As God has existed from eternity, so he will exist to eternity; to use the language of inspiration, "his years shall not fail." No conceivable reason can be assigned, why he should cease to be. There is no superior Being upon whom he is dependent for existence, and who might revoke his gift; and in his nature there is no principle of decay. From the one or the other of these causes, every other being might be annihilated or reduced to a state of unconsciousness; but the Creator is manifestly not exposed to their influence. "A principle," says Plato, "has no origin, for all things arose from a principle, but the first principle arises from nothing, neither were it a first principle, if it were originated by some other. And if it has no beginning, it can have no end." The eternity of God has been proved from his immensity in the following manner. "The mode of existence," says Gale, "always follows the mode of essence, because existence, according to the confession of the schools, adds nothing to essence but actuality; neither is it indeed really distinct from essence. Now duration is nothing else but continued existence; whence it necessarily follows, that if God's essence be infinite, his existence and duration must be also infinite."* But as we have not yet demonstrated the infinitude of the Divine Essence, we shall not deduce an argument from it in proof of its eternity. We think, that its eternity is manifest from its necessary existence; for hence, it is equally evident that it shall never cease to be, as it is that it never began to be. Necessity operates alike at all times. It is a permanent reason; it is the same now as it formerly was; and it will be the same hereafter as it is now. Contingent beings exist at one time, and may not exist at another, because there is nothing in their own nature which secures their continuance; but a necessary Being is immutable in duration. What he at present is, he always will be.

From what has been said, we perceive an important difference between the eternity of God and that which may be predicated of some of his creatures as angels and human spirits. Both are destined to exist for ever, but they are not necessarily immortal, and there is no contradiction in supposing them to be annihilated; nor is their existence without beginning, as it will be without end. There was a time when they were not; and all that can be said of them is, that having begun, they shall never cease, to exist. Their life is an interminable series; it will flow on without intermission, and never approach nearer to a close. It is an infinite duration, not absolutely, but as it is incommensurate, admits of no limits, and will be perpetually progressive. The eternity of God comprehends the past as well as the future, and is thus expressed by an inspired writer: "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting thou art God." And hence we may see why, although angels and the souls of men shall subsist for ever, it is said of God, that "he only hath immortality."‡ To him exclusively belongs the attribute of absolute, underived, independent, and necessary eternity. The creatures to whom we have referred, shall never die, but their continuance in life is the result of the will of their Creator; and besides, to speak in our imperfect manner of so mysterious a subject, it is only half an eternity which is allotted to them as their portion, the half which is to come, while eternal ages had revolved before they were called out of nothing. But there is still a more important difference between the eternity of God, and that of creatures. Theirs is not wholly possessed at once; it is enjoyed in detail, and consists in a perpetual succession of moments. It unites stability and change; stability, as their existence is infallibly secured, and change, as it is a constant transition from one part of duration to another. But the eternity of God has been defined to be the interminable possession of life, complete. perfect, and at once. Eternitas est interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta

Court of the Gentiles, part iv. B. ii. c. 4. § 3.

† Ps. xc. 2.

1 Tim. vi. 16.

possessio. The import of this definition is, that the divine existence is not like that of creatures, successive; but comprehends what we call the past, the present and the future. These are divisions of time; but the first and the last have no place in the duration of the Supreme Being, to whom nothing is past, and nothing is future. The Schoolmen call it punctum stans, or nunc semper stans, and a celebrated poet has thus expressed it:

Nothing there is to come, and nothing past,

But an eternal Now does always last.*

These have been pronounced to be words which have no meaning; but with the same critic we must acknowledge, "that as some being must necessarily have existed from eternity, so this being does exist after an incomprehensible manner, since it is impossible for a being to have existed from eternity after our manner or notions of existence. Revelation confirms these natural dictates of reason in the accounts which it gives us of the divine existence, where it tells ns, that he is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever; that he is the Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and the Ending; that a thousand years are with him as one day, and one day as a thousand years: by which and the like expressions, we are taught, that his existence with relation to time or duration, is infinitely different from the existence of any of his creatures, and consequently that it is impossible for us to frame any adequate conceptions of it."t

Whatever objections may be made to an eternal Now, and a punctum stans, as abortive attempts to express the mode of the divine existence, the truth which they are intended to signify, however confounding to our apprehensions, namely, an eternal existence without succession, may be established by this argument; that a past infinite succession is impossible, as we showed in the preceding lecture, when proving that creatures could not have existed from eternity. We can conceive a future infinite succession, or a line continually extending; but we cannot conceive a past infinite succession, or a line which had not a beginning. Hence, whatever difficulty we may experience in annexing an idea to our words, we must pronounce the eternity of God to be stationary, and not like ours, in motion. It may be objected, that in Scripture, his eternity is described by differences of time, and in particular that he is represented as one, "who was, and is, and is to come."i But it may be answered, that these are only adaptations of the subject to our modes of thinking, of which we have other examples in the attribution of corporeal members and human affections to the Deity. We have no word which properly expresses the stable nature of his eternity, and are under the necessity of applying to it words in common use, founded on the divisions of time. In eternity," it has been said, "there is no divisibility, no majority or minority, no priority or posteriority, no accession, recession, or succession; no difference of time, but one indivisible, simple, and permanent instant." Passages have been quoted from Heathen Philosophers, which prove that this idea did not originate among Theologians, but was entertained long before the Christian era. I shall mention only the saying of Plato, "that the parts of time, it was, and it is, agree not to eternity, because these imply motion and succession; but eternity is always immutably the same."

