fallen under the penalty. There was no clause in the covenant providing him with an opportunity to retrieve his fault, and still holding out the hope of the reward after he had failed. His eternal interests were suspended upon one trial, and if it terminated fatally, his doom was fixed for ever. You will observe that, if what has been now said is true in respect of Adam, it is true also in respect of his posterity, who were identified with him, and placed in the same circumstances by the covenant. It cannot be, therefore, that a promise of life is still made to them upon condition of obedience, for no such promise was made to him after the fall. His hope was founded upon a new promise, a promise of mercy through the seed of the woman, and God gives no other hope to his posterity. Let it not be imagined, that there is a proposal of two ways of obtaining happiness in the world to come, the one by the works of the law, and the other by faith. Men may dream of the former, but they only dream, for, besides the utter impossibility of the thing, God has never come under a new obligation to reward their obedience. The covenant of works is superseded by the covenant of grace, and the promise of life belongs to that covenant alone. It is an error, therefore, to represent men in a natural state, as under the covenant of works, when it is meant that they are required to perform perfect obedience as the condition of life. Perfect obedience is demanded from them, but not as the condition of life; for never since the fall did God 'promise life upon such terms. The first covenant, as a covenant, no longer exists. Nothing remains of it but the precept and the penalty; the promise is cancelled.

It may be alleged that this doctrine is not in accordance with Scripture, in some passages of which the original tenor of the covenant is expressed. "The man that doeth those things shall live by them."*"If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments." But does any person seriously think, that this is a re-enactment of the covenant? Did God intend to teach the Israelites, or our Saviour the young man who was inquiring the way to heaven, that future happiness was still promised to human obedience? No; the design in both cases was to convince the self-righteous of the impracticable nature of the task which they had undertaken; to shew them that there was an insurmountable obstacle to the attainment of their hopes; to remind them that, according to their own plan, there was required an obedience too pure and extensive to be performed by such power as man possesses in his fallen state. Such passages do not import that there is still a constitution by which obedience and life are connected, but proceeding according to men's own notions of the matter, they demonstrate the folly of their expectations, from the unconquerable difficulty of the enterprise.

Let us now inquire what are the consequences of the first sin to the posterity of Adam. If it were true, as Pelagians maintain, that he was not the representative of his children, and that God dealt with him as an individual, it would also be true that none was affected by his sin but himself; but if a covenant was made with him, the consequences are necessarily the same to him and his descendants. It follows from the nature of a federal transaction, that the interests of both were identified, so that the evil which he incurred is transmitted to them as their inheritance. There is no possibility of getting rid of this conclusion, but by refuting the arguments produced to prove that the transaction with Adam was of a federal nature.

We say, then, in the first place, That by his sin his posterity became liable to the punishment denounced against himself. They became guilty through his guilt, which is imputed to them, or placed to their account, so that they are treated as if they had personally broken the covenant. I do not see in what other sense we can understand the words of the Apostle, "By one man's dis† Matt. xix. 17.

Rom. x. 5.

obedience many were made" or constituted" sinners."

." It is not satisfactory to say, that they are treated as sinners although they are not really such, because the question naturally follows, How can they be justly treated as sinners, if they are not guilty? and the question is unanswerable. "The judg ment was by one," or by one offence, "to condemnation." We have, in these words, an act of judgment ascribed to God, who always judges according to truth; the ground upon which it proceeded, the one offence, the deed of one man; and the sentence expressed in the term, condemnation. Now, as it appears from the context that the subjects of this sentence are men universally, it was plainly the doctrine of Paul, that all men are punished according to Divine justice for the transgression of Adam. There is no mention of their personal sins, with whatever demerit they are attended, but of one sin committed before they were born, by him whose children they are. He expresses

the same mournful truth by saying again, "Through the offence of one many are dead." And here we must recur again to a fact, which formerly engaged our attention, the prevalence of temporal death. That man was mortal in his primitive state, is so gross a falsehood, that it scarcely deserves a serious refutation. We have seen the absurdity of pretending that death is sent as a favour, and that, although our death is the consequence of the sin of Adam, it is not to be considered as properly a punishment. These are all contrivances by which some men, who have previously adopted a system, endeavour to make the Scripture give countenance to it, and do not scruple, when they are pushed, openly to give it the lie. It is the doctrine of Paul, that death has come upon us by the sin of Adam, not accidentally or naturally, but by the operation of law: "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned;"§''@ Tartes nμaptov. The expression, '', has been explained in two different ways. If we render it "in whom," as some critics contend, the Apostle teaches, that as death came by the sin of Adam, so all other men die because they sinned in him. If we translate it, "because all have sinned," then the Apostle affirms that all die, because all are sinners. But this cannot be true, if the imputation of Adam's guilt be denied, for thousands of the human race die in infancy, before they are capable of committing actual sin. The Apostle brings infants under our notice in a following verse: "Nevertheless, death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression." Some understand by these, adults who, during the interval between Adam and Moses, could not sin as Adam did, because they were not subject to a law which forbade sin under the penalty of death; and, therefore, they admit that they must have died for his sin. But was there ever a time when men were without law to God, or his law did not denounce death upon transgressors? No, this was the penalty of sin under all dispensations. It is more consonant to Scripture and common sense, to understand by those "who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression," infants, of whom this description is very properly given, because they could not be guilty of actual sin. Yet, they died as well as adults; and how can we account for the fact but upon the supposition that, some how or other, they were sinners in the sight of God? They are among the "all men" upon whom death has passed, and it must be true that they, as well as adults, have sinned. The death of infants is utterly inexplicable, but upon the principle of original sin. As they die in the common course of events, so they have been involved in those terrible judgments which are monuments of the power and wrath of the Almighty. The children of Sodom and Gomorrha perished with their wicked fathers and mothers; and this indiscriminate destruction took place after Ab`aham had said to the Most High, "That be far from thee, to slay the righteous + Ib. 15. § Ib. 12.

