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in the direction of this singleness of logical principle. He has not indicated its ground as given by the very nature of the faculty of thought, nor anywhere gathered into one the seve ral principles of the science. This, logic should now do ; and in its thorough development carry out its single principle into all the parts of the science.
IV. The faculty of thought, as identifying faculty, deals only with quantities—with wholes. Its systematic development should be throughout in this relationship of quantity
of wholes and parts. Hamilton has in this field of logic signalized his meritorious achievements for the science. But here, as elsewhere, his labors are to be characterized as initiative, germinant, suggestive only. His Lectures bear proofs of this crudity and immaturity. His Discussions and posthumous papers still indicate that the development had not ripened into perfect fruit in his own mind. We find thus in his latest writings,' the strange doctrine that "a proposi tion is simply an equation, an identification, a bringing intocongruence of two notions in respect to their extension. I say, in respect to their extension; for it is this quantity alone which admits of amplification or restriction, the comprehension of a notion remaining always the same, being always taken at its full amount." That this is wrong, and that there is no such difference in the two quantities, is clear at a glance. The proposition, " man is mortal," taken in extensive quantity, is explicated thus, on the principle that the proposition is an equation, an identification of subject and predicate: "man is identical with one of the species contained under the class mortal," the predicate being necessarily restricted to a part of its extension-to one included species. Explicated in comprehensive quantity, the proposition, as identifying subject and predicate, must read thus: "the notion 'man' in respect to one of the characters which constitute it, is identical with the notion 'mortal.'" But here "man," although taken in its comprehensive quantity, is restricted as truly as it is in the other case, when taken in its
1 Lectures on Logic (Am. ed.), Appendix V. (iii.), p. 525.
extensive quantity. The principle, indeed, that "every proposition is an equation of subject and predicate," will not hold in comprehensive judgments, if this strange assertion of Hamilton be accepted. We deem it an inconsiderate remark, thrown out in his eagerness to carry a special point in a discussion.
V. Logic, as mainly designed to help us to right, methodical knowledge of objective being, should develop itself co-ordinately in the two directions of the twofold phase of being substance and cause. If our exposition of the true nature of inductive reasoning be accepted as correct, then not only must we, with Hamilton, reject the teachings of logicians concerning the nature of induction as erroneous, but positively derive it from the necessary forms of the identifying activity which moves in the twofold direction, from whole to part and from part to whole, with equal validity and significance. It should therefore recognize causal wholes equally with substantial wholes, as means of illustrating the nature and application of its principles, assuming, of course, both alike.
VI. Logic should recognize and distinctly expound the two kinds of reasoning-mediate and immediate; and in this reduce hypothetical and disjunctive reasonings to the immediate class.
VII. In order to this, and also to perfect its own development, it needs to establish the distinction between subjects of propositions which are originally concepts-mere objects, and subjects which are judgments mere truths. Hamilton, in his posthumous papers, has drawn nice distinctions between mediate and immediate reasonings; but the development of the doctrine is imperfect; and the distinction in the nature of the subjects of propositions just indicated seems utterly to have escaped his notice.
VIII. Logic needs to settle the doctrine of modality on its true basis. By earlier logicians it is expounded extralogically. It is utterly discarded from the science by Hamilton, as thus extra-logical. But modality lies within the
sphere of logic as a pure science. Hamilton's arguments are both of them singular instances of fallacious reasoning. His first argument is that of an example. He adduces the proposition, "Alexander conquered Darius honorably"; and proceeds to show its equivalence to the proposition, “ Alexander was the honorable conqueror of Darius." Unfortunately for his success, his proposition is not a modal at all, since modality is a property of the copula, not of the predicate. His second argument is, that modality is without the domain of logic as a formal science, inasmuch as to determine the modality of a proposition we must go out of the field of form into a consideration of the matter. But this is all a mistake, although Hamilton may have been correct in his representation of the doctrine of Whately and other logicians, and his reasoning valid against them. But modality, belonging to the copula exclusively, attaches to the form, not to the matter, of the judgment; and the reasoning of Hamilton, therefore, is entirely fallacious. Nor, in our opinion, does Dr. Mansel's distinction between the logical and the psychological copula1 help the matter. If logic be, as we have claimed, the science of the products of the discursive faculty, then certainly the necessary general forms of the judgment should come into view in the expositions of the science. Logic loses nothing of its character as pure science by the recognition of these forms of the judgment. It accepts them as psychological facts; its laws apply as well to them as to any of its assumptions, and with all their purely scientific stringency. With much more plausibility, indeed, might the consideration of disjunctive judgments with more than two disjunct members be discarded from logic as pure science. But there is no occasion for rejecting either on any scientific ground.
