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Cicero's Tusculan Questions.

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nor does it claim to be regarded as such, but only a translation into the Latin tongue, of a portion of the Athenian philosophy, perfected and adorned, according to the invariable habit of the Romans, as Cicero informs us, of improving whatever they adopted from the Greeks. The argument is substantially the same as that of the Phaedo. One or two considerations, which the more advanced knowledge of his times had shown to be without weight, are omitted, and others are introduced to supply their place. The several topics are also disposed with greater rhetorical skill, and are, moreover, copiously illustrated by passages from Statius, Ennius, and others of his favorite poets. The argument is thus addressed to the imagination and the taste as well as the understanding, and the reader is lured onward not more by the interest of the theme than by the graceful and attractive manner in which it is treated. The work presents a fine example of that copiousness of illustration and elegance of diction which, according to the Roman orator, is the chief end of all philosophy. "Hanc enim perfectam philosophiam semper judicavi, quae de maximis quaestionibus copiose posset ornateque dicere." At the same time it must be admitted that there is less of that straightforward earnestness, and of that charming simplicity, which are so attractive in the original production.

The only argument of any importance added to those of the Phaedo, is that derived from the universal prevalence of a belief in the immortality of the soul, especially among the nations of antiquity, who, living nearer to the origin of our race, may be supposed to have retained the ideas and sentiments with which the first human beings were created, in a less corrupted state. It is based upon the assumed premise, that whatever obtains the general credence of mankind, is the immediate dictate of nature, and consequently must be regarded as having the divine sanction. "Omni autem in re, consensio omnium gentium lex naturae putanda est." This universal belief in a future life, is not the effect of education, nor is it the result of any process of reasoning; it is an original law of our nature. All men are so constituted that they have an instinctive hope and expectation of surviving death. The feeling is especially strong in the noblest and most gifted minds. "Inhaeret in mentibus quasi saeculorum quoddam augurium futurorum; idque in maximis ingeniis altissimisque animis et exsistit maxime et apparet facillime." It is a revelation, in the soul, of the divine will and purpose concerning its destinies, and, as such, is entitled to as full confidence as the dictates of reason or the perceptions of sense.

Were such the true origin of the very general belief of mankind in a future life, the conclusion which is drawn from it would be irresistible.

But unfortunately for the argument, there are other and less authoritative sources, from which it may have sprung. Lord Bacon, in treating of the different errors which are wont to preoccupy the minds of men to the prejudice of truth, divides them into several classes, one of which he denominates "idols of the Tribe." The ideas and opinions belonging to this class affect alike the entire race. They grow out of common features in the constitutions of men and common circumstances in the conditions under which they are placed. They have their origin especially in the limited and imperfect character of our rational and perceptive faculties, and in the influence which the various passions and desires exert over them. Hence the almost universal belief in signs and omens and dreams, in good and bad fortune, in lucky and unlucky days, in astrology, in vaticination, in spectres, in witches, and in demons. Hence, too, the various forms of superstition which, in the absence of true religion, have so constantly usurped its place in the minds of men. Universality of belief is therefore not alone sufficient evidence of the truth of any opinion. It may have sprung immediately from the intuitions of our rational or moral natures; it is then true. It may have been legitimately drawn from facts taken in connection with those intuitions; it is then also true. Or it may have had its origin in some one of the sources above referred to, and be only an idol of the tribe. In the latter case it may indeed be true, but the universality of its belief affords no evidence of it. For however widely or however long it may have received the homage of truth, it is not the less an idol on that account.

The general principle, therefore, "omnium consensus naturae vox est," which the Roman orator assumes as the basis of his argument, requires important modifications and restrictions. Without these it is not true; and, if adopted and reasoned upon as such, would, in numerous instances, inevitably lead to false conclusions.

But notwithstanding the want of universality in the principle, may it not hold in reference to the case before us, and so be all that is necessary to the argument? Is not the general belief of mankind in the immortality of the soul, in fact an immediate dictate of nature? We think not. We think it has neither the directness, nor the force, nor the universality of an original principle of belief. This we suppose to be sufficiently evident from the want of proof, which has been so generally felt, and which philosophers, moralists and divines have so frequently endeavored to supply. No one ever thought of proving or requiring proof that two and two make four, that the whole is greater than any of its parts, that what we see or feel or gain a knowledge of by any of the senses, actually exists, that every change is produced by

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Instinctive Love of Existence.

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some cause, that virtue is more engaging than vice, innocence more lovely than guilt, fidelity more deserving than treachery. These and numerous other similar truths, force the assent of the mind immediately on being presented to it. Any attempt to demonstrate them would be alike useless and futile. They are necessarily involved in every process of reasoning, and are, consequently, incapable of deriving support from any. They have their foundation in the mind itself, and are so firmly planted, that they equally spurn the aid and defy the attempts of all logic. Such surely is not the character of that earnest desire, that trembling hope, that prevailing expectation of a future life which, in every age, has been the highest attainment of those who, aided by the simple light of nature, have investigated the subject most seriously and most profoundly.