A subject so far above our comprehension may be easily perplexed by objections. It has been said, that if there is no succession in the eternity of God, all succession among creatures is impossible; what is past must be present. as well as what is to come. It has been replied, "that in the co-existence of God with creatures, there is priority and posteriority, not in God, but in temporary beings. The co-existence of things with God is successive, according to the necessitude of the things, and so the co-existence of God with the + Spectator, No. 590. Rev. iv. 8.

* Cowley.

creatures admits of some kind of succession as to external denomination; not as if there were any new existence of God with the creatures, but only by reason of the new existence of the creatures with God." I know not whether this answer is satisfactory; but we may be equally puzzled with respect to the immensity of God, and it may be asked, how can he be present in different places without being extended? as well as, how can he co-exist with creatures, without a successive duration? It is no reason for rejecting a doctrine established upon solid grounds, that there are objections to it, which we cannot answer. It is acknowledged on all hands, that the divine existence is mysterious; and I think, it has been proved from the nature of time, that this cannot be the measure of it. In a Being who had no beginning, succession is impossible.

Having found that there is a Being self-existent and eternal, we are naturally desirous to obtain some more intimate knowledge of him, and in the first place, to ascertain what is his nature. Of the essences of all beings, we are profoundly ignorant: we are acquainted only with their properties; but these we arrange in different classes, and call that to which the one class belongs, matter, and that to which the other belongs, spirit. Both substrata, or subjects, are equally concealed from us by an impenetrable veil. The objection against the existence of spirit, that we can form no conception of it, holds in full force against the existence of matter, for we have no idea of it distinct from its qualities.

As it has already appeared, that matter is not eternal and self-existent, it has been virtually proved, that God is not a material being. If he were material, he could not be immense, for it is not more absurd to speak of an infinite duration which is past, than of an infinite extension, that is, of an infinite whole made up of finite parts. It is certain that matter must have limits, however difficult it may be to imagination to fix them. Besides, according to the acknowledged doctrine of the impenetrability of matter, or that two bodies cannot occupy the same portion of space, were the Deity material, he would be necessarily excluded from every place which is filled up by the visible creation. Were God material, he would be divisible; for divisibility is an essential property of matter. His substance might be separated, and would be actually separated by other corporeal beings; who, occupying certain portions of space would not only exclude him from them, but would interpose between one par of his essence and another, as the continuity of a stream is destroyed by the rocks which rise above its surface. He would also be subject to change from every interposition of this kind; would now be expelled from one place, and then fill up another, as different bodies advanced or retired; in short, as mutability is essential to matter, although there were no cause of mutation in himself, he would be continually exposed to impressions from external objects. I will not add, however, that if he were a material being, he would be visible; because this is not a necessary consequence; there being much matter which is not perceived by the eye, as the atmospheric gases, the magnetic fluid, and electric matter not in a state of ignition.

It will not be deemed superfluous to prove, that God is not a material being, if you reflect, that erroneous ideas upon this subject have been entertained, not only by heathens, but by professed Christians. Some of the Fathers appear to have thought, that God had a bodily shape. The same was the opinion of the Anthropomorphites, who believed, as their name imports, that when man is said to have been created in the image of God, there is a reference to his body as well as his soul. Among the older Socinians also, the same gross apprehension prevailed; and some of them maintained, that God was confined to heaven, and might be seen there with our bodily eyes.

The passages of Scripture, which are supposed to favour this impious.

opinion, have been misunderstood. The image of God in which man was created, is expressive of a moral resemblance to his Maker, and is elsewhere said to consist in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. Appearances of the Deity, in ancient times, were intended solely to affect the mind through the medium of the senses, and not at all to suggest the idea, that he was in himself such a being as was perceived by the eye. We have no reason to suppose, that any of the persons who were favoured with such appearances, fell into this mistake. The ascription of bodily members to the Most High, can be easily accounted for. It is simply an accommodation to our modes of thinking, and is designed to teach us, that there exist in the divine nature, qualities corresponding to those in men, which are exerted by means of corporeal organs. Eyes and ears are expressive of his knowledge, and hands of the power by which he performs his mighty works. We may add to these considerations, that in other places of scripture, such descriptions are given of the transcendent greatness of Jehovah, as are utterly irreconcilable with the notion of corporeal and limited existence. He who measures the waters in the hollow of his hand, and metes out the heavens with a span, and comprehends the dust of the earth in a measure, may justly ask, "To whom will ye liken God? or what likeness will ye compare unto him?"

