with respect to the evidence of their converfion; and what is called the work of grace in the heart, in which much must neceffarily be left to the imagination; and therefore that at times a gloom will be fpread over the foul.-Unless this effect be counteracted, their principles do not admit of that perfect ferenity and chearfulness, with which it is to be wifhed that a life of real piety and virtue might ever be attended. p. 165. At this rate I do not fee any the least advantage, that a Neceffarian. has in proof of his orthodoxy: There is nothing, that can perfuade us of the fuperiour excellence of his fyftem. He is described, as in a state of uncertainty, if not of infatuation; and his principles are faid to lead to gloom and melancholy; and, if we may trust to what has been faid before, to abfolute defpair, These things, if true, do not seem to be the fruits of the Spirit: nor can they recommend the fyftem, in which they are found.

You may perhaps fay, that your notions about neceffity are very different from thofe of the Calvinists. They may be fo: but it is a point, in which I am not concerned. In reality I believe, it will be found a distinction without a difference. There may be fome things,

things, in which you fancy that you do not agree with them: but your first principles are You both believe in abfolute de

the fame.

crees, and unavoidable deftiny: and the fame confequences must follow, however on your part you may try to evade them.

W

SECTION X.

E are here informed, In what fenfe. God may be confidered as the author of fin: and of the objection to the doctrine of necessity on that account. You are pleased to tell us more than once, that when people have confidered the confequences which naturally refult from your principles, they are staggered and frightened: and have not the courage to proceed. Believe me, good Sir, I do not wonder at it: for the path seems to lead to a precipice, and every step is over burning embers. There are few of fuch courage as not to be appalled, when they hear the God of all goodness made the author of all evil. You indeed put your quef tion, In what fenfe God may be fo confidered: but there is only an alternative, that he either is, or is not: and however you may foften things at fetting out, you at last determine,

1

that he is fo in every fenfe, by making him the proper caufe of all evil. p. 125. In this place you go fo far as to fay, that as all evils are fubfervient to greater good,-every thing without diftinction may be fafely afcribed to God. p. 115. Surely, Sir, this is as rafh as it is fhocking; How can a person of the leaft reverence towards his Creator, fuppofe that the God of all goodness and justice, as well as of all purity and holinefs, fhould have decreed, theft, murder, parricide, and every species of cruelty? that he fhould have ordained and appointed pollution, filth, inceft, and every unnatural defire; directed every evil affection of the mind; and with a high hand carried every crime into execution? Do not, Sir, think it want of fortitude

in

me, if I tremble at the bare recital: for it is past expreffion fhocking to conceive the horrid confequences, which neceffarily follow from your principles. You give a reason for what you so boldly affert: that whatever terminates in good, philofophically speaking, is good. This, Sir, is an aphorifm as falfe as it is dangerous. It was an article of the Jefuits creed: by which they thought they were authorized to wade through a fea of blood in order to arrive at a remote advantage. As for your qualifying

ing it by the terms philofophically Speaking: I know not the meaning of the limitation. You afterwards confefs, that the whole is a mere theory; and not to be tice which is very ftrange.

reduced to prac

But this is a view

of moral evil, which though innocent, and even useful in fpeculation, no wife man can, or would choose to act upon himself, because our understandings are too limited for the application of fuch a means of good: though a Being of infinite knowledge may introduce it, with the greatest advantage -While our natures are, what they are,-we must hun vice as any other evil, and indeed the greatest of all evils, and choofe virtue as the greatest good. p. 115. But have you not, Sir, faid, that God is the

author of evil: that it

proceeds from his original decrees: what room. then is there for man either to choose or to fhun? In truth I try, but am at a loss, to find your meaning. I am overpowered by words. and bewildered. I am obliged again and again to recur to what you have faid: that the two fchemes of liberty and neceffity admit of no medium. p. 84. That all things have been decreed: and that our will is under the direction of an abfolute and foreign power. p. 8. You here seem to forget these things: and to allow to man a

free will, by giving him a power of choofing and rejecting. For these conceffions, as I have repeatedly faid, I know not how to account. You proceed to illuftrate your system and to palliate, what you have afferted, by telling us, that fuppofing God to be the author of fin, it by no means implies, that he is a finful being.—If his difpofition and defign be good, what he does is morally good. This, I imagine, will hardly be granted that luft, murder, inceft, parricide, can at any rate be morally good; whatever may be the confequences. However you try to illuftrate and prove your tenets by example, It was wicked, you fay, in Joseph's brethren to fell him into Egypt: because they acted from envy, batred, and covetousness: but it was not wicked in God, becaufe in appointing it, he was not actuated by any fuch principle. In him it was gra

cious and good, &c. p. 117.

This is furely a

weak argument. How would a Voltaire, a Diderot, and even your friend Hume, fmile at these feeble expedients; by which you try to free your felf from the difficulties, into which you have been rafhly involved? You tell us, that it was wicked in Joseph's brethren to behave as they did, because they acted from envy, batred, and covetousness. But was not this ha

tred,