that their wickedness increases, and grows into a confirmed habit; but it is evident that the hardening of their hearts is their own work, and is ascribed to God only indirectly. He does not impel them to commit sin, nor would his dispensations of themselves lead them to it; that is, unless there were a previous inclination or tendency to it. He does not prevent them from committing sin; but he cannot on this account be called the author of it, unless it could be proved that he is under an obligation to impart effectual grace to all men, without distinction. In like manner, we must explain those passages in which God is said to blind the eyes, or the minds of men. What has been already said, is obviously applicable to them; and indeed although the expressions are different, the subject to which they relate is the same. The same effect is pointed out by the hardening of the heart; the blinding of the eyes: the giving of men over to a reprobate mind; the delivering of them up to their own lusts, to walk in their own counsels. Nothing more is intended, than that God withholds his grace from them, leaves them under the power of corrupt inclinations, and does not prevent them from being exposed to temptation. With respect to the blinding of the mind, it is worthy of attention, that while at one time it is represented as the act of God, it is attributed at another to the agency of Satan. "The god of this world," says Paul, "hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine into them.' ""* Now, as both representations must be true, and God and Satan must both be concerned in the effect, it seems to be the proper way of reconciling them, to suppose, that while God withholds his Spirit, who would illuminate their minds, he permits Satan to use his arts to deceive them. Although we are ignorant of the mode in which Satan acts upon the mind, yet we are certain, from the testimony of Scripture, that he possesses the means of strengthening its prejudices, and stirring up its passions in opposition to the truth. But there is nothing positive in the part which God takes in this matter, except that his Providence may so order the circumstances of sinners, that, being already averse to spiritual things, they shall hence find an occasion of being confirmed in their dislike. He does not blind them by weakening or confounding their understandings, or by suggesting objections against the gospel; these come from themselves, or from the secret insinuations of the spirit of error and falsehood. When God is said to tempt man, there is no difficulty, because the word may be used in a good, or in a bad sense. It is used in a good sense, when the Scripture says, that "God did tempt Abraham;"† for the meaning is, that by commanding him to offer in sacrifice his only son, upon whose life the performance of the promises depended, he made trial of his faith, and gave him an opportunity of manifesting it, to the glory of Divine grace and his own honour, as well as for an example to succeeding generations. It is used in a bad sense when it expresses the methods employed to entice men to sin; and to apply it to God in this sense, would be blasphemy: "Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man."‡ What shall we make of the following words? "If the prophet be deceived, when he hath spoken a thing, I the Lord have deceived that prophet."§ After the remarks already made, we cannot suppose that, strong as this language is, it imports that God had actually deceived him; but it must be understood to mean, that, if the idolatrous Jews, who are mentioned in the context, had consulted a person calling himself a prophet, and he, fancying himself to be what he pretended, and imposed upon by his own imagination, had delivered a prediction which proved to be false, God was to be considered as having a right 2 Cor. iv. 4. + James i. 13. § Ezek. xiv. 9. † Gen. xxii. 1. eous hand in this transaction, and making use of the presumption of this man to punish his rebellious people. God had deceived him, because he had permitted him to be the dupe of his own pretensions, and refused to impart to him a true revelation, as he had formerly done to Balaam for a particular purpose. 66 But we hear similar language employed by a true prophet with respect to himself: "O Lord," said Jeremiah, "thou hast deceived me, and I was deceived." To evade the difficulty, the words have been rendered, “Thou hast allured me, and I was allured." It was thou who didst persuade me to undertake the prophetical office; it was by thy powerful influence upon my mind, that my reluctance was overcome, and I consented to engage in it, notwithstanding the opposition and danger which I foresaw as the consequence of doing my duty. Without changing the translation, the words may be explained hypothetically. If I have been deceived, as my enemies allege, who do not acknowledge me to be a true prophet, I have been deceived by thee, by whom I was called to the office.' But the latter being impossible, the former was not true; and consequently, the charges against Jeremiah as if he had spoken lies, terminated upon God who had sent him. If neither of these views of the words should be deemed satisfactory, we may set them down to the account of human infirmity. Perhaps they were uttered by Jeremiah, when his mind was ruffled by the contradiction and reproaches of his countrymen; and if this is the true state of the case, whatever is their meaning, he alone is answerable for it. They are a rash and unfounded charge against God, similar to that which was made by that peevish and irritable prophet Jonah, who presumed to say, in answer to the question of his Maker, "Doest thou well to be angry?