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Infinite Succession.

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vine existence. It will be generally admitted that in the divine mind there is succession of thought and feeling. As has been already said, we can form no intelligible idea of a conscious rational existence, which is entirely destitute of this element. We do not, in fact, conceive of God as cherishing toward the sinner repenting to-day, the same emotions with which he regarded the same sinner impenitent and obdurate yesterday. Nor do we conceive of Him as putting forth, at one and the same instant, all volitions and all acts; as constantly creating this world, or constantly redeeming it, or as creating and redeeming it at one and the same moment. Succession of events enters into all our conceptions of divine agency, as does succession of thought and feeling into all our ideas of the divine existence. Unless then the Deity has existed, at some time, absolutely without thoughts, emotion, or volition, there has actually been an infinite succession of these in the divine mind.

Of the existence of saints and angels, and in like manner of our own future existence, we can form no other idea than this of constant succession through endless duration. The joy, and the song, and the intellectual employment, of an angel before the throne to-day, is not the joy, and the song, and the range of thought, of that same angel as he stood before that throne yesterday and worshipped. And if we are ourselves to exist hereafter and that endlessly, it will be an existence protracted through successive periods of duration, marked by successive events, successive thoughts and emotions, following each other in endless series and progression. In these cases, however, the succession though endless is not strictly infinite, since it is admitted to have had a beginning. Not so however as regards the Deity. In any case we have only to make the supposition of eternal existence, and infinite succession becomes not only possible but seems to follow as a sure consequence. The law of succession then cannot be relied on to prove a begun existence.

It is not necessary, however, to demonstrate that there is any such thing, in fact, as infinite or eternal succession; but only, that such a thing can, without absurdity, or contradiction, be conceived to exist; that it is not impossible. In either case the objection is valid, and the argument is overthrown; for it is claimed, by those who advance this argument, to be a plain and self-evident truth, that such a thing as infinite succession is impossible.

A new element however is introduced into the discussion, when we conceive of the series as composed not merely of successive finite parts, but of parts that are successively dependent each on the other. Plants, animals, men, exist not merely in succession, but each genera

tion depends for its existence on that which preceded. Inasmuch as each part is dependent, can the whole be independent? Can there be an infinite series, every part of which had a beginning, but the series itself no beginning; a chain, each link of which depends on another, but the whole on nothing.

That the argument is not materially modified by the introduction of this new element, will appear on a little reflection. In any argument or illustration of this sort, as for instance that of the chain, ideas derived from things finite are carried forward and applied to things infinite, and it is more than possible that some fallacy may lurk under such a method of reasoning. Because there cannot be a chain of numberless iron links suspended in the air without some point of support out of itself, it does not follow that there cannot be, or that there has not been, an infinite series of generations of living men, plants, or animals, in the world, each starting from the preceding, yet the whole series independent on any external producing cause. If the series be infinite, it is for that very reason, and by the very supposition, independent also. There is a virtual petitio principii involved in this reasoning. It is confidently asked on what the whole chain hangs, thus presuming a first link; whereas, if the chain be infinite, according to the supposition, it has no first link. What produced the first man, plant, animal, of a series which is infinite, and therefore has no first? Where did that begin, which by the very supposition has no beginning.

And where does he who so confidently propounds this query, as if it were the end of all controversy, propose to suspend his chain of existence? On a great first link, of course, and that link infinite and endless, itself unsupported, and hanging upon nothing. Has he ever seen such a chain? Is it not evident that this method of reasoning by illustrations drawn from sensible objects, is, whatever its logical value and force, an instrument capable of turning in either direction, and quite as likely to operate against, as for, him who uses it.

We come directly back then, after all, to the simple question, already discussed, can there be any such thing as an infinite succession or series. Whatever may be the true answer to this problem, the considerations now suggested are, it would seem, sufficient to show that the alleged impossibility of such a thing as infinite or eternal succession is, to say the least, not a self-evident proposition. In an argument of this sort, derived from the abstract laws of being or nature of things, an argument so positive withal in its assertions, and so lofty in its claims, the mind demands, and has a right to demand, clear and positive evidence of the things asserted. When the atheist

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Unequal Infinities - Necessary Existence.

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affirms that the present system and order of things is actually an eternal series, without beginning or cause, we demand proof; when the theist affirms that an infinite series is an impossibility, we demand of him likewise the irresistible evidence of what he asserts. It may be fairly questioned whether either theist or atheist can make good his assertion; whether both have not undertaken to prove what cannot be proved. Certainly the mere possibility of an eternal series, even if it were granted, is no evidence that the present system is in fact such a series. On the other hand the argument under consideration fails to furnish clear and sufficient proof that the present order of things is a begun arrangement, an effect.

