This part of the Governor's message was referred to a committee, whose report breathes of the same pugnacious spirit, and in the same magnanimous strain glories in a resemblance to the ancient republics in the worst feature of those heathen states.

"Let our northern brethren then, if there is no peace in Union, if the compact has become too heavy to be longer borne, in the name of all the mercies find peace among themselves. Let them continue to rejoice in their selfrighteousness; let them bask in their own elysium, while they depict all south of the Potomac, as hideous reverse. As Athens, as Sparta, as Rome was, we will be; they held slaves, we hold them. Let the North then form national roads for themselves, let them guard with tariffs their own interest, let them deepen their public debt until a high minded aristocracy shall rise out of it. We want none of these blessings. But in the simplicity of the patriarchal government, we would still remain master and servant under our own vine and our own fig-tree, and confide for safety upon Him, who of old time, looked down upon this state of things without wrath. "Be it therefore resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Georgia in General Assembly met-That we concur most heartily in the sentiments on this subject, communicated by his Excellency the Governor, that, "having exhausted the argument, we will stand by our arms," "and for the support of this determination we mutually pledge to each other, our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honour."

If proofs were wanted of the debasing effects of slavery, they are furnished by these documents of Governor Troup and his committee. It is here officially declared-in terms which cannot be misconstrued-that it is a monstrous evil, political and moral. But we forbear comment.-Slavery will terminate, in one form or another. The event is certain: a brute force always accumulating cannot always be restrained; and if He whose awful name the committee have profanely used to sanctify oppression, shall see fit to make the evil its own avenger and its own cure, the fierce and blind zeal of such men as Governor Troup and his asso

ciates is no doubt among the means preparatory to such an issue.

The fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Bunker Hill, was celebrated on the 17th of June, and the corner-stone of a Monument in commemoration of that event laid, in the presence of many thousands of people. The procession was formed at the State House in Boston, at 10 o'clock, and in ranks of six deep, extended from the State House to Charlestown bridge. It was composed in part, of the survivors of the battle, about forty in number, in eight barouches, each wearing a badge," Bunker Hill, June 17, 1775”—and some bearing the implements used in the fight. These were followed by between one and two hundred revolutionary officers and soldiers. Arrived at the site of the monument, the various sections of the procession formed in squares around it, when the stone was laid with masonic ceremonies, at which General LAFAYETTE assisted. In the cavity of the stone were deposited the official accounts of the battle by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts Bay, and by General Gage, specimens of old continental money, medals, newspapers, &c. and a silver plate with the following

Inscription.

On the XVII day of June, MDCCCXXV, at the request of the Bunker Hill Monument Association, the Most Worshipful John Abbot, Grand Master of Masons in Massachusetts, did, in the presence of General LAFAYETTE, lay the corner stone of a MONUMENT to testify the gratitude of the present generation to their Fathers, who on the 17th June, 1775, here fought in the cause of their country, and of free institutions, the memorable BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL, and with their blood vindicated for their posterity the privileges and happiness this land has since enjoyed.

The ceremony of placing the corner stone being ended, the vast assembly moved to the north-eastern declivity of the hill, where ample seats in the form of an amphitheatre had been prepared for their accommodation, and where they attended to the address of the President of the Association, and to various other exercises appropriate to the occasion.

For the Christian Spectator.

CERTAIN

NATURAL

PRINCIPLES

NESS.

IN

ALL who profess to believe in the Bible as a revelation from God, consider holiness as an essential requisite to salvation. The only difference among them, professedly, relates to the nature of this qualification; some making it include any things which are entirely distinct from it, and others refusing to allow that degree of estimation to certain valuable principles in man, to which they are justly entitled. It is the object of the following discussion, to distinguish between holiness, and certain amiable affections and valuable principles in human nature, with which it is often confounded.

Holiness has been variously defined, as consisting in moral purity, or freedom from sin; in conformity to the moral character of God-in obedience to the moral law. Any one of these definitions will express the truth with more or less accuracy Holiness doubtless consists in obedience to the moral law. That law, Christ has summed up in love to God and our neighbour. Obedience to the moral law, therefore, or love to God and our neighbour, in other language, is, love to intelligent or moral beings.

Perhaps it would be rather more definite to say, that holiness conVoL.VII. No. 8.

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word holiness is used in a primary and in a secondary sense. In the primary sense, it consists in benevolence to moral beings as such. In the secondary sense, it is exclusive complacency in a character like itself. In this sense, it is the love of holiness in the primary sense.