IX. Logic should perfect its doctrine of methodology. We recognize the hand of a master in the work of Hamilton in this department of the science, as elsewhere. Even if bis views were mainly derived from German sources, the Eng1 Prolegomena Logica, Note H.
lish mind owes him a debt of gratitude for the introduction of this division of logic in a truly scientific way and form. We have to regret here, also, the immaturity of his views as presented in his Lectures. He has transferred the errors and superficialities of the German logicians, from whom he cites so largely, to an extent that seriously mars the presentation. The attempt to found the three virtues in the formal perfection of thought on the three grounds respectively of, "1, the comprehension; 2, the extension; and 3, the concatenation of notions," is most unscientific. Even the introduction by Hamilton of the very unscientific qualification "principally founded" does not save it from this criticism. The exposition of the doctrine of method is, of course, in serious error and, indeed, often in direct contradiction to the principles of the New Analytic. The presentation of "division," thus, in the methodology, is entirely irreconcilable with the teachings given in the doctrine of concepts. The three virtues of perfect thought have no such peculiar relationship respectively to the several principles of method. "Clearness" belongs as much to "extensive quantity" as to "comprehension"; and "distinctness” as much to "comprehension" as to "extension;" as in fact Hamilton expressly teaches in his "doctrine of elements." And "harmony," the third virtue named, does not exclusively pertain to mediate reasonings. The author from whom Hamilton derives his teachings had clearly never recognized the true relation of concepts, judgments, and reasonings; never understood their true nature.
The whole matter of methodology, practically the most important department of the science, calls for an entirely new development on the strictest scientific principles. It may be a question whether the treatment of it should not be wholly relegated to rhetoric. There would seem to be here, in fact, common territory. But if logic undertakes to expound the principles of method, she may justly be required to expound them in exact method. If she show inability to apply her own principles, she discredits herself, and justifies rejection and contempt.
THE BEARING OF MODERN SCIENTIFIC THEORIES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS OF RELIGION.1
BY ANDREW P. PEABODY, D.D., HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
GENTLEMEN of the Delphic and Pithonian Societies; though I visit your University for the first time, it is not with the heart of a stranger. Our American colleges are, in mutual sympathy and helpfulness, a close confederation; and as a member of one academic body I deem myself a citizen of every other. Moreover, I must the more earnestly crave a friendly reception here, on the ground on which the people of Tyre and Sidon desired peace with Herod, "because their country was nourished by the king's country." Among the books which I always keep at hand for daily consultation is the voluminous Commentary on the New Testament which comes from your Professor of Greek,2—a work derived, indeed, from a German original, but so completely overlaid and incrusted with a dense deposit of Genesee scholarship as hardly to permit us to say that it is alter et idem, so much more and better has it become in its American guise. Nor can I forget that, as an editor, I have repeatedly fed my public with supplies furnished by your venerable Professor of Chemistry,3 who at the same time, by his genial correspondence, has taught me to love him as he is loved by you all.
I give you joy on the progress, prosperity, and fair fame of your University - infant in years alone; mature in its capacity of service to the cause of learning and piety.
I would especially congratulate you on the foremost place
An Address delivered before the Literary Societies of Rochester University, July, 1863.
2 Rev. Dr. Kendrick's edition of Olshausen.
8 Rev. Chester Dewey, LL.D.