of brotherly love. We agree with our correspondent, therefore, in his just and seasonable remarks. He will be gratified to find his train of thought anticipated, in our review of James on Christian Charity. Most earnestly do we pray that all discussion on the momentous interests of religion, may be conducted in the meek, affectionate, and humble spirit, so beautifully portrayed by the apostle, in the chapter which Mr. James has taken as the foundation of his treatise. In passing to consider our correspondent's principal inquiry, we shall state briefly the real question at issue.

It is not, then, what is the character of infants, but what is the nature of sin. According to Dr. Taylor, it consists in man's own act of CHOICE. According to those who differ from him, there is sin within us, previous to, and exclusive of, all knowledge, choice, or action of any kind. We stated, that, in our view, this is impossible in the nature of things, that the very idea of moral accountability, or desert of punishment, presupposes and includes the idea of free and intelligent moral action. As well may we speak of gravitation without matter, or of thinking without mind, as of moral character without moral action. But we will not dwell on this topic, after the clear and conclusive statements of our correspondent. His language, in our view, is not too strong when he affirms, that no one can truly and practically think otherwise-that " we may as well say, that a moral being has no sensation of right and wrong, as to say that he does not thus feel and judge."

Now there are certain passages of scripture, and certain providential dealings of God, which are thought by many to prove, that our race are sinners from the very commencement of their being. If this be so, it follows, by inevitable consequence, that from the same early period, they are moral agents. Our correspondent, however, finds other passages of scripture which prove incontrovertibly, in his view, that a brief and undefined period intervenes, between the commencement of our being and moral agency. He thinks it equally clear also, that the passages alluded to above, have been pressed beyond their natural and true import. On this point, the intimate acquaintance which his communication shows with the original languages of scripture, and with the principles of exegesis, entitles his remarks to very serious consideration.

Still, however, we have no wish to disturb the faith of any one, who may differ from our correspondent on this point. Take these passages in their full and literal import, and do they at all force us to adopt the opposing theory? Do they compel us to set aside the testimony of our "moral nature" itself, that we cannot be guilty of that which is not our own act? Do they compel us to believe, that a just God will hold men guilty and subject them to punishment, for that which is antecedent to, and entirely distinct from, any act, knowledge, intention, or choice of their own? No! The other alternative is left open. If the scriptures do teach us that we are truly sinners from our birth, let us conclude as a necessary consequence, that we are moral agents from our birth also ;--not that our Maker will ever separate moral character or accountability from moral action. This places us at once on the ground of Dr. Taylor. Sin is man's own voluntary act. This is his fundamental principle. At what period sin

commences in the human heart, he does not attempt to decide. He lays no stress on this point. Wherever there is sin, there is moral agency, wherever there is moral agency in any of our race, there is sin, until the heart is renewed by the Holy Spirit. These are his positions. They are the only positions which we feel the slightest wish to establish. And in these, we sincerely believe, that those who think themselves to differ from us, do in fact agree; for in all the practical concerns of conscience, we are confident, they do and must decide, that no moral being can be guilty of that which is not his own act.

We shall add only one observation more. . Dr. Taylor maintains, that it is the nature of man to sin, in all the appropriate circumstances of his being, as it is the nature of a stone to fall. At what precise moment after its creation, an infant first sins, or a particular stone first falls, he does not undertake to decide. The event, however, in each instance, takes place at the earliest period possible in the nature of the case, and with a certainty equally great and uniform. But the opposing theory goes farther. It not only maintains, that without regeneration, the first moral act of the human mind is sinful, but that the ground or cause which lies back of that act is sinful too. This has been affirmed on the principle that such a cause must partake of the properties of its effect. It is this principle, we apprehend, which has led to the assertion, that sin is separable from moral action. But the principle, in our view, cannot be sustained. There is nothing in the relation of cause and effect under any circumstances, which involves a community of properties between them. Pain is the effect of applying fire to our bodies, but is there any thing like pain in the element of fire? Thinking is the result of our intellectual nature, but can we conceive of any thing like thinking, back of thought itself? Dr. Taylor maintains, therefore, that the ground or reason of sin which lies back of moral action in the being of man, is not itself sinful.*

