This is the shape which the idea of the gospel assumes in his mind, and from this he derives his impression of it. He avows his belief of the facts contained in the sacred history, and he distinctly perceives the moral qualities manifested in them; but he does not consider them as things existing by themselves, and independent of all human reasoning upon them. He is occupied by the metaphysics of religion, as the formalist is occupied by the ceremonies.-It is also possible to believe in the poetry of the Bible, without any saving consequences.-There is a belief in Christianity as a subject of controversy. The great facts of revelation are not the object of which this belief is the impression. The real object of faith in a believer of this order, is, that his view is right, and that of his opponent's, wrong." Now, here is something approaching, very nearly, to a distinction in the mode of believing, when it is asserted that we may believe the same system of facts, as philosophy, as poetry, as subject of controversy. It is manifest that this defect of faith, is not

to be detected by reading the scriptures or systematizing them, for it is supposed that there is an accurate acquaintance with the system, but that we must look for it in the mind to discover what "shape the idea of the gospel assumes there." Besides, this is leading us back precisely to the old divisions of faith; and if our forefathers had thought of these different modes of receiving the system of the gospel, we should have had, in addition to the historical faith, the temporary faith, the saving faith of their days, the philosophical faith, the poetical faith, and the controversial faith of Mr. Erskine.

We have not yet had the realizing faith of former days, but that also is forthcoming.

"We cannot become acquainted with any thing, except by the impressions which it makes upon us. And these impressions are made on our different senses, external and internal. As we know the taste of a substance by our palate, and its colour by our eye; so we know the joyfulness of an event, by the happiness which it produces in us, and the amiable

ness of an object, by the love or admiration which we feel for it. Where the external sense is wanting, or diseased, or dormant, the information which we ought to receive from it, is different: and where the internal sense is dormant or weak, there is either no impression received, or a deficient one."-Page 47. I shall not dispute the truth of this remark, but I would observe, that it is metaphysical, and that it respects the mode of believing. If a man under disease, see objects double or discoloured, he must look for the cause in his own eye, and not in the object. And if a man's belief be defective in consequence of the dormancy or weakness of an internal sense, he must look not to the thing believed, but to the laws and operations of his own mind, to discover the defect. This defect is further explained, thus:

"We are very apt to think that one man is as much in a condition to believe any moral history, as another; but if there be any difference in the strength or habitual bent of their moral feelings, there must be a proportional difference

in the impression which the history will make on them, and of course in their belief. What can hinder a man of ordinary understanding from believing in a generous action, supposing that there is sufficient evidence of the fact? If the man has never felt a generous emotion in his own mind, he does not know what generosity is, and therefore cannot believe in it. If he has had some generous feelings, but has left them uncultivated and unexercised, the impression of generosity on his mind will be weak and imperfect, and so also will be his belief of it." Here we have the same liberty taken with the word belief, which I formerly complained of, the weakness or strength of belief strictly depends on the evidence, and not on the vivid impression of the thing believed. But let the author proceed. "If a man has never suffered from an accusing conscience, nor perceived any deformity in sin, he cannot understand nor believe the statements which the Bible gives, of the corruption of the human heart. Our moral faculties must be in right and

healthful exercise, in order that we may have a correct belief of moral truths."-"There is a great diversity in human characters and capacities. There is a fervour in the feelings of some, which colder spirits cannot conceive, and therefore cannot believe."-" It is impossible really to have clear views of the gospel, whilst the affections are muddy. What adequate impression can an impure mind have of the holy love of God."—" The purest heart has the most correct faith, because it is susceptible of the truest impressions from holy love."-And much more to the same purpose. Here, then, a defect of faith is traced, first to the dormancy or weakness of internal senses, a want of susceptibility to receive impressions from moral objects, and that want of susceptibility traced to a perverted state of the affections or moral powers. This, surely, is sending a man to the state of his own mind to detect the defects of his faith; he must consider whether his internal senses are awake and strong; if he finds them to be weak, he must consider the perverted state of