Rom. v. 19.

† Ib. 16.

I Ib. 14.

with the wicked; and that the righteous, should be as the wicked, that be far from thee; shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" and the Lord had assured him that he would make a distinction. Here was a case in which evil was not to fall promiscuously upon a people, but they alone were to suffer, who were found worthy of punishment; yet here children were destroyed with their parents. Let it not be said that they could not escape, when the fire fell from heaven upon their habitations. Besides that there are no limits to the power of God, he could have saved them as he saved Lot and his family, by the ministry of angels; yet the angels did not carry away a single infant, but left them all behind. It is therefore certain that they were not righteous, and that, although free from the enormous crimes of the adults, they were chargeable with some sin, and what could that be but the sin of our nature? It may be said that God could compensate the sufferings of those innocents in the world to come. This is nothing to the purpose, as the same thing might have been said of Lot, and any other righteous person who happened to be in the city. On this principle there was no better reason for delivering him than for delivering them. But God had declared that he would not slay the righteous with the wicked; he did slay the children, and the inference is plain, that the children were guilty.

I shall appeal to another passage, in proof of the imputation of guilt to the posterity of Adam, and their obnoxiousness to punishment. Speaking of the children of disobedience in whom the evil spirit works, the apostle adds, Among whom also we all had our conversation in times past, in the lust of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind; and were by nature the children of wrath, even as others." It is observable, that, while he addresses in the first instance the Ephesians, who were Gentiles, he afterwards includes himself and his compatriots the Jews in this account, shewing that he is describing the moral state of the whole human race. It is an assertion contrary to evidence, that he is speaking of the Gentiles alone: for why did he change the person, if the subject of discourse was the same? Would it not be absurd in a man who was talking to an assembly of the poor or the diseased about their case, suddenly to change his style, and include himself in the number, while he was rich and in good health? It is vain, therefore, to pretend that the words, "and were by nature children of wrath," are referrible only to the Gentiles. Whatever they signify, they are descriptive of the natural state of all unconverted men. It has been contended that the phrase, "by nature," simply means, really or truly, and that men are really children of wrath, in consequence of their wicked practices. In this manner, the argument for original sin from this passage is evaded. Undoubtedly this is not the obvious sense of the expression, the sense suggested by the use of it on other occasions, and arising from the understood import of the term, nature. What any thing is by nature, it is by its original constitution. This quality is coeval with it. We oppose what is natural to what is acquired. If, then, the apostle meant that the Ephesians and others were children of wrath by practice, had incurred the anger of God by their personal sins, it must be acknowledged that he did not adopt the most luminous mode of conveying his meaning. The word "nature" was unhappily chosen, being calculated, as no explanation of it is subjoined, to give a false idea of the moral condition of men; and, accordingly, it has led to the conclusion, that they are objects of the Divine disapprobation when they come into the world. It is alleged, however, that this interpretation of the word is not without the authority of the apostle himself; and a passage is produced, in which it is said that nature unquestionably signifies practice or custom: " Doth not even nature itself— quis teach you, that, if a man have long hair, it is a shame unto him?"‡ † Eph. ii. 3. 1 Cor. xi. 14

*Gen. xviii. 25.

What else can quos here signify but custom? Although, however, quru should mean custom in one solitary instance, this would not be a good reason for so explaining it in other instances, where the connexion did not necessarily require it. It is not sound criticism to say, A word occurs once in an unusual sense, and therefore we may give it the same sense when it occurs again. But there is no cause for departing from the common acceptation in the passage before us. "The emphasis used, aut quo, nature itself, shews," says Mr Edwards, "that the apostle does not mean custom, but nature in the proper sense. It is true it was long custom that made having the head covered a token of subjection, and a feminine habit or appearance, as it is custom that makes any outward action or word a sign or signification of any thing; but nature itself, nature in its proper sense, teaches that it is a shame for a man to appear with the established signs of the female sex. Nature itself shews it to be a shame for a father to bow down or kneel to his own child or servant, because bowing down is, by custom, an established token of subjection and submission."* To express his idea more clearly and concisely, as custom had made long hair a part of a woman's dress, nature itself taught that it was a shame for a man to wear it, because, by doing so, he confounded the visible distinction between the sexes. The result of this discussion is, that nature is to be understood literally, when we are said to be "by nature children of wrath," and the meaning is, that we are born in a state of condemnation.