It has been contended, also, in opposition to Dr. Taylor, that this ground or reason is, in the strict sense of the term, an efficient cause. This we cannot admit. An efficient cause is one which exerts a direct and positive influence, and which no supposable power in the given case could resist. If there is such a cause in man, lying back of the will, if moral action is the mere effect of some tendency or nature within us,operating as an efficient cause, mind and matter are brought to one level, and we sink at once into machines. When our correspondent asks us, therefore, "How is the case essentially different?"-What advantage is there in the views of the Christian Spectator, over those which it rejects? we say, he may find the answer here. Is it of no importance, in his view, whether voluntary agency and moral accounta bility, are reduced to mere effects, resulting from the operation of a sinful efficient cause, seated in the being of man? Will he say that the certainty of Judas' sin rested on the same foundation, as the certainty that fire, applied to our bodies, will burn? All coming events are certain. Under the eye of Omniscience, the future is spread out like the past. But does this certainty reduce all events to one level? Is there no difference between the ground of the certainty

* See this subject discussed in the Christ. Spect. for this year, page 352.

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that God will never lie, and of the certainty that this earth will continue to roll onward in its orbit? But we need not ask our correspondent. He has answered his own question. He has told us, that the principles against which we contend, are not only bordering on fatalism," but are, in his view, "actually embracing it." To this point, the whole discussion ultimately comes. The question whether nature is the efficient cause," or the "ground" and "occasion" of moral action, (the certainty of the result being admitted in both cases) is, in our view, only the question whether New-England has been deluded for a century by the semblance of a distinction between natural and moral ability and inability, which has no foundation in the nature of things?

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Nor is this all. According to our system, it depends upon the act and choice of each individual, whether he will be a sinner or not. He has power never to be a sinner. But on the opposing theory, it does not depend on the choice or act of the individual, whether he will be a sinner or not. He becomes a sinner previous to, and separate from, all action or choice of his own. How came he to be so ! Not by chance; not by a transfer of moral character; not by a propagation of soul from his parent. Who then has made him a sinner? Is there no difference here?

One word more on this point. "Mankind come into the world in such a state, that without the intervention of divine grace, all, as soon as they become moral agents, sin in every accountable act.” The assertion of this FACT is Calvinism, not the theories which attempt to explain it. In respect to those theories, there has always been great diversity and mutual forbearance. The views which we have stated can hardly be dignified with the name of theory. They consist essentially in the rejection of all theories. In stating the simple fact, that God's "leaving the common natural principles of self-love, natural appetite, &c.. (which were in man in innocence,) leaving these to themselves, without the government of superior divine principles, will certainly be followed with the corruption, yea, the total corruption of the heart, without any occasion for any positive influence at all."* If a brief period intervenes between birth and moral action, then natural appetites will have been strengthened by self-indulgence. If no such period intervenes, then, we see, they are so strong from the first, that in every instance the will does in fact yield to these demands. But whenever it thus yielded, there was power to the contrary; otherwise there could be no freedom or moral action. Thus we have no theory on the subject, except the assertion of the acknowledged fact, that man does uniformly sin from the commencement of moral agency. Whatever is thus uniform, is BY NATURE. Now, in our view, there is a most material advantage in this rejection of all theories on the subject, -the theory of our oneness with Adam-the theory that God is the efficient cause of all our volitions-the theory of a sinful nature back of moral agency. We prefer to rest in the simple FACT-established by scripture and experience-that such is the nature of man, that by an absolute undeviating certainty, he does sin from the moment that he can sin; but yet with perfect freedom and with full power to do his duty.

* Edward's Works, Vol. VI. p. 428.

We agree with our correspondent that the great body of Calvinists have always held that sin consists essentially in man's own act of choice. Passing by the names of President Edwards, Dr. Bellamy, and Dr. Woods, whose strong declarations were given in our last number, we shall add the following, as specimens of a multitude of similar declarations.

