to the popular apprehension. Dr. Reid says of it, "These are the speculations of men of superior genius; but whether they be solid as they are sublime, or whether they be the wanderings of imagination into a region beyond the limits of the human understanding, I am unable to determine." Dr. Brown speaks with more confidence: “I conceive the abstract arguments which have been adduced to show that it is impossible for matter to have existed from eternity — by reasoning on what has been termed necessary existence, and the incompatibility of this necessary existence with the qualities of matter - to be relics of the mere verbal logic of the schools, as little capable of producing conviction, as any of the wildest and most absurd of the technical scholastic reasonings on the properties or supposed properties of entity and non-entity." Dr. Chalmers also professes himself entirely unsatisfied with this argument, and unimpressed by it. "Because I can imagine Jupiter to be a sphere instead of a spheroid; and no logical absurdity stands in the way of such imagination, therefore Jupiter must have been created. Because he has only four satellites, whilst I can figure him to have ten; and there is not the same arithmetical falsity in this supposition as in that three and one make up ten, therefore all the satellites must have had a beginning. We must acknowledge ourselves to be unimpressed by such reasoning. For aught I know, or can be made by the light of nature to believe matter may, in spite of those dispositions which he calls arbitrary, have the necessity within itself of its own existence and yet be neither a logical nor a mathematical necessity. It may be a physical necessity the ground of which I understand not, because placed transcendentally above my perceptions and my powers—or lying immeasurably beyond the range of my contracted and ephemeral observation." - The metaphysical argument against the eternity of the present system has been somewhat differently stated by a late ingenious writer. -The world might have had a beginning — there is nothing to forbid such a supposition. If it might have had a beginning, then it might have had a cause whatever admits of the one, admits of the other. But if it might have had a cause, then it must have had one-for whatever is capable of having a cause of its existence, is incapable of existing without a cause. We have here, to use an artistic term, a variation of the original theme, sprightly and pleasing, but embodying the same essential idea. It devolves on the reasoner, in this case, to show, inasmuch as he throws the whole weight of the argument on that one word, that the world might have had a beginning; that it is possible for anything, for such a thing, for this particular thing, to 1849.] Necessity of resorting to Physical Science. 625 come into existence out of nothing; and also to show that whatever can be caused, cannot be uncaused; neither of which propositions can easily or clearly be made out by any abstract process of reasoning. Suppose, in the present instance, an obstinate objector were to insist upon reversing this argument, as an engineer reverses his machine and so obtains movement and speed in a contrary direction. Suppose he were to say, It is possible that the world should have had no beginning; it might have been eternal. If it might have had no beginning, then it might have had no cause. But if it might have had no cause, then it must have had none, for whatever admits of being uncaused does not admit of being caused. It will be observed that in this investigation we have not been careful to distinguish between the existence of matter in the abstract, and its existence in the present state and system of things, as we find it in our world. The argument, in fact, includes both; nor is the distinction essential to it, since if the non-eternity either of matter abstractly, or of our world as we find it, were once clearly established, we obtain in either case the demonstration of a first cause. Whether this point can be established by any abstract process of reasoning is, to say the least, altogether questionable. As brought to prove the present system an effect, and so to establish the existence of a first cause, the metaphysical argument must, on the whole, it would seem, be pronounced unsatisfactory and unsound. When once this point is established, the method in question may, however, be of service in demonstrating the self-existence, independence, and eternity of that first cause, which can perhaps in no other way be so clearly shown. How then, it will be asked, since not in this way, is that most important point, absolutely essential indeed to the argument, and to the whole science of natural theology, to be made certain? That the present system, this world of ours, had a beginning, may, we believe, be clearly shown, if not metaphysically, yet in some other way. The physical sciences have it for their appropriate sphere and province to do this; and they can do it to the satisfaction, it would seem, of any reasonable mind. They can and do show that the present things have not always been; that our earth has passed through a series of changes, always advancing. In the deep foundations of the globe itself, they read the sure history of these changes, written as with an iron pen, and lead, in the rock, forever. They carry us, with unerring step, back to a period in that history when, instead of the present highly organized forms of matter, and of life, there is no longer the least perceptible trace of any organization whatever. Back of the VOL. VI. No. 24. 53 ever rushing stream of time, and beneath its mighty cataract, they conduct us along, till we reach the spot where all forms of organized being finally disappear, and we stand on "termination rock;" beyond all is darkness; we can go no further; but the conclusion irresistibly forces itself upon the mind, uttered as with the sound of many waters, that this unorganized matter, too, had its beginning. But however that may be, one thing is now certain, that life in all its varieties of structure and development, life in the plant, the animal, the human species, had a beginning. We reach, we examine, a point in the earth's history when, as yet, there were none of these things. But if these things began, there must have been a beginner; one capable of producing such things. The existence of a first cause is thus reached. In all this, however, we are reasoning not from metaphysics but from physics. So doing, we build not upon airy abstractions, but upon the firm and solid earth. II. We come now to the second method or argument in natural theology, an argument not from the existence of matter, but from its manifest properties, and relations. The starting point, the nov azw, is entirely changed; the scene is laid, not in the distant places of the universe, but near at home, amid the daily walks and under the common observation of men; the argument rests, not on the abstract truth that matter, or even our world, exists, but