known, for the sake of proving it? He states, that we know it by intuition. And what is intuition? "This part of knowledge," he says, " is irresistible, and like bright sunshine, forces itself to be perceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way." Does M. Cousin refer us to any knowledge more direct than this? Here is no logical process of disjoining, and abstracting, and comparing, and inferring.

But Cousin says, "The theory of Locke not only makes the human mind begin with abstraction, but also to derive the concrete from the abstract; while in point of fact, you could never have had the abstract, if you had not previously had the concrete." pp. 202, 203. Now what does Locke say? Speaking of abstract general maxims, he says, "That they are not the truths first known to the inind, is evident to experience." "Such self-evident truths must be first known, which consist of ideas, that are first in the mind; and the ideas first in the mind, 'tis evident, are those of particular things; from whence, by slow degrees, the understanding proceeds to some few general ones." "For abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children, or the yet unexercised mind, as particular ones." B. IV. ch. vii. § 9. If in the concrete proposition, I exist, the terms I and exist are so distinct, that we can understand the meaning of the expression; no farther abstraction is necessary, to enable us to see the truth of it. Seeing the agreement between our ideas, is not, according to Locke, a method by which we are to arrive at knowledge, but it is that in which knowledge consists.

The "subtle" argument, in the commencement of the ninth chapter of Cousin, IS of the same character with that which we have now been examining. He says, that according to the theory of Locke, every judgment implies comparison; a comparison between two terms. But in cases of real existence, at least, terms must be known, before they can be compared. There must, therefore, be some knowledge before any act of comparison; that is, before any judgment. pp. 213-216. But, in the judgment which Cousin calls primitive, are there not the two terms which constitute the subject and the predicate of a proposition, as in his own example, I exist? And does Locke's theory require any other comparison between these, than what is implied in seeing intuitively the truth of the proposition ?

We fully agree with Cousin, that " one of the best chapters of Locke, is that on Faith and Reason." "Locke assigns the exact province of reason and faith. He indicates their relative office, and their distinct limits." p. 232.

It is one of Cousin's favorite principles, that every scheme of philosophy contains some truth and some error, and that error retains its hold on the human mind, only by being intimately blended with truth.

،

Men, individuals and nations, men of genius and ordinary men, un-.

questionably give in to many errors, and attach themselves to them; but not to that which makes them errors, but to the part of truth which is in them. Examine to the bottom all the celebrated errors, political, religious, philosophical; there is not one which has not a considerable portion of truth in it, and it is to this it owes its credence in the minds of great men, who introduced it upon the scene of the world, and in the minds of the multitude, who have followed the great men. It is the truth joined to the error, which gives to the error all its force, which gives it birth, sustains it, spreads it, explains and excuses it. Errors gain success and footing in the world, no otherwise than by carrying along with them, and offering, as it were, for their ransom, so much of truth, as, piercing through the mists which envelop it, enlighten and carry forward the human race. p. 240.

The last point discussed, in the volume before us, is the evidence of the being of a God.

There are various and different proofs of the existence of God. The gratifying result of my studies in this respect, is, that these various proofs have different degrees of strictness in their form, but that they all have a foundation of truth, which needs simply to be disengaged and put in clear light in order to give them an incontrovertible authority. Every thing leads us to God; there is no bad way of arriving thither; we may go in different ways. In general, all the proofs of every sort of the existence of God, are comprehended under two great classes, namely: proofs a posteriori, and proofs a priori. p. 264.

After various introductory observations, our author expresses, very briefly, the substance of the a priori argument. "The simple fact of the conception of God, by the reason, the simple idea of God, the simple possibility of the existence of God, implies the certainty and necessity of the existence of God." pp. 266, 267. On the demonstration of Locke, Cousin observes :

' Locke believes in the existence of God, and he has given an excellent demonstration of it. But he comes from the Sensual school, he therefore repels arguments a priori, and admits scarcely any thing but arguments a posteriori. He does not wish to employ the argument of Descartes, which proves the existence of God from the idea of him, from the idea of infinity and perfection. p. 270.

In succeeding observations, Cousin intimates, that Locke's demonstration "grounds itself, specially, upon sensible and external experience." Now the fact is, that the single point which Locke assumes, as the basis of his argument, is our own existence. “Το show, that we are capable of knowing, that is, being certain, that there is a God, and how we came by this certainty, I think we need go no farther than ourselves, and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence." B. IV. ch. x. § 1.

At the close of his work, Cousin says, that in combating Locke, he has borrowed many of his arguments from Reid and Kant. He proposes, at a future day, to make an attack upon "the sublime errors and mystic tendencies" of the spiritual school of Kant. How great a portion of the labors of philosophers, is employed in endeavoring to overthrow the positions of preceding writers! Aristotle is attacked by Descartes, Descartes by Locke, Locke by Reid, Reid by Kant, and Kant by Cousin. How far this demolishing process may be carried, it is not easy to determine. It may not stop with Cousin. His philosophy, built on the ruins of other systems, may last till the next popular lecturer appears in Paris. The sexton, who digs his thousand graves, may well consider, that some one may soon be at hand, who will dig his grave.

