consistent with themselves, must be something altogether different from that of Wesley and Fletcher.

5. We will advert to but one more topic, and then leave the book. We allude to the doctrine of moral necessity; or, the actual certainty of all events under the government of God. We call a denial of this doctrine a peculiarity of Methodism; and our warrant for so doing, is the fact, that such a denial holds a most conspicuous place in that flood of "checks," "sermons, "doctrinal tracts," etc. etc. etc., with which, in the "torrent, tempest and whirlwind of their passion" to annihilate Calvinism, our Methodist brethren have inundated every corner of their church, and graced every shelf in their "book-room." Many of them, indeed, to be consistent with themselves, formally deny, not only the certainty of all events, but the actual foreknowledge of God. This is true of Dr. Adam Clarke, who resolves God's omniscience into power, -power to know all things, which he exercises at his pleasure; knowing some things, but where his knowledge would interfere with Arminianism, choosing to remain ignorant! We do not intend to deny, however, that some of our Wesleyan brethren-in those calm moments when Calvinism, with all its fancied images of terror, are out of mind, and when, instead of collecting their thunders, and gathering up their energies to "burn, fire, kill and slay," their man of straw, they have acquired a temperance which gives their passion smoothness,-have not, incidentally at least, admitted this doctrine. Wesley did so; we have understood Dr. Fisk to do so; and Mr. Watson concedes and advocates it in the fullest terms.

He states and confutes several Arminian theories of the divine foreknowledge and counsels, with peculiar ability. In arguing against those theories, he has the following language:

The prescience, counsels and plans of God, are prescience, counsels and plans which respect free agents, as far as men are concerned; and unless we superadd influence to necessitate, or plans to entice irresistibly, or to entrap inevitably into some given course of conduct, there is clearly no incongruity between these and human freedom. There is a difficulty in conceiving how foreknowledge should be absolute, as there is a difficulty in conceiving how God's present knowledge should penetrate the heart of man. But neither party argues from the incomprehensibility of the mode to the impossibility of the thing. The great difficulty does not lie here. It seems to be planted precisely in this, that God should prohibit many things which he nevertheless knows will occur, and in the prescience of which he regulates his dispensations, to bring out of these circumstances various results, which he makes subservient to the displays of his justice and his mercy. This forms the difficulty. But if the perplexity arises from this, nothing can be more clear, than that the question is not, how to reconcile God's prescience

with the freedom of man, but how to reconcile the conduct of God toward man, as a moral agent, with his own prescience, how to assign a congruity to warnings, exhortations, and other means adopted to prevent destruction, as to certain individuals, with a certain foresight of that terrible result. In this, however, no attribute of God is impugned. On the contrary, both justice and mercy require such divine conduct. The difficulty, then, resolves itself into a mere matter of feeling, which, of course, as we cannot be judges of a nature infinite in perfection, nor of proceedings which, in the unlimited range of God's government, may have bearings and connections, beyond all our apprehensions, we cannot reduce to a human standard. Is it then to adjust a mere matter of feeling, that we make these outrageous interpretations of the word of God in what he hath spoken of himself?' p. 201.

In this part of his work, Mr. W. abundantly maintains, that, in point of fact, there can be no question as to the previous certainty of moral actions; and concludes his reasoning on this subject by quoting, with high approbation, the arguments of Edwards, to show the irrational and unscriptural consequences which follow a denial of the certainty of all events. We commend this portion of the volume to the faithful study of every Methodist, and of those in particular, who have imbibed the absurd and almost impious notion, borrowed by Dr. A. Clarke from the philosophy of Chevalier Ramsay, that God does not choose to know all he can know.

Notwithstanding these admissions, it is true, that, in another part of this book, Mr. Watson deals out his anathemas, and pours forth his strong reasons against what he calls Calvinism, though with a good degree of coolness, yet with all the resolution of a decided follower of Wesley and Fletcher. It turns out to be a fact, however, that he battles chiefly with difficulties of his own creating, and with theories, which, though they have been held by some Calvinists, yet, properly speaking, form no part of the Calvinistic system. With him, as with our Wesleyan brethren generally, it is too much the case, that, at the very mention of Calvinism, all frank inquiry quits its sway over his judgment, his power of just discrimination is suspended, a dark cloud settles down upon his sober reason, his imagination fills with horrid spectres, his soul swells with loathing, and he spurns and detests, rather than discriminates and reasons. With respect to God's counsels or purposes, Calvinism contends for nothing which he has not conceded. It contends for the doctrine of moral necessity; or, which is the same thing, the previous certainty in the divine mind of "whatsoever comes to pass," a denial of which we regard as constituting a peculiarity of Arminianism,-at the same time it contends for man's moral freedom, as ardently, and far more consistently than Mr. Watson or any of his admirers. To reconcile certainty with human liberty, different Calvinists have adopted different theories;

but many prefer to rest in the conclusion of our author. There is a difficulty in conceiving how foreknowledge should be absolute, and man remain free. Such knowledge lies beyond our comprehension, and is too wonderful for us. It is better to abstain from such speculations; we willingly give them up; they cause us to tread irreverently upon holy ground; we would not break through and gaze. But no Calvinist, while maintaining the certainty of all events, has ever professedly denied man's freedom. The annals of the church furnish no such instance. We ask, when was there, where is there such a Calvinist? It may, perhaps, be said, that some have adopted theories which involve such a denial. This may be so; but theories are not doctrines. Have they ever admitted such a consequence? Have they formally made such a denial? Did Augustine, Calvin, Beza, Gomarus, or Edwards, deny, that man is a free moral agent? We repeat it, that theories adopted to show the harmony between the different parts of a theological system, are not doctrines. And if in any case they are shown to be irrational and monstrous, they prove nothing against the system itself. Suppose some Calvinists, in attempting to reconcile the two doctrines in question, have adopted unhappy theories, which have tended to "darken counsel by words without knowledge:" this by no means proves Calvinism to be a dreadful heresy. Why will not such men as Mr. Watson see this, and make the proper distinctions? Why should any man, who admits, that whatever comes to pass is previously certain in the divine mind, immediately and peremptorily deny this fact, and recoil from it, as from a serpent, whenever he hears it uttered by a Calvinist?