—I do well to be angry, even unto death."t .6 It is easy to apply these observations to other passages which speak of the agency of God in the sinful actions of men, as when he threatened" to take David's wives, and give them to his neighbour, who should lie with them in the sight of the sun," and when he is said to have bidden Shimei curse him," "to have put a lying spirit into the mouths of Ahab's prophets," and to have turned the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his people, and to deal subtilely with his servants." Some allowance should be made for the oriental style, which admits a boldness of expression, not so suitable to the more correct and philosophical languages of the west. When transferred into our language without qualification, it conveys ideas different from those which were intended by the original writers. Hence, I cannot but think that those Divines have greatly erred, who imagined that Scripture authorized them to make use of the strongest and harshest terms in speaking of this mysterious subject. It would have been wise, since nothing is more certain than that God is not the author of sin, to have carefully avoided every term which seemed to lead to this impious conclusion. All the passages which have been quoted, and others of a similar nature, may be explained by admitting. that God permits sin, and upholds sinful creatures in the exercise of their faculties. This is surely safer, and more consonant to our conceptions of his character, than to say with Calvin, that the devil and wicked men act by his command, and that they are so completely in his power, that he compels them to act. I have considered the objects of Providence, and have shewn that it extends its care to all created beings, and in particular, is concerned in the actions of intelligent creatures. Before leaving the subject, it will be proper to say a few words with respect to what has been called God's peculiar, or more accurately perhaps, his gracious providence, the objects of which are his own people. It may be observed in general, that it implies a difference, not so much in its acts * Jer. xx. 7. † Jonah iv. 4, 9. 2 Sam. xii. 11. towards them, as in its design. It is not miraculous; it does not suspend the laws of nature in favour of its objects, although it occasionally did so in former times; it does not consist in visible interpositions. I acknowledge that remarkable things do sometimes take place in the experience of the righteous, which fully satisfy them that they have been wrought by the hands of their heavenly Father; but still they are not deviations from the laws of nature, so far as we are acquainted with them. I make this limitation, because, although we have ascertained the laws by which the material system is governed, we are, in a great measure, ignorant of the laws of the spiritual world. Hence our views of Providence are imperfect, because many of its operations are carried on, not only by the instrumentality of the thoughts and volitions of men, but also by the agency of invisible beings. To them the care of the righteous is entrusted, and they are said "to minister to them," "to encamp about them," "to bear them up in their hands, lest they should dash their foot against a stone." Yet, when we look at the persons who are thus favoured, we see that they are placed in the same external circumstances with other men, and that similar events occur in the course of their and other men's lives. They are rich or poor; they are sick or in health; they meet with successes and disappointments; they have their sorrows and their comforts; but these things are ordered by unerring wisdom, and are rendered subservient to their most important interests. They mortify their sinful inclinations, exercise their graces, excite them to duty, and train them up in a course of progressive holiness, to eternal life. We know that all things work together for good to them that love God; to them who are the called according to his purpose." In short, this department of Providence is a uniform dispensation of love. The glory of God in the salvation of his people is its ultimate end, to which, the evils of life as well as its good things, the opposition of adversaries as well as the co-operation of friends, contribute by a mysterious process. It might be illustrated by an appeal to the Scriptures, which are a history of Providence in relation to the world at large, but particularly of its procedure towards the Church and its genuine members. "All the saints are in the hand of God," and "he keeps them as the apple of his eye." I proceed, in the last place, to take notice of the objections against the doctrine of Providence. It is not surprising that, in a mind disposed to cavil, objections should occur, as the subject is manifestly too extensive and complicated to be fully understood. We may see a part of the scheme, but cannot comprehend the whole. Now, as it may happen with respect to the plans of men, of which we have an imperfect idea on account of their intricacy and extent, that they shall appear to us defective or confused, although they have been arranged with consummate wisdom; much more may we be tempted to draw this conclusion concerning the mighty plan, which embraces the affairs of the visible and the invisible world, and reaches from the beginning to the end of time." Lo, these are parts of his ways; but how little a portion is heard of him! but the thunder of his power who can understand?" There are difficulties in many subjects, which are not considered as sufficient to make us doubt or disbelieve if the evidence in their favour preponderates. It would not be consistent with the character of rational creatures to give our assent without evidence; but we must often be content with partial evidence, by which I mean, evidence that may be justly considered as amounting to a proof, although it does not fully remove every objection. In such a case, instead of setting the evidence aside on account of the difficulties, we should make the difficulties yield to the evidence. In this manner we proceed in many of the most important affairs of life; and there is no reason why we should not pursue the same method in matters of religion. Some of the most formidable objections against the doctrine of Providence, have been anticipated; namely, those which are founded on the existence of moral evil, the agency of God in the sinful actions of men, and its supposed incompatibility with human liberty. Of these I have attempted to give a solution, and shall not, therefore, consider them again. Let us direct our attention to other objections. The first objection which I shall mention, would not occur to any person who entertained a worthy idea of God, but has been advanced both in ancient and in modern times. It is, that the doctrine of Providence supposes God to have his attention occupied and distracted with a multitude of cares; of which some are in danger of being neglected, and all are inconsistent with the enjoy ment of undisturbed felicity. This was the great argument of the Epicureans; and it may still seem to have force, to those who apply the standard of humanity to the Divine nature. Those who are affected by this objection, must be persons of a very shallow understanding. With regard to the multiplicity of objects about which Providence is conversant, we may reason from analogy. We find that the human mind is capable of attending to a considerable number at once, or in quick succession, and of managing different concerns, although they are of a complicated nature. If we should suppose its powers to be greatly enlarged, to be raised, for example, to an equality with those of