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of itself, as we have shown, prove design. We must first know that this fitness, and the substance to which it pertains, is a begun arrangement, a begun existence; nor is there anything in the mere fitness, however striking that may be, to determine the point whether such fitness, and the subject or substance to which it pertains, be or be not, an effect, a begun arrangement, in distinction from existence uncaused and eternal. There is this essential defect in the argument from design as usually stated. It is the defect of Paley and other reasoners. They rely upon the fitness of things as of itself proving contrivance, irrespective of the question whether this fitness had a beginning or not.

The true method of establishing this first, chief, absolutely essential point in natural theology, that the present system of things is an effect, had a beginning, and a cause of beginning, has been already indicated. It is not for any process of reasoning, whether from the abstract existence of matter, or from its wonderful adaptations and arrangements, to set this matter in a clear light. It is for science only to do this. It is for her to trace out for us, in nature itself, the written demonstration not simply of the begun but of the recently begun existence of whatever forms of organized life dwell upon the earth, and in its waters;-to show us the relics and records of a period quite antecedent to this of ours, nay of many such periods; - and so to furnish us with the clearest evidence, that, whatever may be true of matter in the abstract, this fair and goodly frame of things which we now behold, and wherein we dwell, is an edifice of recent date. And this is enough for the purposes of the argument. To show that there is an effect, is to show that there is a cause. If these things began, there must have been a beginner.

Now it is at this precise point in the demonstration, and not at any previous stage in the process, that the argument from design falls into its proper place and use. The present things being not eternal but begun existences must be the result not of blind chance and mere fortuity, nor of an unintelligent unintentional agent, working without purpose or plan, and creating at random, but evidently and most manifestly they are the work of an intelligent and designing cause; there is order about them, forethought, intention, plan about them; they are mechanism, not mere effects; must therefore have had not a cause merely, but a contriver, capable of planning and executing such designs. The wisdom, skill, power, of the Being who made these things are thus demonstrated; to some extent also, though not with equal clearness, perhaps, his goodness, and his other moral attributes, are evinced.

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Argument from the idea of God.

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Such would seem to be the true province, the logical value, of the argument from design; - not to prove the world, or the present system of things, to be an effect, but, that being settled in another manner, to show what sort of an effect it is, and what sort of a cause is required to account for it; viz., such a cause as answers to the idea of God. It must follow, not precede, much less set aside, the testimony of physical science as to the origin of the present system. In its proper place it is valuable, indispensable; out of it, of little worth. Thus far we have considered only those arguments in natural theology which are derived from the external world. These may seem sufficient; perhaps they are so; but they are evidently not the whole field and scope of the science. They do not exhaust the theme. Beside this material system and mechanism that is in operation around us, this fair structure and frame of things without, there is in existence another and a different sort of world, immaterial, invisible, not less wonderful, not less replete it should seem with evidence of the mighty Maker, the inner world, the spiritual part of man. This again unfolds itself into a twofold division, the mental, and the moral nature; each of which furnishes independent evidence for the existence of a first cause. Upon this department of the subject, not less important than that which has already engaged our attention, nor less deserving a thorough investigation, we are compelled, by our already exceeded limits, to touch briefly if at all.

III. The argument, derived from the nature and constitution of the human mind. The argument which we are now to present admits of being stated in different forms, but is based on the essential fact that there is in the human mind an idea of such a being as God.

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The following is in substance the famous method of Descartes. Among the various ideas which I find in my mind is one of a very peculiar character, unlike all others, and which I am at a loss to account for, the idea, that is, of a being infinite, eternal, independent, immutable, the first cause of all other being. Sublime idea, and most wonderful withal! But how came I by such an idea? How shall the mysterious phenomenon be explained that into my mind, limited as it is in the range of its observation and reflection, the thought, the bare conception, of such and so vast a being, should enter? Whence came this idea to me? The qualities enumerated are such, and so excellent, that the more I reflect upon them the more sure I am that the idea of a being in whom they all reside, and that perfectly, could never have originated in my own mind; for how can the finite give birth to the infinite. Does it originate in the fact that I perceive in myself the negation, the absence of these qualities? But

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how came I to know that there were such qualities, and that I was destitute of them; how should I know my own imperfection and finiteness, if there were not already in my mind the idea of some perfect some infinite being, with whom to compare myself? Does it proceed from tradition? Then where did the tradition originate; whence came the idea of such a being to the mind that first entertained the thought, and handed it down to others? Is the mind so formed as to reach the thought spontaneously by its own natural cause and operations? Then who formed it so? Is it a simple matter of revelation? Then who revealed it? In fine, there is but one way in which we can account for this phenomenon, this idea in man of a being so unlike himself, and that is that the idea has its corresponding reality; that such a being does actually exist; and that this idea of him which we find in our minds, wrought into our very being, is the stamp and impression of the workman's name, set indelibly upon the work.