It is not from a spirit of ill-will towards our Methodist brethren, that we have made these remarks. We are not conscious of cherishing such feelings toward any denomination of christians. On the contrary, we sincerely desire to see the walls of partition broken down, and all those who are at heart evangelical in their views, brought to regard each other as brethren, belonging to the same great family, ready to proffer and to receive the hand of christian fellowship. To accomplish such a result, we feel it necessary, so far as we can, to disabuse the minds of those who have imbibed, as we conceive, incorrect views of the leading doctrines of the bible, as maintained by either side of the Calvinistic and Arminian controversy. Neither are wholly right; neither are altogether wrong; and a spirit of mutual concession is indispensable. The advocates of both have resorted, in many cases unintentionally, no doubt, to weak argumentation, to invidious appeals, and to mutual misrepresentation, to attain success. We are confident, that nothing more is necessary than a fair statement of what is meant by either party, to secure a union adequate for all useful purposes,

in such a system of truth, as is self-consistent and scriptural, and such as commends itself at once to the common-sense of all. It is in the hope of aiding in so desirable an end, that we have now endeavored to point out some mistaken statements and erroneous arguments in the volume before us. We have not intended to say any thing at variance with such a purpose; and should we have so erred, we commend ourselves to that charity which "is kind" and "hopeth all things." At the same time, however, we do not mean to disguise our conviction, that the effect of certain views, and modes of stating them, adopted by our Methodist brethren, especially in their practical bearing, are calculated to retard the progress of the kingdom of Christ. We have not time to specify particulars; but our foregoing remarks on Watson, and the general tenor of various articles which have appeared in our pages, will enable any one to understand our meaning. We now take our leave of the work. No formal review has been intended, and we have glanced at some of its contents farther than we at first designed. If our notice of it shall aid in making our readers more fully acquainted with the state of theology in the Methodist communion, to which Mr. Watson belonged, our object will be attained.

ART. III.-A TRANSLATION AND EXPOSITION OF ROMANS IX. 22, 23, 24.

In the common version of the scriptures, this passage is translated in the following manner:

"What if God, willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction; and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory, even us, whom he hath called, not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles?"

The translation which the writer would propose, is the following: Now if God, willing to show his wrath, and make his power known, endures with much long-suffering, vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, and endures them, in order that he may make known the riches of his glory on vessels of mercy, which he prepares beforehand unto glory, even us, whom he hath called, not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles; hath he not the right?

This translation varies from the common version in the following respects:

1. "What," which in the common version is supplied by the translators at the beginning of the passage, is here omitted.

2. A, the translation of which is omitted in the common version, is here rendered as a particle of transition, "Now."

3. "Vessels of wrath and mercy," to which the definite article is prefixed in the common translation, are here rendered as they stand in the original, without the article.

4. The verbs in the aorist tense, (which tense is designed to represent an action either as customary, or as without a precise limitation affixed to it in the past or by the present,) translated in the common version in different tenses, are here placed in the indefinite present. The writer would not object, however, to the use of the imperfect tense, were it employed without reference to any precise time in the past: as, God endured, and prepared beforehand.

5. The common version does not supply, in any manner, the omissions which must be supplied, in order to render the sense complete. This may be said to belong to the interpreter of the sacred writings, rather than the translator. Yet the authors of the common version have not deemed this wholly beyond their province, as will be seen, (to mention no other cases,) by recurring to Heb. vii. 8, 20. It seems to be required in the present case, because the passage, unless something be added to fill up the vacuities in the language, conveys no definite sense whatever. The translation proposed, endeavors to supply the ellipses in the manner indicated by the words printed in italics.

Yet, as a determination of the manner in which we shall supply the manifest deficiencies of the language, amounts, in the present case, to an exposition of the sense of the whole passage, the question arises, whether the writer has here suggested a correct mode of supplying them; and to this question his remarks shall now be directed.

The passage is obviously elliptical in two respects. First, the whole passage is a question, commencing with the hypothetical conjunction, "ɛi," "if"; and should be followed, therefore, before the sense can be complete, with some result or conclusion. On the condition or supposition, that certain things are true,-what then? Why, the previous question of the apostle will tell us what' follows. He had just asked, ' Hath not the potter power,' isaíav, right, etc.? Now if God,-on the condition or supposition, that God has been and is acting in the manner which I now state,— "has he not the right?"

But, secondly: The question itself, or the supposition, is not fully stated. "And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy," etc. Did what, for such a purpose? The apostle does not state. He leaves it to the sense of his readers to supply. Now there are only two methods in which we can supply the omission, which are at all plausible, and between these our choice lies. One method is, to supply the words "hath called them," at the close of verse 23. Thus: if God, willing to