angels, we could conceive its sphere of observation and activity to be extended, without in any degree increasing its labour. Now, if we suppose an infinite understanding, which reason and Scripture attribute to the Deity, it must be capable, not only of attending to all the affairs of the world and the universe, but of attending to them without an effort; for the labour which accompanies the exercise of man's intellectual faculties, is the consequence of their imper fection. We must inquire, and compare, and judge; we must pass from one subject to another; and in this way we feel fatigued, whether the feeling arises from mind itself, or from the influence of the body upon it. The knowledge of God being infinite, embraces all things which exist, however obscure and minute; and being intuitive, is as easy to him as to man is a glance of his eye. All created things are before him; they are naked and open in their essences, their properties, their operations, their thoughts and designs. It costs a man no labour, when the sun is shining, to look at the objects on the table at which he is sitting; it costs no more labour to God to know all the creatures and all the events in the universe, because he is intimately present with them all. If it be objected, that Providence implies not only the knowledge, but the care of all things, I answer, that this care is not burdensome to the Deity, because his power is almighty, as his understanding is unlimited. There can be no resistance to almighty power; and its purposes are accomplished without exertion. This is manifest from the idea of infinite power, and is confirmed by the Scriptures, which represent him as performing all his works by his word, that is, with the same ease with which we pronounce a word. 66 The Creator of the ends of the earth, fainteth not, neither is weary."* Hear how even a heathen philosopher, Aristotle, has expressed himself on the subject. "What a pilot is to a ship, a charioteer to a chariot, a chief musician to a chorus, the law to a city, a general to an army; all this is God to the universe; but with this difference, that to those persons the management of their respective departments is toilsome and painful, while it costs God neither labour nor pain to govern the universe." In the second place, it has been objected, that the doctrine of Providence degrades the majesty of God, by representing him as extending his attention. and care to objects altogether unworthy of him; to creatures the most insig nificant, to a fly, a mite and an animalcule, which the human eye cannot per VOL. I.-56 • Isa. xl. 28. ceive without the assistance of a microscope. It is a fact, however, that such creatures exist; and it will be acknowledged by every Theist, that they exist by the will of the Creator. If, then, it was worthy of God to give them being, how is it unworthy of him to uphold them? We cannot assign the reason why such creatures were made, because we are ignorant of the purpose which they serve; but the simple fact of their existence is a proof, that there was a sufficient reason why God exerted his power in their production. The objection, therefore, against Providence, founded on their apparent insignificance, arises from the most stupid inattention; for a moment's reflection would convince any ordinary understanding, that the objection, if made at all, should be made not against the care, but against the existence of such creatures; and that, after they have been brought into being, there is not the shadow of an argument from the dignity of the Divine nature, against the continuance of their life. To a man of piety, such creatures would rather furnish matter of admiration and praise. He would extol that Being who has been said to be “maximus in minimis," and whose power does certainly astonish us in the least, as in the greatest of his works. In a fly or a mite, or an animalcule, there are mascles, and nerves, and vessels for circulating the blood, and organs of digestion, and organs of sense; and these are assembled in a point indiscernible to the keenest human eye. If meditation on these wonders of Divine skill awaken devout sentiments in any bosom, such creatures have not been made in vain; and what a sublime idea does it give us of the goodness of God, to think that it communicates itself, not only to the angelical hosts, to the rational inhabitants of our globe, and to the lower animals, which daily fall under our observation; but to myriads of living particles, nestling on a leaf, or swimming in a drop of water, or burrowing in a grain of sand! Cold and impious is the heart of that man, in whose eyes it does not exalt the Deity, to conceive of him as the bountiful Parent of innumerable orders of creatures; as the Guardian and Benefactor of the meanest of his offspring; as diffusing his beneficence over the whole extent of creation, and making the extremities of being teem with life and enjoyment! "The eyes of all wait upon thee, and thou givest them their meat in due season. Thou openest thine hand, and satisfiest the desire of every living thing.' In the third place, it is objected against the doctrine of Providence, that there are many facts which appear to be inconsistent with the wisdom and benevolence of an almighty Ruler of the world, namely, all the physical evils which impair the beauty and happiness of the creation; the barrenness of many places of the earth, the profusion of weeds and noxious plants which it yields, the excesses of heat and cold, of moisture and drought, by which its valuable fruits are destroyed; to which may be added, all the other calamities to which mankind are exposed. It is a common answer to this objection, that the evils complained of, or some of them at least, are the consequences of general laws; and that, although when viewed by themselves, they may seem to impeach the goodness and wisdom of the Deity, yet they cease to appear in this light, when considered as the necessary result of laws, which are the foundation of the regularity of nature, and a source of innumerable blessings to men. This answer, I do not consider as at all satisfactory; for it supposes, that those evils are necessary attendants of the system; that they could not have been avoided; and that, although not the objects of the primary intention of the Deity, they were contemplated by him, and admitted in the formation of his plan. It would seem, that they could not have been excluded; that they were inseparable from the, plan which he adopted; and that they were chosen on account of the greater good with which they would be associated They are not properly a part of the plan, but an imperfection adhering to it, Ps. cxlv. 15, 16. |