Strictly speaking, holiness has no direct reference to the happiness, or to the qualities of mere sensitive beings-beings capable of happiness, but not moral agents. That which embraces the happiness of all beings capable of happiness, whether animal or rational, is properly denoted by the broader term, benevolence. In its widest and appropriate sense, benevolence has respect to the happiness of all percipient beings, considered simply as enjoyment; whether it be animal, social, intellectual, or moral enjoyment. That which has respect to man, considered simply as an animal, a social, or an intellectual being, is properly benevolence.

The word moral, in this discussion, is used in the theological sense,--to denote what is either sinful or holy, except where other phraseology expressly affixes to it the popular sense. I do not think it important in this discussion, to exclude God from the number of beings denom inated moral, and confine the term as some have lone, to beings who are subject to the divine law.

Where it has respect to man as a moral being as a subject of the government of God-it then becomes boliness. Benevolence is a general term; holiness is specific. Benevolence may become specific, by the addition of some qualifying term, as holy or Christian. Where we do not wish to distinguish holiness from the native benevolent affections, and where we know that we shall not be misunderstood; it is sufficient to call it benevolence.

It may serve to render our views on this subject more definite and clear, to inquire in what manner our conceptions of holiness are formed. Like the other attributes of an agent, holiness is a relative term; and our conceptions of it are formed in the same manner as we form our conceptions of his other attributes, by considering certain classes of his actions; or, which is the same thing, by considering his actions in view of certain objects. It is a well known principle in intellectual philosophy, that every attribute of an agent has its appropriate object, in view of which it is brought into exercise; and without this object we should never discover the existence of the attribute itself. We learn therefore what any attribute is, by considering that class of actions which have respect to its appropriate object. Let us apply this principle to inan and to God.

We discover whether a man pos sesses memory, by observing whether he is capable of recalling former thoughts, or impressions once made upon the mind. We do not think of discovering the existence or nature of memory, by observing how he conducts towards a being in distress. This is not the proper object. Here we see the operation of compassion, or the want of it. Nor do we think of discovering whether he is compassionate, by observing his skill to mathematical

demonstration. Here we see the exercise of reason.

Considering God in respect to the design displayed in his works, we say he has wisdom. Viewing his conduct in relation to the happiness of all percipient beings, considered simply as enjoyment, we say he is benevolent. But how do we learn the nature of his holiness? I answer, by considering his conduct in respect to moral beings; particularly sinful beings. In this way we learn, that he hates sin; that he desires to make holy beings happy, and views their characters with complacency; that he desires sinners should become holy and in this way happy; and that, though he gives them social and intellectual enjoyments-he will not make them happy as moral beings, unless they become holy; but, on the contrary, will make them miserable. Without thus considering the conduct of God in relation to a moral object, we should never have any just conceptions of him as a holy being. Though we should for ever consider his treatment of mere sensitive beings, possessing the highest degree of enjoyment of which they are capable, we should have no just conceptions of his holiness. Benevolence and holiness are relative terms; and in order to form just conceptions of them, we must consider the agent acting in view of the appropriate object. What that object is, so far as it is a subject of the philosophy of mind, is shown by reflection and observation. There is the same evidence that the proper object of holiness is a moral object, as there is that the proper object of benevolence is the happiness of all percipient beings; or the proper object of compassion, a being in distress. Other evidence will be exhibited in the course of the discussion. We may however, with propriety, speaking in a general way, ascribe all the happiness in the universe to God's

benevolence; but that which has respect to the happiness of moral beings is holy benevolence-it is holiness.

Holiness in man, therefore, differs from the native benevolent affections, because it has respect to a different object; namely, a moral object. Compassion towards animals, is a benevolent, but not a holy affection, because it has not a moral object.

It is, in itself considered, no more a holy affection, than that compassion which is exercised by one animal towards another. Instances are numerous, of animals manifesting kindness to one another, in a manner which "puts human nature to the blush." They have imparted their own food to the wounded and distressed, so as to be the means of restoring health. They have with great exertion often saved persons from drowning. They have communicated intelligence of persons in distress to those who could relieve them, with all that apparent anxiety and tender solicitude which a man could have manifested, without the use of language and when the desired relief has been afforded, they have exhibited the highest degree of satisfaction. Now, here is sympatby, kindness, affection; but it is not holiness. Neither is it holiness in man, when exercised toward the same object. But the man himself is holy or sinful, in his treatment of the animal creation, according as he carries along with him a regard or a disregard to the will of God. So he is in the indulgence of his natural taste, which is in itself neither sinful nor holy. But if he does not eat and drink to the glory of God," he shows a disregard to the authority of Jehovah. Doing what God forbids or neglecting to do what he requires, shows a disregard to God himself. It brings to the view of the agent, a moral object, a Being above him,