Thus I have proved the first proposition, that in consequence of the sin of Adam, his posterity are obnoxious to the penalty.

I observe, in the second place, That in consequence of his sin, they come into the world in a state of depravity. Pelagius and his followers maintained that, notwithstanding what had happened to Adam, the power of free will remains entire, and that, independently of Divine grace, man is capable of beginning, carrying on, and consummating good works; that God gives us the ability, but that we can exert it without farther assistance. Socinus treated the idea of innate depravity as a fable and a dream. The sin of Adam was so far from corrupting his posterity, that it did not destroy the image of God in himself, and it remains entire in all other men. Arminians admit that we are born less pure than Adam was, and that we have a greater inclination to sin, which is apt to be excited even by a light occasion; but as far as this inclination, or concupiscence as it is called, is from nature, and not contracted by vicious custom, it is not properly sin. It is merely the natural appetite or desire of having what is agreeable, and avoiding what is disagreeable; which, as long as the will does not consent to it, is not sinful, but furnishes matter for the exercise of virtue. Virtue is discovered by conquering the desire of the flesh; but there would be no place for it, if the flesh spontaneously desired nothing but what reason approved. Papists hold the same opinion concerning concupiscence, because, finding that it remains in all men, they are under the necessity of denying that it is sin, to uphold the doctrine of their Church, that original sin is completely taken away in baptism. And thus both combine to set aside the argument for original sin, founded on this tendency, this proneness to evil, which is one of the strongest proofs that our nature is tainted. Yet it is of this proneness to evil, this inflammability of our nature which every spark is in danger of kindling, that Paul speaks in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans: "I had not known sin, but by the law: for I had not known desire, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet. But sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of desire" or "concupiscence. For without the law sin was dead." Here he expressly calls concupiscence sin, and represents it as flowing from a sinful principle in the heart; but it seems that, before his conversion, he was as blind ⚫ Edwards on Original Sin, Part ii. Chap. 3. § 3. † Rom. vii. 7, 8. VOL. I.-61

2Q

as Arminians and Papists, and never suspected it to be sin, till he became better acquainted with the law, and found the desire to be so importunate and imperious, that the more it was forbidden, it was the more violent in its operation.

The doctrine of our Church is thus stated in the Confession of Faith: "By this sin," of our first parents, "they fell from their original righteousness, and communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body. They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation."* Again, in the chapter on free will, it says, "Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so as a natural man, being altogether averse from that good, and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto."†

A difficulty meets us at the outset. If, as we say, the soul of man is depraved from the commencement, what shall we say? Does God create it sinful? Does he infuse depraved principles at its first formation? Then he must be the author of sin? or is it pure when it comes from his hands? and is it contaminated by its connexion with the body? Then we may ask, How can there be moral contagion in a piece of matter? or how can the union of a spirit to it, cause the pollution of that spirit? These are questions which cannot be answered. They are curious, but not useful. They may perplex us; but a solution of them is not necessary to the proof of the doctrine, which rests upon arguments supplied by both Scripture and experience.

Let us begin with Scripture. Our first proof shall be taken from an early period of the history of mankind. It is said before the flood, "And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." Lest we should think that the description is applicable only to the corrupt generation which then lived, and may be regarded as a singular one, since the Divine patience would no longer bear it, God said again after the flood, "The imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth;"§ intimating that, notwithstanding this awful testimony against sin, it would still abound in the world; for it was like a stream which, having suffered a temporary check from some external cause, will continue to flow, because it has a permanent source. The word rendered imagination, signifies a figment, or formation; and, in its present use, denotes a device or contrivance of the mind. "The imagination of man's heart” is expressive of the operation of his faculties, intellectual and moral. All his thoughts, all his desires, all his purposes are evil, expressly or by implication; because the subject of them is avowedly sinful, or because they do not proceed from a holy principle, and are not directed to a proper end. The words are pleonastic, since to say, that "every imagination of the thoughts of his heart is evil," was sufficient; but, as if with a design to exclude the possibility of evasion, and to exhibit the truth in the most emphatic manner, it is added, that they are "only evil," evil without any mixture of good, and they are evil" continually," or all the day. It is not occasionally that the human soul is thus under the influence of depravity; but this is its habitual state. It seems impossible to construct a sentence, which should more distinctly express its total corruption. Now, there must be some cause of this constant and universal effect; and the sacred historian refers it to our nature itself, when he affirms that the imagination of man's heart is evil "from his youth." The word translated "youth," is not only used to denote the period of life commonly so called, but comprehends infancy also, and, in the present case, must be thus Conf. c. vi. § 2, and 3. † Ib. c. ix. § 3. + Gen. vi. 5. § Gen. viii. 21.