more than the superstructure includes the foundation on which it is built. Revelation implies a revealer; it must first be known, then, that there is a being to reveal, before it can be known that anything is revealed. Until natural theology has done its work, all other theology is impossible.

Nor does revelation come in to aid and assist us in this work. Revelation is out of place, cannot be appealed to as authority, until natural theology has first established this primary truth, that besides and beyond man there is a being capable of revealing himself, and eternal truth, to man.

Manifestly, then, it is of the highest importance that a science. which lies thus at the foundations of all other theological truth, should be well and thoroughly wrought, and carefully adjusted to its true position. There should be no flaw in the arguments. No part of the work should be slightly done. It should not be left to the enemies of truth to make the first discovery of any existing defect or weakness in the processes of our reasoning. In this matter, the friends of truth have more at stake than its enemies. He who points out a defect, or suggests an improvement, in the method of stating or defending that truth, should be regarded not as a foe but as a friend to the cause. Yet, strange as it may seem, no department of theology perhaps has been left in so unfinished a state as this; none stands in greater need of what military men term inspection. The work has been wrought upon by diverse minds, in different ages, and in diverse methods; each in his own way has wrought. Some of the laborers have been truly sons of might, men of lofty and noble powers. But how well the diverse parts of the structure are fitted to each other, what are the strong and what the weak points in the line of defences, how and where it can most readily be assailed, these are to say the least open questions.

What we propose, in the present essay, is to take a general survey of this department of theological science, with a view of ascertaining, if possible, the comparative strength, and value, of the different arguments generally relied upon to establish the cardinal doctrine of the divine existence.

For this purpose some method of classification becomes necessary. It has been common to arrange the various arguments in natural theology under the general methods a priori and a posteriori. It admits of question however whether, strictly speaking, there is any such thing as a priori reasoning on this subject; any such thing as reasoning from some high and abstract truth downward to the existence of a supreme being; whether, in fact, all arguments for that existence

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Different Methods of Procedure.

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must not and do not have some starting point, some яov σ7, in the world of effect.

Take for instance the argument of Clark, usually pronounced one of the finest specimens of this method of reasoning. The starting point in this instance is that something exists; from which it is, by a logical process, inferred that something has always existed-something uncaused, independent, the first cause of all other existence. The whole argument goes to show that this something which now exists is in reality an effect, and requires a cause. It cannot therefore with propriety be termed a priori reasoning, since it does not proceed from cause to effect, but on the contrary from effect to cause.

The celebrated argument of Descartes, derived from the idea of God in the human mind, is another instance of what has been usually called the a priori method. The substance of the argument is, that there could not be this idea of a supreme being in the human mind, unless there were a corresponding being, the type and originator of the idea; in other words, this idea of God, which man has, is an effect, which requires God as its cause. Is this reasoning from cause to effect, or the reverse!

Presuming then that there is, strictly speaking, only one general method of procedure in conducting the argument for the divine existence, viz. the a posteriori, it becomes evident that what we have to do is precisely this; to bring forward, from whatever source, something which can be shown to be an effect, and then to show, moreover, that for the existence of this effect there is and must be not simply a cause, but such a cause as corresponds to our idea of God. The effect must be such as to require for its production all that which we include under the term God. For it is evident that, in reasoning from effect to cause, we can infer no more in the cause than is sufficient to account for the effect. This principle has been strangely overlooked, however, by many writers. They have set out with a definite idea in their own minds of what God is, and having demonstrated, as they suppose, the existence of an effect, and so of a cause, they conclude that they have also demonstrated the existence of the being whom they call God, without pausing to inquire whether the effect in question is of such a nature as to require for its production just that sort of cause which they have in mind, and which they thus designate. The truth is, we are dependent on the effect for all our positive knowledge of the cause, --not simply that it is, but what it is; not simply that there is a God, but what sort of a being God is. The cause may be more than commensurate with the effect,-adequate to the production of effects vastfy beyond this which we observe; but we do not know that it is so,

have no evidence of that, and therefore no certainty of it. What we have to do then in natural theology is, first to find something which can be clearly shown to be an effect, and then to show, furthermore, that it is such an effect, as requires for its production not a cause, merely, but the cause whose existence we wish to establish, and which we call God.

The arguments on which different theological writers have placed reliance, are manifold and diverse; yet they admit of being reduced to several classes, or leading divisions, according to the sources from which they are derived.

There is first the argument from the simple existence of matter the ground-work and simple premise of which is this proposition, 'something is.'

There is next the argument from the properties and relations of matter; not merely something is, but something is so and so. The argument from design, commonly so called, falls under this division.

Both the methods now indicated relate to the external world, things without. They are the arguments on which English and American theologians have hitherto placed their chief reliance, and with which they have principally concerned themselves. But arguments which others have deemed at least of equal strength and importance have been drawn from the world within. Of this sort is the method of reasoning from the idea of God which exists in man, in other words from the nature and operation of the human mind.