The conclusion to which we are led by the preceding reasoning, is, that God is a Spirit. We cannot tell what a spirit is, but we know, that it is not compounded, that it is not divisible, that it is not the object of sight or of touch. There are other properties of spirit, which strengthen our argument, because we have undoubted evidence, that they belong to the divine essence, but cannot be predicated of matter.

First, he is a living being, as we infer from the fact, that there is life in the universe, which is replenished with various orders of animated creatures; and it is a dictate of reason, that there cannot be more in the effect, than there is in the cause. Now, life is the peculiar attribute of spirit. Matter is dead. If our bodies are said to be alive, it is solely because they are connected with another substance by which they are actuated; and hence, as soon as the union is dissolved, they are reduced to the same state of insensibility with the earth in which they are deposited. God is called in Scripture "the living God," and "Jehovah," which is his incommunicable name, and imports that he possesses all life in himself, underived, independent, and immutable. He is the fountain of life; and all that feel and think, all that exert the various energies of body and mind, live, and move, and have their being in him.

Secondly, he is an intelligent being, as we collect from the appearances of design in his works. But knowledge is an attribute of spirit or mind. There is nothing in the properties of matter which is allied to thought and feeling. Divide or combine it as you will; take it in its state of greatest refinement, pure as a ray of light, and subtle as an impalpable and invisible gas; it makes no nearer approximation to thought than in its rudest and most unshapely form. Even when organized, it is still unconscious; and merely serves as the instru ment of sensation to the principle with which it is united. It is not the eye which sees, or the ear which hears, but the soul. Matter being incapable of intelligence, all the proofs of wisdom in the universe, are at the same time proofs, that the divine essence is spiritual. God is a being possessed of understanding. He certainly knows every thing in the system which he made and governs; and we may presume, also knows every thing possible, every thing which his power could effect.

Thirdly, he is an active being. He is the first cause of all things which exist, the prime mover of this great machine. We are conscious of the activity of our own spirits, which are employed without interval when we are awake, and are often equally busy in sleep. Matter is essentially inactive. It moves

only by impulse: and as it cannot begin, so it is incapable of stopping or altering its motion. Power belongs to God, as we know from its effects; and it belongs to him, because he is a Spirit. As he is possessed of intelligence, so he is possessed of will; and its acts are omnipotent. He speaks, and it is done; that is, the effect follows the volition, without delay and without difficulty. His work is perfected in a moment, as it was in the beginning, when he said, "Let there be light, and there was light."

It follows from the spirituality of his essence, that he is the object of mental contemplation. We neither see his shape, nor hear his voice. Wrapt up in the mystery of his nature, he is concealed from the eyes of mortals. He addresses our senses in his works and his word; but in this case, the senses serve only to convey to the mind materials of reflection, from which we rise by a gradual ascent to a conception, imperfect indeed, but not altogether unworthy of the Being of beings; with whom none in heaven or earth can be compared, and whose glory the highest created understanding cannot fully comprehend, He is "the King eternal, immortal, and invisible, dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto; whom no man hath seen, nor can see."

LECTURE XVIII.

ON GOD.

The Unity of God: inferred from the harmony of the Universe; just force of this Argument: Unity inferred from various other Properties in the Divine Nature-Unity opposed to Polytheism and Dualism-Account of Dualism-Unity consistent with a Trinity in the Godhead.

We have proved that there is a Being distinct from the universe, who has existed from eternity by necessity of nature, and upon whom all other beings depend. We have neither seen his shape, nor heard his voice; he is concealed froin all our senses; and it is solely by the deductions of reason from the objects around us, that we arrive at the knowledge of him. The arguments in support of this fundamental truth are conclusive, and produce, in every unprejudiced mind, a conviction not inferior in strength to that which we entertain of our own existence. But our inquiries will not stop here. We must feel a desire to be more fully acquainted with this mysterious Being; to make some partial discovery of his character; to ascertain what he is in himself, and in his relation to us; what are the distinguishing properties of his nature; what homage we owe to him, and what expectations we are authorized to entertain.

In our reasoning in proof of the existence of God, we have proceeded on the assumption that there is only one eternal and self-existent Being; nothing occurred in our progress which could lead us to suspect that there is a plurality. Those who argue from the idea of God, include in it every possible perfection, and consequently unity; for certainly a Being existing alone, without any equal, is more perfect and glorious than he would be if there were other beings independent and possessed of the same excellencies. The argument, that since something now exists something must have always existed, does not require that there should be more than one; for this is its amount, that since the universe could not have started into being by chance, nor have subsisted from eternity, because an infinite past succession is impossible, there must have been a self-existent First Cause, and more than one do not appear to be necessary. In like manner, when we reason from the proofs of design, that VOL. I.-23.