present to him; and yet, as time is a succession of moments, of which some are past, and others are future, this appears to be impossible. Still we hesitate to ascribe memory to him, because it is a faculty of mutable beings, who have been carried away in their course to a distance from objects and events which were once present. As there is no distinction of past, present, and to come, in his duration, so there may be no distinction of the same kind in his knowledge. He knows all things by a glance. But in these speculations, it may perhaps be justly said, that we darken counsel by words without knowledge. This knowledge of past things God claims in proof of his superiority to the wisest of men and to the gods of the Gentiles. "Let all the nations be gathered together, and let the people be assembled: who among them can declare this, and shew us former things? Let them bring forth their witnesses, that they may be justified; or let them hear, and say, It is truth." "Let them bring them forth, and shew us what shall happen; let them shew the former things, what they be, that we may consider them, and know the latter end of them; or declare us things for to come.' Upon the past as well as the future, there rests a cloud which the eyes of mortals cannot penetrate; and the only difference is, that while futurity without the aid of prophecy is all darkness, from the past there issue a few rays of light, in the accounts of former transactions which have been preserved, but which are often mixed with fable and falsehood, and leave us in utter ignorance of millions of facts which are irrecoverably lost. Without the knowledge of the past, God could not execute the august and awful office of the Judge of the human race. At the close of time, Adam and all his descendants will appear before him, to receive their final award, and the justice of the sentence will depend upon his accurate acquaintance with their character and actions. As he was the witness of their conduct during its course, so he will recall the minutest parts of it after an interval of thousands of years: and it is to assure us that no mistake will be committed, that the Scripture, in allusion to the proceedings of men, represents books as produced and opened, that the dead may be judged out of those things which are written in them.

God knows all present things, all things that now are. In this respect his knowledge resembles our own, but is infinitely superior in degree. He tells the number of the stars, and calls them by their names; he sees in one view the various orders of creatures which people the universe; he is acquainted with every individual of mankind, obscure as he may be and unnoticed by his neighbours; he observes the minutest and most insignificant animals, and counts the piles of grass. "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing, and yet not one of them is forgotten before God." Nothing can be more unimportant than a hair of our head, and yet our Saviour assures us, that our hairs are all numbered, and that one of them cannot fall to the ground without the knowledge of our heavenly Father. The humblest person upon earth has no cause to fear, that amidst the multiplicity of objects which engage the Divine attention, he shall be overlooked; nor may he whose interest it would be to remain unnoticed, hope that he shall be concealed in the dark recess from the eye of Omniscience. He knows the actions of men; "for the eyes of the Lord are in every place, beholding the evil and the good." It is too often their sole object to maintain external decorum, in order to secure the good opinion of others; while in their absence, they throw off restraint, and display their real character. But there is a witness with them in the most secret place; there is an eye observing them, which they should dread more than the severest human judge. It is about the actions of men, that the knowledge of God as the moral Governor of the world is exercised; for in this character, he is the guardian of his laws, and observes whether they are obeyed or trans

Is. xliii. 9. xli. 22.

+ Luke xii. 6.

Prov. xv. 3.

gressed. And we remark, that he alone is the competent Judge of our actions, because he alone is acquainted with our circumstances and motives, and can distinguish between the form and the substance, the specious pretence and the upright intention. There are many considerations to be taken into account in a moral estimate of conduct, which he only can combine, to whom the proceedings of the mind are as manifest as external actions are to us. And hence we are led to remark, that God knows the hearts of men, and claims this knowledge as a prerogative in which no mortal shares with him. "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked; who can know it? I the Lord search the heart, I try the reins, even to give every man according to his ways, and according to the fruit of his doings." Although we easily believe such knowledge to be the attribute of a Being who is as intimately present with our spirits as with our bodies, yet we can form no adequate conception of it, because it is so different from our own knowledge of each other's hearts, which is founded upon outward signs, often of doubtful interpretation, upon analogy or a presumed resemblance between them and ourselves, and in some cases merely upon conjecture; whereas the knowledge of God is immediate and intuitive. How awful the reflection, that he is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart, that its inmost recesses are naked and opened to the eyes of Him with whom we have to do! Thoughts which are only half-formed, which are suppressed as soon as they arise, which fly across the mind and are forgotten, do not escape his observation. He traces the windings and labyrinths of the soul, and discovers latent principles and motives, of which we are ourselves hardly conscious. "His eyes are upon the ways of man, and he seeth all his goings. There is no darkness, nor shadow of death, where the workers of iniquity may hide themselves."†