The true explanation of the phenomenon under consideration, must be sought, as we think, partly in that instinctive love of existence, that "dread and horror of falling into nought," which is natural to man, and which was designed in the framing of his constitution to prevent under any circumstances self-destruction, and partly in the presages of conscience, taken in connection with the moral government of God, which he sees plainly commenced in this life, but of which the completion can take place only in another. So far as the belief in question has its origin in the former of these sources, it is a mere idol of the tribe, and the wide extent to which it has at all times received homage, confers upon it no title to respect. So far however as it comes from the latter source, its deduction we think is legitimate, and the fact of the almost universal prevalence of the doctrine, must be regarded as of real weight in establishing the probability of a future life. But of this we shall have occasion to speak further on.

Passing over a period of nearly two thousand years, we propose next to examine the argument of bishop Butler, contained in the first chapter of his immortal work on the Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of nature, to which allusion has already been made. It is not easy to conceive a more perfect contrast to the Tusculan questions than is presented by this work. Destitute of all ornament, and addressed purely to the understanding and the reason, it has little interest for readers who require to be allured by the charm of imagery, or the attractions of style. In the conduct of this noble defence of religion, no aid is sought from any of the lighter powers of the mind, but on the contrary, they are sternly rebuked away, as altogether impertinent and out of place in discussions pertaining to so grave a theme. At the same time there are evinced a precision of thought and comprehensiveness of view, as well as a powVOL. VI. No. 21.

6

er of delicate analysis, of subtle discrimination, and of rigid logical deduction which were unknown to the Roman orator, and which make it no boy's play to grapple in argument with the English theologian and philosopher.

We think, however, it must be admitted that the author of the Analogy is less successful, perhaps less fortunate in his efforts to demonstrate the doctrine of a future life, than in any other portion of his great work. Both of the main arguments employed by him, are no less applicable to the lower animals than to man, and just as much prove the immortality of the living principle connected with the minutest insect or humblest infusoria, as of the human soul. It is not a little remarkable that this fact which in reality converts the attempted proof into a reductio ad absurdum of the principles from which it is drawn, should not have awakened in the cautious mind of Butler a suspicion of their soundness, and led him to seek other means of establishing the truth in question. These he would have found, and as we think, far better suited to his purpose, in the facts and principles so ably and so fully set forth in his chapters on the moral government of God, and on probation considered as a means of discipline and improvement. Indeed, we have always been of the opinion that these two chapters contain the only real and solid grounds for belief in a future life which the work presents; the considerations adduced in the one particularly appropriated to that object, serving at furthest only to answer objections to the doctrine. But let us examine his argu

ments.

The first is from the analogy of nature. Without the explanations and illustrations by which it is accompanied, it is simply this. "From our being born into the world, in the helpless and imperfect state of infancy, and having arrived from thence to mature age, we find it to be a general law of nature in our own species, that the same creatures, the same individuals, should exist in degrees of life and perception, with capacities of action, of enjoyment and suffering, in one period of their being greatly different from those appointed to them in another period of it. And in other creatures the same law holds." "Therefore, that we are to exist hereafter in a state as different (suppose) from our present as this is from our former, is but according to the analogy of nature; according to a natural order or appointment of the very same kind with that we have experienced."

This argument, as we think must be apparent to every one upon reflection, does not really touch the question of a future life. The most that it goes to show, is that if there be a future life, it will probably differ widely in its character and circumstances from the present,

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Argument in Butler's Analogy.

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and that the different periods of that life will in like manner differ widely from one another.

same.

sect.

From this

The chry

Life in this world everywhere moves in cycles. Of these, some are of greater and some of less magnitude. Some embrace a period of many years, others are completed in a few days. At each successive point of these cycles, life is constantly assuming new phases, so that it never continues for two consecutive moments in all respects the But however numerous these phases may be, and however widely they may differ from one another, the movement is always in the form of a curve returning into itself, and never in a straight line of indefinite progression. This general law is well illustrated by the metamorphoses of most insects. There is first the egg. springs a worm. The worm is changed into a chrysalis. salis in due time bursting its envelop, issues from it a perfect inFrom the perfect insect proceed other eggs. These give rise to new worms, destined in turn to pass through the same round of changes; and so on interminably. The metamorphoses which all the higher animals undergo in passing through the successive stages of their development, are scarcely less remarkable, although as they take place for the most part during the embryonic period, they are less open to observation, and therefore less generally known. In some of the lower Articulata, the successive phases of existence are still more varied and striking. There are not only numerous metamorphoses, but successive generations, each differing widely from that which preceded it. In the case of the Distoma Hepaticum, it is only in the fourth, and in some species of Aphides not till the eighth generation even, that the descendant returns to the form, structure and habits of the original progenitor.1

Now the only inference that can be drawn from all this by analogy is, that should the existence of man be extended into a future life so as to embrace a much wider cycle than it does at present, or should it be indefinitely prolonged and its type changed from the form of the cycle to that of a direct line in endless progression, it will probably continue to present, as it has hitherto done, new phases of character at each of the successive stages through which it is carried. Whether or not man be destined to experience such an extension of his being, is a question which these analogies by no means reach. Indirectly they may serve to answer objections to the doctrine of a future life, on the ground of its necessarily being so unlike the present; for they not only prove that God is able to continue the same being in existence under conditions and circumstances widely different, but show