While endeavoring to do justice to the principles of Locke, we have not undertaken an examination of Cousin's own system of philosophy. We doubt whether its features could be accurately drawn, from the occasional glimpses which we have of it, in perusing the work under review. We should not choose to incur the risk of misrepresenting him, as much as he has misapprehended Locke. The translator, in his introduction and appendix, has given us brief sketches of our author's theories. Some of our friends complain, that these explanations need to be explained. And we were about proposing some queries ourselves, respecting the "higher metaphysics," the "transcendental logic," the "subjective primitive," "objective intellections," and "self-reduplication," together with the "antithetic synthesis," the "hyperphysical determination," the " spontaneity of reason," and " egoistical idealism," of the article in the Edinburgh Review, pronounced, by Mr. Henry, to be "one of the best specimens of philosophical criticism, which has recently appeared in the English language." But we have thought it prudent to pay some regard to our own reputation, taking to ourselves a caution from the sage remark of Dugald Stewart: "I am fully aware, that whoever, in treating of the human mind, aims to be understood, must lay his account with forfeiting, in the opinion of a very large proportion of readers, all pretensions to depth, to subtlety, or to invention." Phil. vol. ii. We are inclined to think, that the obscurity of which some complain, in the introduction and appendix, are to be ascribed, not the editor, but to his subject. He appears to have caught the spirit and manner of his originals. This is no vulgar philosophy. It is transcendental. The profound, as well as the sublinie, are nearly allied to the obscure. The examination of the Essay on the Understanding, is more perspicuous than any of the other writings of Cousin which we have read. His criticisms are rendered distinct, by the light reflected from the luminous

pages of Locke. We have been repeatedly told, by those who profess to know something of the German philosophy, from which Cousin has borrowed so largely, that it is impossible to translate it into English. If this is so, we ought not to complain of the failure of any attempt to teach us its mysteries. We may congratulate ourselves, however, that we are not subjected to the restriction, which, according to Cousin, prevented the entire development of Locke's philosophy in England, that it was put forth on an island! There must be room, we think, in America, for the expansion of the most ample philosophical system. "There is no subject," says Fontenelle, "on which men ever come to form a reasonable opinion, till they have exhausted all the absurd views which it is possible to take of it." From the history of philosophical opinions, there is ground to hope, that the catalogue of all possible absurdities is nearly complete; and that, hereafter, we may look for some other results, than the conclusion at which the poet arrives,

That metaphysics, rightly shown,
But teach how little can be known.'

ART. VI.

CHARACTER AND WRITINGS OF HANNAH MORE.

In the closing article of our last number, we gave a rapid sketeh of the principal incidents comprised in the Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of Mrs. Hannah More. Our limits not then allowing us to enter upon such an estimate, we now resume the subject, with the intention, and in the hope, of paying an appropriate tribute to the superiority of her intellect, the beauty of her character, and the useful tendency of her writings. Much of the interest of literary biography, is derived from delineations of this sort, provided they are true to the reality; since we often meet with the remark, that the lives of authors are destitute of incident and adventure, the chief attraction of other kinds of biography. Not that such a remark is applicable, in its full extent, to the life of Mrs. More. During the greatest part of a century, she experienced the usual vicissitudes which affect human beings; for many years, she was actively engaged in the most spirit-stirring scenes, helping to form an age which had begun to be benevolent; and her correspondence, which included many persons of rank and talent, the most illustrious in the British empire, is full of enlivening details of opinions, respecting the leading characters and absorbing events of the times, to say nothing of its no less interesting pictures of domestic life and manners. The whole work forms a body of anecdote and sentiment, compared with which, according to our taste, the rarest adventures, whether of fictitious or real life, can claim no superiority of interest. Still, over this mass of informal, though awakening narrative, we love to see the movement of the presiding mind, -the spirit which infused into it its vitality, the genius which threw over it its colors of light and beauty. It is the just delineation, if it can be done, of this interior principle, which can excite fresh interest in the admired subject of the present biography, and in the productions, that have rendered her name precious to the wise and the good. We venture, then, to present a condensed view of those intellectual and moral characteristics, which, as exhibited in the life and writings of this celebrated woman, have, for so many years, charmed and improved so many minds, both in Europe and in this country.

Here, however, at the very outset, we feel the difficulty of portraying excellence, when all that can be said of it, is more than admitted, by the greater portion of those who may take the pains to read this article. It may add to their gratification, to find their views confirmed, but scarcely to their knowledge. The most material facts respecting Mrs. More, have, for a long time, been before the public: her writings, as they have appeared in succession, belong to the standards of the didactic religion and literature of her country. Both the facts and the writings have already made their impression; and it is an impression not easily to be deepened by any eulogium; though we have no intention of making the mere eulogium of this lady. Every reader of taste and piety, who reads the Shepherd of Salisbury Plain, or Celebs, or Practical Piety, has in his mind an image of moral beauty, which it would be difficult to improve by any abstract representations, or by any thing short of extended comments on those productions. Her praise is the delight, the improvement, the religious, subdued feeling, which she effectually conveys to the mind of her reader. Although we despair, then, of adding much, if any thing, to the sentiment of admiration, in the minds of those who are acquainted with her history and works; yet we may experience a pleasure, in giving utterance to our own admiration of such excellence. Or it may happen, that a few of our readers, if there be a few who are little acquainted with her character and writings, would be led to bestow a greater attention upon them, by means of a sober estimate of their constituent excellences.

A fanciful writer has remarked, that the vulgar are wiser than philosophers. We will not pretend to fortify or explain this paradox, by insisting upon another, and that is, when we say of Mrs. More, comparing her with her literary cotemporaries of the opposite sex, that she is the wiser man of them all. We have sometimes been tempted to pay such a homage to this female genius, as an offset against her own modest admission of the superiority of the men,an admission which so aroused the gentle indignation of one of her