duty of this House, in order to preserve the rights of all, to conform to the vote of censure before passed, which is a justice the House owes to itself.

"Mr. DEMERS enquired whether the learned gentleman who spoke last meant to say that Mr. Christie would be deprived of his right of citizenship by being excluded from this House. He would possess those rights as much when he was outside the bar as within it. He might when outside of the bar have his Habeas Corpus, as well as inside. He may come here like other citizens, and hear our proceedings. To say so was to say that all who are not inside our bar are deprived of the rights of citizens-yet no one dare say that those respectable citizens then at the bar were deprived of their rights of citizens.

Mr. L. LAGUEUX said, I do not pretend that we are bound to go by the decisions of the last Parliament, but I say that the same reasons and the same dangers exist now as then; though we may not be bound by the same resolutions, we are bound by the same motives of prudence, policy, and justice. The representatives of the people are the same here as there -jealous of our liberties-and cannot but come to the same decision. The same people who decided by their representatives then, are here present by their representatives. It has been said, a punishment cannot be twice inflicted for the same offence-but this is not a punishment, it is a censure-and the consequences are that future confidence is withdrawn. Mention has been made both of expunging the entries, and of absolution from the offence; but neither can be done. It renains the same as in 1829. The corps de delit remains. We do not want to be convinced of it, to see all the particulars of the progress; all we have to do with is the record of the judgment-the conviction is sufficient. Had any one shown that in 1829 we were wrong, it might be otherwise; but as long as that conviction is recorded, we have no occasion for other proofs.

"Mr. QUESNEL said, that if any one could produce but one similar instance of the political crime for which Mr. Christie had been expelled, he would submit. But all the precedents. were for different matters. This was a delit unique, and could not but be visited as such. He wondered at the honourable member for the Lower Town taking the present course, as on the former occasion he had expressed himself very differently."

I have thus, so far as in me lay, put before the public all the materials necessary to enable them to come to a correct conclusion; and I have been more particular, not only by reason

of the intrinsic importance of the subject, but also because the district of Gaspé having, with a very becoming spirit, (and I say so without any reference to the merits or demerits of the object of their choice, but solely in reference to the maintenance of their own elective franchise, and in that, the liberties of all the electors of the Province,) re-elected Mr. Christie; and as the question may thus be anew brought under the consideration of the Assembly, it is of the last degree of importance that a right and sound judgment should be come to thereupon.

Division on the Expulsion of Mr. Christie.

YEAS.-Archambault, Beaudet, Blanchard, Boissonnault, L. Bourdages, R. S. Bourdages, Brooks, Bureau, Cazeau, Corneau, Courteau, Demers, Deschamps, Dessaulles, Dewitt, P. A. Dorion, Dumoulin, Fortin, Guillet, Heney, Joliette, Knowlton, Lafontaine, Lagueux, Malhiot, Methot, Morin, Mousseau, Neilson, Noel, Panet, Proulx, Rochon, Scott, Thibaudeau, Trudel, Turgeon, Valois, Viger, Wurtele, Quesnel-41.

NAYS.-Baker, Baxter, Bedard, Caldwell, Casgrain, Clouet, Cuvillier, Deligny, De Montenach, De St. Ours, Duval, Dionne, Fisher, Goodhue, Heriot, Hoyle, Huot, Larue, Laterrière, Lee, Leslie, Letourneau, Peck, Stuart, A. C. Taschereau, Taylor, Wright, Young-28.

Division on the motion that the Committee should be named in the ordinary way.

YEAS.-Boissonnault, R. S. Bourdages, Caldwell, Christie, Corneau, Courteau, Deligny, De Montenach, Dionne, Dumoulin, Fisher, Heriot, Huot, Laterrière, Letourneau, Stuart, A. C. Taschereau, P. E. Taschereau, Wurtele -19.

NAYS.-Archambault, Baker, Baxter, Beaudet, Bedard, Blanchard, Louis Bourdages, Brooks, Bureau, Casgrain, Cazeau, Cuvillier, Des. champs, De St. Ours, Dessaulles, Dewitt, P. A. Dorion, Fortin, Goodhue, Guillet, Heney, Hoyle, Joliette, Knowlton, Lafontaine, Larue, Lee, Leslie, Malhiot, Methot, Morin, Mousseau, Neilson, Panet, Peck, Quesnel, Quirouet, Rochon, Taylor, Thibaudeau, Trudel, Turgeon, Viger, Wright and Young-45.

