that confequently it is never determined without Jome real and apparent cause, foreign to itself, i. e. without fome motive of choice, or that motives influence us in fome definite, and invariable manner : fo that every volition, or choice, is constantly regulated, and determined, by what precedes it. Permit me here to make a fhort paufe, and confider what has been faid; for being rather fhort-fighted I am apt to overlook the clue, which fhould lead me, and am foon loft in a maze. As to nature and the law of naturė 【 know not what to fay about them. They seem to be terms, to which we have often recourse by way of fubterfuge, when we are treating of properties, for which we cannot account. upon this I fhall not dwell; as that which follows demands our immediate attention. For you affert, if I mistake not, that the mind with all its powers, and particularly the will, is never determined without fome real or apparent caufe, foreign to itself. p. 8. much at a lofs as I was before.

Büt

Now I am as

For it seems im

poffible to make, what you fay here, confiftent with that, which you maintained above. In this place the will, and the mind in general, must be determined by a foreign caufe: if we look but fix pages backward we find just the

contrary

contrary afferted-viz. that men are quite free
to do, whatever they will or please, both with
respect to the operations of their own minds, and
the motions of their bodies, uncontrolled by any
This feems to
foreign principle or caufe. p. 2.
be an abfolute contradiction: but poffibly as
we go on we may have it cleared up. To
proceed then. And this conftant determination
of mind according to the motives prefented to us,
is all, that I mean by its necessary determination.
This being admitted, there will be a necessary con-
nection between all things paft, prefent, and to
come, in the way of proper caufe and effect, as
much in the intellectual as in the natural world}
fo that how little foever the bulk of mankind may
be apprehenfive of it, or staggered by it, accord-
ing to the established laws of nature, no event
could have been otherwise, than it has been,
is, or is to be, and therefore all things, paft, pre-
fent, and to come, are precifely, what the Author
of nature really intended them to be, and has made
provifion for. p. 8. I take the liberty to make
answer, that in respect to the Author of na
ture, I think that we often introduce him with
too little reverence, and determine about his
purposes too boldly. And it feems to me in-
explicable, that this all-wife Being should give

to

1

to man a full power of choice, which you allow, that he did: and that he should at the fame time lay him under an irresistible influence, and render the gift useless and abortive.

W

SECTION II.

E come now to your fecond chapter, in which you try to enforce the fame doctrine from the confideration of cause and effect. We have perceived above, that the mind of man, which was faid to be quite at liberty either to choose or reject; and in all its operations free from any foreign power and impulse, is at last tied down by a blind neceffity, and is obliged to determine by an external overbearing influence; so that whatever has happened, could not have been otherwise, according to the fixed laws of nature. You go on to explain farther what you have before faid. You inform us, that there is a series of parts, which are connected like the links of a chain: and that they neceffarily follow one after another; and are dependent upon a first mover, whose original energy paffes through the whole;-fo that unlefs the fundamental laws of the system were changed, it would be impoffible, that any event

fbould

fhould have been otherwife, than it was; juft as the precife place where a billiard-ball refts is neceffarily determined by the impulfe given at first, notwithstanding its impinging against ever fo many other balls, or the fides of the table. p. 9, 10, I hope, I have not mifquoted your words, nor mifreprefented your meaning. You go on to tell us, that this chain of causes and effects cannot be broken, but by fuch a provifion in the conftitution of nature, as that the fame event shall not cer tainly follow the preceding circumstances. In this cafe indeed it might be truly faid, that any par ticular event might have been otherwife than it was, there having been no certain provifion in the laws of nature for determining it to be this rather than that. But then this event, not being preceded by any circumstances, that determined it to be what it was, would be an effect without a caufe. For a cause cannot be defined to be any thing but fuch previous circumftances as are conftantly followed by a certain effect; the conftancy of the refult making us conclude, that there must be a fufficient reafon in the nature of the things why it should be produced in thofe circumftances. So that in all cafes, if the refult be different, either the circumstances must have been different, or there were no circumftances whatever correfponding

correfponding to the difference of the refult; and confequently the effect was without any cause at all. -Thefe maxims are univerfal, being equally applicable to all things, that belong to the conftitution of nature corporeal or mental, &c. p. 10, 11, I must confefs, that I do not perfectly underftand this process of your argument: however I quote at large; as it may meet with others, who are bleffed with a better apprehenfion. The fame manner of reafoning is purfued, p. 13. A particular determination of mind could not have been otherwife than it was, if the laws of nature respecting the mind be fuch, as that the fame determination fball conftantly follow the fame ftate of mind, and the fame views of things. And it could not be poffible for any determination to have been otherwife than it has been, is, or is to be, unless the laws of nature had been fuch, as that though both the state of mind, and the views of things, were the fame, the determination might or might not have taken place. But in this cafe the determination must have been an effect without a caufe, becaufe in this cafe, as in that of the balance, there would have been a change of fituation without any previous change of circumftances: and there cannot be any other definition of an effect without a caufe. The application of

the