DR. HOPKINS. "ALL sin consists in the nature and qualities of the exercises which take place in a moral agent, and not in any thing which goes before, or follows after them." System, vol. I. 337.

DR. N. STRONG. "The disorder in the sinner's heart is misplaced LOVE." Serm. I. 114. "CHOOSING a truth or object is loving it. rejecting, is hating it." Do. 103. "A holy will is a holy heart.” Do. do." A temper, disposition, inclination, taste, or relish, which are right or wrong, mean the same as a heart or WILL, that is right or wrong." Do. do.

DR. EMMONS. "All our sin is personal, and consists in our own free and voluntary exercises." Serm. i. 267.

DR. S. SPRING. "Sin being a wrong choice, must consist in selflove." Mor. Disq. p. 19. "All sin consists in self-love." Do. 15, passim.

Theology,

DR. DWIGHT. "Man is the actor of his own sin." vol. I. 460. "Selfishness consists in a preference of ourselves to others, and to all others, to the universe, and to God. This is sin; and all that in the scriptures is meant by sin." Do. III. 162.

DR. BEECHER. "Neither a holy nor a depraved nature are possible, without understanding, conscience and choice. National Preacher, vol. II. 12.

DR. TYLER. "When we say that man is entirely depraved,-we mean that he is a guilty rebel who voluntarily refuses allegiance to the God who made him. This supposes no difficulty in the way of his salvation, except what lies in a perverse and obstinate will." National Preacher, II. 163.

DR. G. SPRING. "Seriously considered, it is impossible to sin without acting voluntarily." Essay, p. 172.

Now there is no room left for saying, that the authors of these passages may have believed in some other kind of sin, which does not consist in voluntary action. They speak of all sin; they describe the "heart," "disposition," every thing, in short, which is right or wrong in man, as consisting in acts of the will. According to this definition, therefore, all their other language must be understood. Do Dr. Strong and Dr. Dwight, for example, speak of a "corrupt nature," a " sinful disposition," "taste," "relish," etc. from which, all action or volition flows? We see from their language, as in the passage from Dr. Strong, that this relish, taste, etc. was itself, in their view, a voluntary state of mind,—it was "the will." At what period these writers considered moral agency to begin, does not in all cases appear. But it is certain, that of whatever period they designed to affirm sin in the strict sense of the term, of that period they must also have intended to affirm moral agency in some proper use of that expression.

ERRATA. In the first article of this number, p. 424, read Bererning for Bevering. Some other errors occurred in that article which the reader will easi ly correct.

THE

CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR.

QUARTERLY---NO. IV.

DECEMBER, 1829.

ART. I.-REVIEW OF ADAM CLARKE'S DISCOURSES.

Discourses on various Subjects relative to the Being and Attributes of God, and his Works in Creation, Providence, and Grace; by ADAM CLARKE, LL. D., F. A. S. etc. etc. New-York. 1829. 8vo. pp. 304.

THE writings of Dr. Adam Clarke are a strange compoundwe will not say of sense and nonsense-but of common sense and that which is singularly uncommon. From his Commentary on the scriptures, which opens with some ten or twenty reasons to prove that the serpent who tempted Eve was a baboon, down to the volume of sermons now before us, they abound in learned lore, ingenious conjectures, gross inconsistencies, very doubtful metaphysics, and much excellent feeling, which are poured out upon the reader with but little regard to order or selection. If Dr. Clarke does not act on the fixed principle of exhibiting the whole amount of his knowledge on every subject as it comes before him, he at least deals it forth with a lavish hand; leaving it, however, very often to the reader, to discover at his leisure the precise relevancy of his facts and quotations. Though frequently pungent in his public discourses, yet, where his subject or the occasion would prompt him to be eloquent, we commonly find him either coldly learned, or drily casuistical. Of this his Charity sermons are a striking illustration.

This profusion of learning, science, and metaphysics, appears a little singular in one who stands at the head of a sect so distinguished for fervid declamation against human learning and man-made ministers." Precisely what proportion of his brethren in this country, whether bishops, priests, or laity, will be able to follow him in his quotations from the