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who rightfully commands his services; and whom, if he disobeys, he disregards and sins against him. But it may still be thought that the animal creation is the proper object of holy affection. because " a righteous man regardeth the life of his beast." True he does; and so does the unrighteous man, when not under the influence of bad passions. The righteous man also possesses and exercises memory, imagination, reason, judgment; but this does not prove that these exercises are in themselves holy. Not every thing which a righteous man has or does, is of course holy, in itself considered. Nor is every thing which a wicked man has or does, in itself sinful. It may not of itself possess any moral character at all; and yet it may in either case become holy or sinful in the agent, according as it is done from a regard or a disregard to God or to the spiritual good of man.

Holiness differs from the social affections in two respects;-in respect to its object, and its effects. When exercised towards man, it has respect to his moral character and circumstances simply. But the social affections have respect to man only in his social capacity. Parental affection, for example, has for its object, a child, considered simply in that relation; without regard to his moral condition, or to his relation to his Creator. Suppose a pious parent has a child that is grossly vicious: has he no affection for that child?" Can a mother forget her child?" Yet, if the parent has the love of God in his heart, he neither desires to gratify the sinful propensities, nor approves of the moral character of his abandoned child. That character is the object of his entire disapprobation. Still, as a parent, he loves his child. On the other hand, his holy love will fill him, as a Christian, with tender compassion for the spiritual welfare of his child, and

cause him to pray and labour for his child's salvation. His parental affection may operate favourably, by awakening his attention and fix ing it more intensely on the condition of his child, and quickening his efforts as a Christian. But the object of his parental affection is his child, as his child; not as a moral being. On the contrary, the object of his holy affection, is the soul of his child; it is his child considered as a subject of God's moral government-two distinct objects. If we look at their effects more par ticularly, their difference will further appear. Holiness opposes sin, in every form and degree, in the person towards whom it is exercised; and though it seeks the highest happiness of its object, it will not allow, for the sake of gratifying that person, the least sinful in dulgence. Natural affection, on the contrary, will consent to sinful indulgence in its object, even against reason, conscience, and the law of God. How often do we find parents, from parental affection, consent to their children's partaking of sinful indulgences and amusements, when reason testifies that those indulgences will injure the health, and conscience testifies that they are contrary to the divine commands and ruinous to the souls of their children. This, lamentable as the fact is, pious parents sometimes do, through the strength of their natural affection and the weakness of their love to the souls of their children. They have so little holiness, that their parental affection often triumphs over it, and causes them to yield to their children's importunities though contrary to the precepts of God's word. But did they possess greater degrees of holiness, more concern for their children's spintual welfare, and more regard to God, they would testify against such practices, tenderly and faithfully enforce the divine precepts, and hold up to

view the dreadful consequences of disobedience; and if need be, they would interpose with parental anthority.

To an inattentive observer, the social affections sometimes appear, at first view, to have respect to the moral condition of their object; but a little attention to the circumstances of the case clearly shows that they do not. A tender parent, though influenced by no higher principle than parental affection, will earnestly desire that his chil dren may be happy in the future world and will not endure the suggestion, that those of them who have departed this life, have not gone to heaven, whatever may have been their conduct while bere. But if you mark his conversation, you will clearly perceive it is not the moral happiness or misery of his children which he has in view. The kind of happiness or misery is not taken into the account. It is mere pleasure or pain, without respect to its nature; and that is sufficient to excite the highest degree of parental solicitude. That it is not the holy happiness of heaven which he desires for his children, is further evident, because be neglects to instruct them in the only way of saivation, and to pray for their conversion to God; and because he allows them in such amusements and unhallowed practices, as serve to drown all serious thoughts of God and salvation, and to fix them in a state of thoughtlessness respecting their hereafter and of utter unpreparedness for heaven. These things he does, instead of training them up in the way they should go. But these things he would not do, if he had a sincere regard to the spiritual welfare of his children, or a holy regard to the authority of God.

Another illustration of the general subject-An unsanctified man sees his Christian neighbour suffering some great temporal calamity. His sympathies are wrought upon,