God knows things to come. In this respect there is no resemblance of his knowledge in man, nor we presume in any creature. We perceive what is present, and remember what is past; but the future can be approached only by imagination, unless we deem it an exception, that we are necessarily led to believe that the laws of nature will always be as they have hitherto been, and that succeeding generations will be like the present in form, and in general habits and pursuits. But these vague notions leave us in perfect ignorance of the actual state of things which will afterwards take place. We know not a single individual who will be born, or a single event which will befall him. Something indeed is revealed to us concerning the future history of the world; but the light of prophecy has emanated from him, who says, "Behold the former things are come to pass, and new things do I declare; before they spring forth I tell you of them." This subject came under review, when we were speaking of the immutability of his knowledge. A proof, that he sees the future as well as the present, is furnished by the predictions of Scripture. God announced Cyrus by name long before his parents were born, and foretold his war against Babylon, and the means by which he should obtain possession of the city. He foretold the rise and fall of the four ancient monarchies, and portrayed before hand the characters and achievements of Alexander the Great and his successors, with such particularity and truth, that Porphyry, the learned adversary of Christianity in the third century, affirmed that the prophecies must have been written after the events. He foretold the birth of Jesus Christ, the place of his nativity, and the family from which he should spring, with the principal events of his life, and his death, although it was effected not by an immediate interposition of providence, but by the unex pected combination of Jews and Gentiles. It is unnecessary to multiply in We formerly adverted to the difficulty which has perplexed the 'houghts, and exercised the ingenuity, of the studious in every age, with re * Jer. xvii. 9, 10. + Job xxxiv. 21, 22. Is. xlii. 9.

stances.

gard to the means of reconciling the foreknowledge of God with the free agency of man. What is certainly foreseen, will certainly happen; but the infallibility of the event seems to preclude liberty of action, which consists in the power of acting or not acting, and of acting in this way or in that, as at the moment the mind of the person shall determine. The discussion of this point would lead us into a digression from the present subject. It has been often remarked, and justly, that the simple foreknowledge of actions has no influence upon their existence; of which we may satisfy ourselves by reflecting, that when we have at any time ground for confident expectation that a neighbour will take a particular course, our foresight is not the cause of his conduct, which would have been the same if it had not been foreseen but this observation only removes the difficulty a step farther back. As there can be no certain foreknowledge of things in themselves uncertain, it still remains to inquire, what is the ground of certainty in human actions which renders them the object of infallible foreknowledge? If it be said to be the Divine decree, the difficulty unquestionably is not diminished. Amidst all the perplexity in which we are involved, one thing is beyond dispute, namely, that God does foreknow future events, and prophecy is a proof of it. The truth of both these principles is incontrovertible: that known to God are all his works from the beginning of the world, and that man is accountable. He is free, while he is acting the part which his Maker has assigned to him; and may be justly punished for doing what constitutes a necessary link in the chain of events. The Jews fulfilled the Divine purpose in crucifying our Saviour, and yet brought wrath upon themselves to the uttermost. It ought not to weaken our belief, that we cannot reconcile liberty and foreknowledge. Such is the condition of man and of all finite beings, that they must assent to many things, for which they cannot account. We need not wonder, that when our thoughts are directed to God, we are on all sides encompassed with mysteries. God knows all possible things. No person can suppose, that those alone are possible, which have been, now are, or shall hereafter be; that Divine wisdom is exhausted by the plans which it has already concerted, and Divine power by the effects which it has already produced, or has determined to produce. God could have called into existence many other worlds, and many other orders of creatures. He could have arranged systems totally different from any of those which have been established, governed them by different laws, and peopled them with inhabitants of different natures and faculties. He could have made our own world the scene of a different train of events, by replenishing it with a race of holy beings, who should have never been induced by temptation to swerve from their duty, and among whom pain, and sorrow, and mortality, would have been unknown. His infinite understanding knows not only what he has done, and has purposed to do, but all that his wisdom could have devised, and all that his power could have accomplished. If any man should be so curious as to ask, why he chose the present system in preference to so many possible systems? he should be reminded, that the question is presumptuous, and that we can return no answer to it, because God has not informed us of the reasons; but that if he shall ever be pleased to disclose his counsels to us, they will undoubtedly be found worthy of eternal admiration and praise.

The knowledge of God may be distinguished into two kinds, which have been called by Scholastic Divines, scientia simplicis intelligentiæ, and scientia visionis. Scientia visionis has for its object all things past, present, and to come; it is said to be founded on will, because the measure of it is the will of God, as expressed in his eternal purpose. He foresees as future those things alone which he has determined to bring to pass. They were only possible, till he decreed their futurition. It is called also scientia libera, free knowledge,

because it depends upon his will, which is the only reason of all the events of time. As nothing could take place independently of him, so he was under no necessity to act at all, or to act in any particular manner; but all his operations, ad extra, are the result of free choice. Scientia simplicis intelligentiæ has for its object possible things, things which might have been done, but never will be done. The measure of it is omnipotence; that is, while the former knowledge is limited by his decree, this is extensive as his power. He knows all that he could do; and because this knowledge is not founded on his will but on his power, it has been called scientia necessaria. His infinite understanding necessarily knows every thing which his infinite power can effect. A third kind of knowledge has been ascribed to God, and called scientia media, as being something between the two kinds already mentioned. It is the knowledge of what will happen in certain given circumstances, the knowledge of what creatures will do, if endowed with certain qualities and placed in certain situations. But there is no occasion for this distinction, as all the objects of this new kind of knowledge are comprehended under the head of scientia simplicis intelligentiæ. If God by his infinite understanding, knows all possible causes and all their possible effects, he knows what would be the result in any supposable case. He knew that the men of Kielah would deliver up David to Saul, because he knew the state of their hearts, and the influence which the authority and solicitations of that monarch would have upon their conduct. It is objected farther against the media scientia, that it is unworthy of God, as it makes him dependent upon creatures for a part of his knowledge; for the distinction has been invented with a design to prove, that his knowledge of the future actions of men is not founded on his own purpose to permit them, or to bring them to pass, but in a prospective view of the manner in which they will conduct themselves. It was introduced in opposition to the doctrine of free and sovereign grace, and it proposes to account for his purpose to give grace to one and not to another, by his foresight of the use which they would make of means and opportunities.