NO. V.

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMY OF THE ASSEMBLY.

Hoc volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas.

JUVENAL.

CAR TEL EST NOTRE PLAISIR.

Ordonnances des Rois de France.

THE SUBJECT RESUMED AND CONCLUDED.

THE most general division of governments, and of the most ancient too, is into governments of law and governments of will. That form of government known by the name of a tyranny is but one species of the latter description of governments. History affords us many examples of aristocracies not restrained by law, and subsisting for considerable periods of time-so also of democracies; but the duration of these last has, from obvious and permanent causes, been so short, that they have been looked upon as transitions from one to another settled form of government, rather than as being themselves entitled to the name of a government.

In governments of law, the assumption, by any body in the state, of power not given to it by the law, is evidently subversive of the principle of the government.

In a Constitution like our own, composed of three separate and independent branches, the assumption of such power is dangerous in any of the component branches, but in none so dangerous as in the popular branch. The irresponsibility belonging to large majorities, the passion to which all popular bodies are liable, the confidence which the people naturally place in men selected from among themselves, and by them

H

selves, as the guardians of their rights, joined to the difficulty of restraining any abuse committed by them, all contribute to render encroachments of this body upon the Law and Constitution particularly alarming.

In the previous numbers I have pointed out some of what I deemed encroachments of this character, and have now to add to them a plain, open and undisguised assumption of legislative power, to the exclusion of the powers vested by the Law and the Constitution in the King's Majesty.

The Constitutional Act of these Provinces, 31st Geo. III., c. 31, declares who shall be qualified to sit as Members of the Assembly in the following three clauses:—

XXI. Provided always, and be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, that no person shall be capable of being elected a Member to serve in either of the said Assemblies, or of sitting or voting therein, who shall be a Member of either of the said Legislative Councils to be established as aforesaid in the said two Provinces, or who shall be a Minister of the Church of England, Priest, or Ecclesiastic, or Teacher, either according to the rites of the Church of Rome, or under any other form or profession of religious faith or worship. XXII.-Provided also, and be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that no person shall be capable of voting at any election of a Member to serve in such Assembly, in either of the said Provinces, or of being elected at any such election, who shall not be of the full age of 21 years, and a natural born subject of His Majesty, or a subject of His Majesty naturalized by Act of the British Parliament, or a subject of His Majesty, having become such by the conquest and cession of the Province of Canada. XXIII. And be it also enacted by the authority aforesaid, that no person shall be capable of voting at any election of a Member to serve in such Assembly, in either of the said Provinces, or of being elected at any such election, who shall have been attainted for Treason or Felony, in any Court of Law within any of His Majesty's Dominions, or who shall be within any description of persons disqualified by any Act of the Legislative Council and Assembly of the Province, assented to by His Majesty, his Heirs, or Successors.

It will be seen that the above provisions of the Statute do not create any disqualification to sit and vote, in persons ac" cepting offices of trust and profit after their election. Under the Statute 6th Anne, c. 7, and 1st Geo. I., c. 56, no person having a pension under the Crown, during pleasure, for any term of years, is capable of being elected or sitting as a Member of the British House of Commons. So, too, by the former of these Statutes, if any member accepts an office of profit under the Crown, which was in existence prior to 1705, except an Officer in the Army or Navy accepting a new commission, his seat is void, though such member is capable of being re-elected.

These provisions, it is well known to those in the slightest degree conversant with constitutional history, were introduced to limit the great and increasing influence of the Crown in the Commons of Great Britain, derived from its enormous patronage. The situation of the Crown in its Colonial possessions is, as we all know, very widely different from this. I am not aware that, in the British Colonies adjoining to us, or in the old British Colonies, it was ever found necessary to extend to them the provisions of the above Statute of Anne. This at all events was quite clear, that if the provisions of that Statute were to be extended to this Colony, it could only be done here as it had been originally done in England, by an Act of the Legislature; and such, at the outset, was the understanding of the majority of the House who favoured this measure, and of the Member who introduced it. The first mention we find of the subject is in the Journals of the Assembly of the 17th March, 1825.

The Resolution of the House is to the following effect :

Resolved, That it is expedient that it should be enacted, that if any person being chosen a Member of the House of Assembly shall accept of any office of profit from the Crown, or accept as a Commissioner, or otherwise, any appointment from the Crown, whereby he shall become accountable for any public money during such time as he shall continue a Member, his election shall be void, and a new writ

1