Then deeper and beyond this, in the inner world, there is the moral nature and constitution of man, which also furnishes an argument for the divine existence. These four comprise, it is believed, the various arguments which have been generally relied on to prove the exist ence of the supreme being.

I. The argument from the existence of matter, claims our first attention. It may be thus expressed. Something exists, therefore something must always have existed; either the things which now are, or else some other and superior being capable of producing them. But the things which now are, the present system and universe of things, lying about us, subject to ur observation, of which we form a part, this cannot have been in existence from eternity; is not independent, self-existent, and uncaused. Therefore some other being is so, and is the first cause and author of these things.

This has been regarded by many as one of the strongest arguments which it is possible to frame in proof of the existence of a first cause. Reduced to the syllogistic form, it would read thus:

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Analysis of the Argument.

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1st Syllogism.

1. Whatever exists must either have eternally existed, or have begun to exist.

2. But matter has not existed eternally.

3. Therefore matter begun to exist.

2d Syllogism.

1. But whatever begins to exist, has some cause of beginning.

2. Matter begun to exist.

3. Therefore matter has some cause of its existence; in other words a producer or creator.

It is evident now at a glance on what portion of the argument the burden of proof mainly falls. In either syllogism, the major premise is obviously true; self-evident; it is the minor alone that requires proof. To show that the present system of things is not eternal, that it had a beginning, hic opus, hoc labor est. Unless this can be clearly and certainly established, the whole argument falls. You have not shown an effect, and cannot therefore demand a cause. Now this is precisely the point which it is most difficult to establish, and which nevertheless seems to have been comparatively overlooked, and hastily passed over by many writers, not sufficiently aware of its importance and difficulty. It is manifestly not so much the existence as the begun existence of matter that concerns us in the present argument. And how is this to be proved? For in an argument of this sort we are not to take a mere impression, a conviction of the mind, however firm, as a sufficient basis of reasoning, but to demand clear and conclusive evidence. What then is the evidence that the present system of things, or that matter in general, began to exist, and is not from eternity?

Various have been the methods by which different writers have attempted to establish this. Prominent among them are these two. 1. The present system of things cannot be eternal because it is composed of successive and finite parts. Generation succeeds generation, plant succeeds plant, man follows man, and so on in constant series and progression. Each part being finite, the whole cannot be infinite. 2. It cannot be eternal because it admits of change, which is inconsist ent with absolute and necessary existence.

The first of these arguments proceeds on the supposition that an infinite whole cannot be composed of a series of parts each of which is finite; in other words, that an infinite series of finite parts is impos

sible. This has been called a self-evident proposition. It may be fairly questioned, however, whether the evidence of its truth lies so fully obvious as to merit that high claim. Can we not conceive of extension or of duration infinitely protracted through successive periods, each of which is finite, yet, because they are infinite in series, making an infinite whole. If the successive periods or parts, though finite, are without number, so that you cannot fix your thoughts upon any one of them, and say this is the first, or that is the last, is not the series, in that case infinite? Indeed, what other idea can any man form of the existence of God than this, of a being existing from eternity in successive periods of conscious duration. An eternal now,' however bold and sublime as a figure of poetic diction, yet, strictly interpreted, is an expression to which it is utterly impossible for the human mind, constituted as it is, to attach any clear and intelligible idea, for the simple reason that if it means anything, it means that which to us can never be true, but only a contradiction in terms. We might safely challenge any man to form in his own mind a distinct idea of the existence of a conscious intelligent being, from which idea and from whose existence all succession of thought, feeling and event shall be entirely excluded.

Does the finiteness of the parts destroy the infinity of the whole? Let us apply this to the divine existence. If there be a God, the first cause and producer of all things, he must have existed before he created; creation is an event, has a date, a beginning, previous to which the Deity existed alone. We may in our thoughts then divide the duration of the Deity into these two parts, in the first of which he dwells alone, in the second, surrounded with created existence. The two make up the entire duration of the Deity; yet both are finite; for the first ends, and the other begins, at the moment of creation. We may and do then, without inconsistency, or contradiction, conceive of finite parts, yet an infinite whole. It may be said that the duration of the Deity is in reality unbroken and continuous. This is admitted. But the same is also true of all existence so long as it continues. Succession of parts does not interrupt the series. The line may be in reality unbroken, yet in its extension may be carried through a succession of inches without number. A single human life is, from the moment of its beginning, to the instant of its termination, a continuous existence, an unbroken thread; yet it is no inconsistency to speak of it as composed of successive parts. Protract that existence, that continuous thread, infinitely in either direction, and you have an infinite series of finite parts.

Is eternal succession impossible? Let us apply this also to the di