstract divine substance, in comparison with which all that is finite is but an illusion. Thus the Greek who began with such proud consciousness of human power, ended in the same abstraction with which the Oriental began, and found in it his grave. And since he began, when the Oriental ended, the whole circle of the heathen world is completed; it returns in the end to its empty and unsatisfying beginning. It was not able to grasp the problem which it was trying to solve; and history has written the judgment of its religions. The originality of the idea of the God-man, as this appears in Christianity, is not impeached by any of the conceptions to which these heathen religions attained.

One of the main hindrances in the way of these pagan attempts to reconcile the human and the divine, which made them perpetually sink down into an extreme they were always striving to avoid, was their defective views in respect to the moral character of the supreme being, universal deficiency, and their want of a sense of God's perfect justice. Where the moral element is wanting in our conceptions of God, it is difficult to realize his personality, it is easier to confound him with the world. And any idea of the union of the human and divine, which does not save the personality of God, and which does not recognize the moral element as essential to this union, must be incomplete. The Persians presented in a bolder relief than any other pagan people, the intense antagonism between right and wrong; but with them it is a perpetual strife between two elements without any reconciliation. Evil is a substance-fixed in nature.

In the Hebrew religion we have for the first time the full distinction between God and the world openly revealed; and we have also the moral element in the divine nature clearly set forth. In both these points it stands far above all the Gentile superstitions; and it may in these respects be considered as the disclosure of a mystery which weighed upon the whole of the ancient world. Other claims, and deeper mysteries than are those of paganism, it indeed has; but the enigmas of the ancient world on these points it has fully solved.'

The best view of the heathen religions which has been published, is probably Stuhr's Religionsformen der heidnischer Völker. Berlin, 1836, 2. 8vo.

Before the union of divinity and humanity could be clearly seen, the distinction between the two must be clearly seen; and before the distinction of the divine and the human can be held fast, we must have a definite view of the moral attributes of God, especially as a God of justice, (without which love is not love). Neither of these heathenism had, both of these the Hebrew faith possessed; and this faith, therefore, made one step in advance towards the solution of the problem. It remains to be asked, whether this religion had the true idea of the union of the divine and the human in such a form that the Christian doctrine could be directly derived from it.

The Hebrew religion stands alone among the ancient systems in making a broad distinction between God and the world; and in its recognition of the personality of Jehovah. God is so elevated above the world, stands so alone in his spirituality and holiness; the difference between God and man is made so vast, that little is said of any other than a moral union between the two; of a relation between the human and divine nature or essence, which is necessary to the idea of the God-man, we find no traces. And it is, besides, a characteristic of this people, that they had little to do with metaphysical questions. To raise them above and keep them separate from all Gentile polytheism, it seemed necessary that they should have such a view of the relation of God to man, as would be most remote from that which lies at the basis of the doctrine of the incarnation. This is not inconsistent with the fact that God revealed himself in various ways to his people; nor with the office which is ascribed to the Angel of Jehovah in many parts of the Old Testament. But this angel is not always represented as a definite person, nor are all revelations made through him; and there is no hint of a union of the human and divine in him. Such passages as Ps. 103: 20. 148: 2. 34: 8. 91: 11, where the angel appears to have a very intimate connection with the world, and to be less restricted to the theocracy, are probably to be interpreted as personifications, or, if not so, as referring to created beings. And it is worthy of remark, that the angels came to have the highest importance to the Jews after God had ceased to speak with his people; and that in proportion as a prodigal fancy in later time ascribed to them the most important works, the sense of the presence of God himself seemed to retreat, which is an opposite result from that of the true doctrine of a divine Mediator. Nor in the "Wisdom" of the Proverbs and the Apocrypha do we find the elements of this doctrine. While this wisdom is the boldest attempt which the Jewish mind made to bring God and the world into conjunction, yet, in its highest form, it is doubtful whether we can regard it as a per

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Characteristics of Philo's System.

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sonal agent; and even if it be, it has closer affinities with the doctrine of the Logos than with that of the Incarnation. When the greatest power and knowledge are ascribed to wisdom, it ceases to have any direct connection with human nature; the idea of a manifestation of God in history, which is essential to the Christian view, is lost sight of, and the only revelation recognized is in the soul of man. Nothing like a direct union of God with human nature is recognized in all that is ascribed to wisdom. The view of Philo respecting the Logos is often adduced as the precursor of the Christian doctrine. This is the most remarkable attempt made on the basis of the Jewish system, and by a contemporary of Jesus, under the influence also of the Greek philosophy, to bring the floating ideas of the Jews respecting the Messiah into a systematic form; and by giving a philosophical system to do away with the need of having a real and personal Messiah. And the results to which this attempt conducts, when compared with the reality as it is found in the person of Christ, confirms our position, that from the Jewish system alone the idea of the God-man could not be engendered. There are two opposing elements in Philo's system; on the one hand there is the strictest monotheism ; God is an absolute, simple and unchangeable being. On the other hand, there is the pagan notion of an emanation from God, which seems to relieve this idea of a purely abstract God, and to bring him into a more intimate connection with his creatures. But between these two elements Philo is never at rest. As soon as there is an emanation, it is taken back again. He has and he has not a difference between God and the world. And he also exchanges the ethical element, which distinguishes the Hebrew conception of God, for the physical element, which is one of the characteristics of Paganism. And as to the Logos of Philo's system, it is difficult to maintain the position, that he is a different hypostasis from God, having a middle position between God and the world, To regard him as a distinct hypostasis would be repugnant to Philo's severe monotheism; and the passages which seem to favor this view can be explained on a different supposition. Still more opposed is he to any idea like that

I We wish it were in our power to give even an abstract of the thorough discussion of Philo's system, which extends to nearly forty pages in the original. The import of this Logos, as is well known, is one of the vexed questions. High authorities, as Lücke, Ritter and Semisch take a different view from our author. The questions are two: 1. Whether the Logos of Philo is a personification or an hypostasis; 2. Whether Philo considered this Logos as really divine. The whole question has more bearing upon the doctrine of the Trinity than upon that of the Incarnation. As far as Dorner's argument is concerned, the originality of the

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