Concerning the knowledge of God, we assert, in opposition to this opinion, that it is independent. It is not obtained through the medium of his creatures, but, so far as it respects future things, is founded on his own will. No effect can be viewed as future, or in human language, can be the object of certain expectation, but when considered in relation to its efficient cause; and the cause of all things that ever shall exist is the purpose of God, "who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." As the knowledge of God does not depend upon the actual existence of objects,-for this would limit it to the present and the past, so it does not depend upon any conditions attached to their existence. He does not know that such things will happen, if such other things shall go before; but the whole series of events was planned by his infinite understanding, the ends as well as the means; and he foresees the ends, not through the medium of the means, but through the medium of his own decree, in which they have a certain future existence. They will not take place without the means; but the proper cause of them is not the means, but his almighty will.

It follows, in the second place, that the knowledge of God is eternal. If it be independent upon creatures, and founded in his own purpose, then it is as ancient as his purpose. Were it impossible to foresee the free actions of men, much of his knowledge would be acquired in time. It would be daily receiving accessions, like our own, to which something is added every day by our observation of the conduct of those with whom we are surrounded. It has been said, "that as it implies not any reflection on the Divine power, to say that it cannot perform impossibilities, so neither does it imply any reflection on his knowledge, to say that he cannot foresee as certain what is really not certain,

but only contingent." This is true; but it remains to be proved that the actions of men are contingent in such a sense as to be uncertain. Reason will ascribe all possible knowledge to God; and that it is possible certainly to foresee the free actions of men, cannot be a matter of doubt to a believer in Divine revelation, which abounds in predictions of such actions. The knowledge of God is eternal. The doctrine of temporal decrees, of decrees made in time, as men shew themselves to be worthy or unworthy, is chargeable with the impiety of setting limits to the Divine understanding, and making the Most High fickle and mutable as man, who is of one mind to-day, and of another to

morrow.

In the next place, The knowledge of God is simultaneous, or as it has been differently expressed, not discursive but intuitive. Some parts of human knowledge are intuitive; that is, the things are perceived at once, and no process of reasoning is necessary to discover them. There are certain axioms or first principles, to which the mind gives its assent as soon as they are proposed, and the terms are understood. There are also some truths, which, although not intuitive, are nearly such, because the mind arrives almost instantly at the conclusion. But the general character of human knowledge is, that it is successive. The riches of the mind, like external wealth, are acquired by accumulation. New objects and new relations of objects, daily present themselves to our senses; and from truths which we know, we infer other truths by a longer or a shorter train of reasoning. Thus our knowledge is discursive. But the infinite understanding of God receives no accession of ideas. The term infinite, which we apply to it, proves an accession to be impossible. He sees all things, as we see axioms by intuition. Eyes are ascribed to him to denote his knowledge, and to signify that it comprehends the whole system of things, as the human eye surveys at a glance the whole visible horizon. It follows, that what is called media scientia, or the knowledge of events through their causes, cannot be properly attributed to him, because it is a discursive process, or implies the inference of one thing from another, and consequently a succession of ideas. There is no progression from ignor ance to knowledge in the Divine mind, which was from all eternity omniscient.

Hence it is evident, that the knowledge of God is immutable, as I shewed in a former lecture; and I proceed, therefore, to remark, that it is distinct This is true also of human knowledge, to a certain extent. We have a distinct knowledge of mathematical truths, of facts which we have witnessed, and of the existence of objects which we perceive by our senses. On the other hand, we are ignorant of the essences of all things; we have no conception of the relation between their properties and their essences, or how the former inhere in the latter; and our ideas of many things are general and obscure. But all things are naked and opened to the eyes of God, titprzakioμiva as an apostle says, as manifest to him as the interior of an animal is to us, when it has been fairly divided and spread out for inspection. An infinite understanding is incapable of oversight, of misapprehension, or of taking a hasty and inaccurate survey. Every object, every quality of every object, every relation which it bears, every thing which may be predicated of it, whether it be animate or inanimate, all is before God, and is as thoroughly known as if his attention were fixed upon it alone. Among the many millions of the human race, every individual may truly say, "Thou, God, seest me."

In the last place, The knowledge of God is infallible. There is no mistake in his apprehension of things, and there is nothing like conjecture. Future events are as certainly known as present, because, although they may be contingent in respect of the agents, or may be produced by the free volition of