The force and validity of this reasoning depend entirely on its abil ity to show that the idea of God in the human mind is not only an effect, but such an effect as absolutely requires God for its cause. This it essays to do. That the idea in question is an effect of something is doubtless true, for it is not in the nature of an idea to be selfexistent or uncaused; but that it could not have originated in the mind itself by the mind's own simple action, is not so clear. It is not an easy matter, if it be indeed a possible thing, to trace any idea, and especially such an one, to its true source, and determine with precision and certainty its real origin. What is there in this idea which precludes the possibility of its being the product of the mind itself? Is it certain that the finite cannot reach the idea of the infinite? Is it absolutely necessary that there should actually exist, and be known by me to exist, a being more wise or powerful than myself, in order for me to discover that my wisdom and my power are limited? And does not the idea of the unlimited, the infinite, stand over against the idea of the limited and the finite, so that by the simple law of contrast, if we have one, we get the other also? Do not the differences which we observe among men, one being greatly superior to another in power, skill, etc., lead us naturally to conceive of one superior to them all, in whom may reside the perfection of these various qualities, and whose powers may be unlimited? If in any such manner it is possible for the mind, unaided from without, and in the exercise of its own proper faculties, to reach the idea of Deity, then it is not certain but the idea in question may in fact have thus originated. In other words the existence of the idea does not render certain the actual existence of the being corresponding to that idea, inasmuch as the existence of

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the idea can be accounted for in some other way. The argument labors at a disadvantage in undertaking to show positively that the idea in question could never have entered the human mind, had there been no such being as God in existence. This is more than can be determined with certainty. And yet it deserves to be considered well by us, more than we are wont to do in these exact and logical processes of reason, which call into exercise the intellect and not the heart, whether in fact the idea of such a being as God, the infinite, the uncaused, the eternal, the supreme, author of all being and perfection, be not something in itself more vast and wonderful than we have been accustomed to regard it; whether the simple conception and thought of such a being is not in itself, when duly considered, a grand and sublime mystery a thought before which all others in the mind ought to bow down in awe and reverence- -a thought which may be the very shadow cast upon the human soul, of that mysterious, incomprehensible, unseen one of whose being and presence it dimly informs us. Whatever may be the errors of the Cartesian philosophy, it has at least this element of truth and beauty, that it invests the idea of God in the human mind, regarded as a simple and pure conception, with a dignity and importance, and regards it with a reverence, well befitting its august and real character.

From the same source, the idea formed in the mind, Descartes derives also the following argument for the divine existence, which, though distinct from the one already stated, involves essentially the same principles.

Pertaining to this idea of God which is in the mind is this peculiarity, as I perceive, by which it differs from all other ideas, viz. that I cannot separate, in my thoughts, the ideal and the actual; cannot, as in all other cases, distinguish in my mind the existence from the essence; cannot divest my conception of the divine being of this element, or idea, that he does actually exist. Take away from me the conception which I form of this being as an actual, eternal, necessary existence, and you take away my whole idea of God; nothing is left in my mind, nor can I conceive of him in any other way. It must be, then, that actual, eternal, and necessary existence does really pertain to this being. For how do we determine, in any case, what are the essential qualities of any object? Is it not by observing that such and such qualities pertain to the very nature of the object, and are inseparable from it? I see clearly, for instance, whenever I think of a rectilinear triangle, that its angles are in amount equal to two right angles; cannot conceive of a rectilinear triangle of which this shall not be true. Hence I conclude that this equality of the angles to two VOL. VI. No. 24.

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right angles is something inseparable from the nature of such a triangle; and that whether there is any such thing as a triangle actually in existence or not. In like manner, when I think of God, the idea invariably presents itself of a being to whom actual and real existence pertains. Existence pertains to the highest perfection; and my only idea of God is that of a being every way perfect. I can no more conceive of an imperfect God, i. e. a God existing only in name, or idea, or supposition, and not in reality, than I can conceive of a triangle the sum of whose angles shall be less than two right angles.

This argument like the preceding is based on that cardinal doctrine of the Cartesian system, that every pure and simple idea has its corresponding objective reality, from which it originates, and of which it is but the tableau or image; and that whatever pertains inseparably and essentially to the idea, belongs also invariably to the reality; a principle we cannot here stay to discuss. That there is a fallacy, however, in the argument now stated, is obvious. It does not follow, because I conceive of a triangle possessing a certain property, and never think of it otherwise, that any such triangle exists, but only that if it exists, then this property belongs to it. Neither does it follow that any such being as God exists, simply because I conceive of him as existing, and as possessing certain properties, as eternal, independent, and necessary being; but only that if such a being exists, then these qualities may be supposed to belong to him. Nothing is, in reality, determined as to the previous question, whether there really is such a being.

Aside from this, it admits of question whether the premise is correct; whether there is, really and of necessity, this alleged difference between our ideas of God and our ideas of other objects; whether we cannot, if we will, conceive of God otherwise than as a real actual existence, in the same sense that we can conceive of a star of a certain magnitude and brilliancy, and having a certain position in the firmament, without at the same time being sure that such a star actually exists. But on this we cannot dwell.

It is somewhat remarkable that Dr. Clarke, though professing great abhorrence of the Cartesian philosophy and method of reasoning, should himself unconsciously have constructed an argument very like the one now presented. We refer to that part of his treatise in which he discourses respecting "the absolute impossibility of destroying or removing some ideas, as of eternity and immensity, which therefore must be modes or attributes of a necessary being, actually existing." "For," continues he, "if I have in my mind an idea of a thing, and cannot possibly in my imagination take away the idea of that thing as

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