that it is such a sort of world as we find it to be. The strongly practical tendencies of the English mind have made this a favorite method of reasoning with theological writers of that country, especially for the last century; previously to which the metaphysical reasoning of Clark, and others of that school, held, for at time, predominant influence. The argument is that in the world, as it lies before us, there are such evident indications of contrivance, such adaptation of means to ends, such fitness of one thing to another, as can leave no reasonable mind in doubt that an intelligent, designing mind has been concerned in the arrangement; in other words, that there must have been a contriver. What, now, is the real strength and true value of this argument? Has it sound logic, and a sound philosophy, as its basis and support? In proposing and conducting such inquiries, let us not be understood as disparaging, much less abandoning, this method of reasoning, but rather as diligently carrying on a sort of coast-survey and soundings, with a view to ascertain the true depth of the channel, and its proper direction. The more important the channel, the more important that such survey and soundings should be accurately and thoroughly made. It must be borne in mind that, whatever method we pursue in natu 1849.] Evidence necessary to establish Design. 627 ral theology, the things to be done, as stated at the outset, are these two: first, to show conclusively that something is an effect; then, that it is such an effect, as to require for its producing cause whatever we include under the name and idea of God. Does then the argument from design, as now stated, really accomplish these two things? In order to settle this point, we must first determine what degree and kind of evidence is necessary in order to prove anything to be an effect. How are we to know what is effect, and what is not? The real question is, not what proves a designer, but what proves design. Does simple fitness of means to an end prove it? This is assumed, it will be perceived, in the argument now under consideration. It is the running principle that pervades and holds together the entire body of reasoning in Paley's justly admired treatise; the warp, that receives the entire filling, with all its beautiful devices. The design of the work, and object of the writer, is evidently this, to point out in nature a considerable number of instances, as striking as possible, of this manifest fitness of means to a given end,— and thence to draw the conclusion, from the facts observed, that this fitness must have been designed, must be an effect, and therefore requires an efficient cause or producer. It is assumed that simple fitness of means to an end is a sufficient basis on which to construct the argument, is in itself demonstration that the system of things, which exhibits such arrangement and relation of parts, must be an effect. The whole argument from design, as usually brought forward by its advocates, rests upon this essential premise, which, instead of assuming, it had been well perhaps to have examined somewhat thoroughly, before proceeding to build so important a structure upon it. This seems nowhere to have been done. Everywhere it is taken for granted, that fitness of things to given ends is contrivance, and so proves a contriver. But is this invariably and necessarily so? Is there no element overlooked in this process? Does simple fitness to an end, however striking and admirable that fitness may be, in itself prove design? Is it of no consequence that we should know whether this relation and fitness of things, which we call contrivance, is a begun arrangement, or not? If in proposing these inquiries, we seem to be striking at the very foundation of the argument from design, as usually advanced, it is only that we may replace that argument upon a firmer basis. The question is one not to be determined at a glance. The simple fact that the human mind, whether rightly or wrongly, logically or illogically, does nevertheless almost universally reason in this manner, that where there is manifest fitness of things to given ends, there is design, there is an effect, somebody has been at work there, this of it self goes far toward establishing the correctness of the principle in question. But how is it, and why is it, that we invariably reason in this manner? This is a matter deserving the closest attention. Reid, Stewart, and the philosophers of that school, refer the matter to a primary law of the human mind. We are so constituted, that when we perceive this relation of things, this fitting of one thing to another so as to bring about a certain end, we are convinced that there must have been design there - contrivance a contriver; and in coming to this conclusion we simply carry out the law of our nature. Now it is easy to account for any phenomenon which we imperfectly understand, in this way; to refer it to a primary law of the mind, and say, we are so constituted, and that is the end of the matter. Nor is it easy for any one to show that such is not the true solution of the problem. It deserves to be considered, however, whether, in the present instance, such a principle will not carry us too far. If it be a primary law of the human mind that leads us to reason thus, then such reasoning is beyond question correct, and its conclusions valid. Wherever we see this fitness and relation of things, there it becomes certain that design has been employed. We have the best possible evidence of it, the testimony of this primary law of our own being, which, unless we are so constituted as to be always deceived, must speak the truth. Whatever presents to our mind, then, any fitness to a given end, is, beyond doubt, an effect, a contrivance; the greater and more manifest the fitness the greater and more sublime the end to be accomplished so much the greater the evidence and the certainty of this. Above all other beings and things, then, we must conclude the Deity to be an effect; for he, of all beings and things, presents to our conceptions the greatest and most manifest fitness to the greatest and sublimest ends. Nor is there any escape from this sad conclusion, but to retrace our steps, and proceed anew more cautiously. Perceiving the difficulties which are likely to attend this solution of the matter, others refer the whole thing to human experience. Of this number are Paley and Chalmers. It is not, according to them, because of any primitive law of the mind that we infer design where we see fitness to given ends, but simply because our own experience teaches us thus to reason. We have ourselves, in repeated instances, observed this fitness of things to be the result of special contrivance on our part, or on the part of others; have never perhaps, in a single instance, observed anything of it where it was not, to our knowledge and satisfaction, the result of such contrivance; we come, therefore, naturally to conclude that it is invariably so, and whenever we see |