It has been shrewdly objected to the idea of infinite succession that in this way we should obtain infinite quantities that are unequal to each other, one infinite greater than another infinite; that if the generations are infinite, the number of individuals must be vastly greater than that of generations, and the number of eyes, limbs, etc., so many times greater than that of individuals, and so we have one infinite ten times as large as another infinite, and that again just half as large as another, which it is affirmed is sheer absurdity. So reasons Bentley, and others after him have attained to the same sharpness. The dialectic subtilty of this objection is more worthy of admiration than its logical force. Are all infinites equal of necessity? Where is the evidence of that? Clark, the very Philistine of dialectic warfare, confesses the futility of this reasoning. "To ask whether the parts of unequal quantities be equal in number or not, when they have no number at all, being the same thing as to ask whether two lines drawn from differently distant points, and each of them continued infinitely, be equal in length, or not, that is whether they end together, when neither of them have any end at all!"'1

The other argument by which metaphysical writers have endeavored to prove that the present system of things is not eternal, viz. that it admits of change, next demands attention. It is contended that if the world has existed from eternity and is uncaused, the ground of its being is in itself alone, in other words it is a necessary existence, a thing which it is an absurdity, and a contradiction to suppose not to exist. But all change or modification is inconsistent with the idea of necessary existence. If the world is a necessary existence then it can never have been, or be supposed to have been, other than it now is, in any respect. It would be a contradiction, and absurdity, to suppose it either larger, or smaller, than it actually is; either swifter or slower, in its movements; having more, or fewer, mountains, rivers,

1 Demonst. p. 35.

seas, plants, animals, than it now has. Everything is fixed by the law of absolute unalterable necessity. But such is not the fact with respect to the present system. It admits of and is constantly undergoing change, and cannot therefore be eternal. Such is substantially the reasoning of Clark in his celebrated demonstration.

With all deference to the great minds that have elaborated, and the great names that have endorsed this argument, it may nevertheless be called in question; the more so, that it has ever professed itself fearless of scrutiny, and boldly challenged investigation.

Where then, it may be asked, is the evidence that all change is inconsistent with self-existence; how do we know that? Let the same method of reasoning be applied to the divine existence. The Deity it will be admitted exists by a necessity of his own nature; owes his existence to nothing out of himself. It is impossible then, according to this argument, to conceive of him either as not existing, or as being other than he is. But how is this? Since I can conceive the world not to exist, can I not also, in that case, conceive the world-maker not to be; the work being gone, what forbids my supposing there is no workman? Or I can conceive that it is self-existent, and then, being no longer an effect, it does not demand a cause. Or I can conceive it to be a different sort of world from what it is, in which case it may have required a different kind of Deity to produce it. Had it been a malevolent effect, I should have inferred a malevolent cause. word, there is no inconsistency or absurdity in modifying our conceptions of the maker, in such a manner as to correspond to any changes we may make in our conceptions of the things made. If it be not absurd or impossible to conceive of the world as not existing, or as existing otherwise than now, then it is not absurd or impossible to conceive of the Deity as not existing, or as being other than he now is. But it is a contradiction in terms, says Clark, to suppose a selfexistent, that is, a necessarily existent being, not to exist, or to be other than it is. Therefore, he says, this world is not self-existent. Therefore, he might add, also, the Deity is not self existent.

In a

But in those conceptions which the mind ordinarily forms, and is taught to form, of the Deity, is there not involved something of this forbidden element, of transition from one state or circumstance of being, to another; do we not conceive of him, now as working, now as resting from his works; and that without any implied change in his nature, or attributes? Now, who will say that in this transition of the supreme being, from the state of absolute rest, and alone existence, to that greatest of all conceivable works, creation, the calling into being other existences, and innumerable worlds, and systems, there

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1849.] All Change not inconsistent with necessary Existence. is not involved a change at least as great as occurs on the earth, in the gradual passing away of one generation, and the succession of another, the falling of a tree in the forest, and the springing up of another in its place, or the gradual changes constantly going on in the relative position of mountain and valley, of land and sea? For in these transitions which we observe, this constant succession of things in the world, is it not a change of state and circumstances, rather than of nature or essential qualities, that we behold? How do we know that all this does not take place in nature according to some fixed, eternal law, founded in the very nature of things, as immutable in its character, as unvarying in its operations, existing by a necessity as absolute, as the Deity itself the universal, eternal, immutable law of transition and succession? What forbids such a supposition, and what is there in it inconsistent with the idea of self-existence? Where is the evidence that these and the like transitions have not been going on eternally?

But however that may be, if we can and do conceive of the supreme being as working, or as resting from his works, as existing for a longer or a shorter time before beginning to create, as calling into existence more or fewer planets, systems, orders of being, as having never created, if in any or all these respects we can, without absurdity, suppose the Deity to have been, or to have done, far otherwise than he has actually been, or done, if it be, in fact, no more a contradiction to reason, and to the actual state of things, to make such a supposition than it is to suppose the world different from what it now is, then how does it appear that all change, and even the very conception and possibility of change, is inconsistent with necessary and eternal existence? And if this be not inconsistent with the necessary existence of the Deity, why should it be with that of the universe, or of being in general?

But to suppose a self-existent being not to exist, or to exist otherwise than it is, involves as great an absurdity, says Clark, as to suppose two and two not to be equal to four. But suppose one were to deny this. Suppose some one, less acute than the great philosopher, were audacious enough to say, "To my mind this does not so appear, nor can I possibly make it appear thus;" what shall be done with this man? How shall he be made to perceive the alleged absurdity? Is not his denial of any such absurdity, as valid in argument, as our assertion of it? To say the least, is it not somewhat singular that, if this be as its advocates affirm a self-evident truth, so many, and by no means illiterate, or ill-informed minds, should have confessed themselves unable to perceive its conclusiveness?

The argument under consideration, however subtle and ingenious, has failed to commend itself generally to reflecting minds, much more