And Oaths do produce this effect. Men's minds are solemnized by this form of an engagement. Under this impression of an Oath, they no longer claim excuses and allowances for their falsehood. They speak with consideration and gravity. If they give testimony on Oath, they are careful in their recollection of the fact. If they promise on Oath, they are watchful over themselves for the future.

685. The Oaths commonly in use among meri are principally of the two kinds just referred to; Oaths of Testimony or Assertion, and Oaths of Promise or Engagement for the future. Oaths of Testi

mony impose upon us an especial duty of careful recollection and exact narration. The formula used in the administration of English law expresses this; it requires men to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, touching the matter in question. But in the cases in which this is employed judicially, it is for the Tribunal, rather than for the Witness, to determine what is the whole truth touching the matter in question and the English Courts of Law expect only that the Witness shall answer the questions put to him. They also excuse him from doing this, when the answer would criminate himself. These definitions of the Obligation of the Witness, are also the definitions of his Duty as a Witness. As a lover of Justice, it will often be right for a man to do much more than this.

686. In the same manner, Oaths of Assertion; as when we declare the value of our income, or of anything belonging to us; impose upon us a Duty of careful examination of the matter concerning which we assert; and an entire sincerity in asserting, without reserve, equivocation, or straining of the truth. Thus an Oath that we have not received or paid money, or reward (as in oaths against bribery at elections, sale of ecclesiastical offices, and the like), is violated not the less, if the money be receive and

paid by some contrivance which escapes detection, or evades the law.

687. Oaths of Promise with regard to special acts are not much in use among us. We do not require a man to swear that he will perform a contract, or resign an office, or the like. The law has other ways of enforcing its Will, on such points. Our Oaths of Engagement for the future are, for the most part, promises of a general course of action; and promises of certain dispositions as suitable to the condition to which we look forward. Thus we have Oaths of Office administered to Magistrates, Judges, Jurymen, Legislators, and to the sovereign himself; and Oaths of Allegiance, administered to the subject. In these Oaths, the swearer engages to conform to the Laws of the Land in the discharge of his office; and also, generally, to act with care, impartiality, and equity. He promises to be faithful to the law, and the intention of the law; which intention is understood to be, the administration of justice. The subject promises Allegiance to the Sovereign; which was formerly further explained in the Oath itself: 1 promise to be true and faithful to the King, and not to know of any ill or damage intended him without defending him therefrom. These Oaths all engage the swearer to that conduct, and those dispositions, which morality would require without the Oath. For the Magistrate's Duty is generally to administer the law, to regard the intention of the law, and to identify this intention with justice (333). And the Subject's Duty is generally, as we have already said (309), a willing obedience to the laws, an affection for his country, a love of its institutions and of its constitution, a loyalty to its sovereign. There may be special cases of exception to these Duties; as when the Magistrate cannot look upon a particular law as other than unjust: or when the Duty of Allegiance is broken, under the pressure of a case of extreme

necessity. Oaths such as we have just mentioned, which engage the Swearer to that course of action which forms the General Rule of Morality, are inconsistent with a contemplation of the cases of Exception, as prominent or frequent. A person cannot, without the guilt of Perjury, take an Oath to administer the laws faithfully and justly, if he believe that to administer the laws faithfully will be to commit habitual injustice. A Subject cannot swear allegiance to the reigning Sovereign, if he not only believe him to be an usurper, but if he also be ready to join in a scheme for deposing him, if a favourable occasion should arise. Oaths of Office, of Allegi ance, and the like, are to be taken in such a manner, as to identify the citizen's Duties with his Obligations and by being Oaths, they further express his conviction that the discharge of Duties, and therefore of legal Obligations, is the only way to obtain the approval of God, and the happiness which he bestows with his appreval.

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688. Besides the general moral engagements contained in Oaths of Office, such Oaths often include some specification of a particular subject, with a prescribed course of action relative to it; thus, the English Sovereign, at his Coronation, swears that he will maintain the Protestant Reformed Religion established by Law: Members of Parliament take a similar Oath: Officers of special bodies, as Colleges and Corporations, in many cases take Oaths to observe the Special Laws of their body, to maintain its privileges, and the like. Along with the Oath of Allegiance to the Sovereign, there has often been demanded an Oath of Allegiance also to his Heirs; or an Oath of Renunciation of the Obligation of Obedience to some rival Authority: as in this country, we have, in addition to the Oath of Allegiance, the Oath of Abjuration, in which we abjure the Authority of the Pope

689. All such Oaths require of him, who takes them, a sincere and unchanging purpose to do what he thus engages to do.

For instance, If an officer of a corporation, having sworn to maintain the Protestant Religion, should afterwards endeavour to overthrow it; it would be no exculpation for him to say that he had become convinced that the Protestant Religion was erroneous. If a man has entered upon an office engaging himself to a certain course of conduct, and afterwards thinks such conduct wrong; he is bound by Justice and Truth to give up his office; and cannot honestly pursue any other course. In this case, as in others, Law supplies the definition, which is requisite to give form to Justice. The Oath of Office is the expression of a Contract between the Body and the individual. If he breaks the Contract, and keeps his share of the advantage which it gave, he is guilty of fraud and falsehood, aggravated by Perjury.

690. An important question in many cases of this kind is, how the Oath is to be interpreted. Of course, a Promise so made, like other Promises, is to be interpreted according to the common intention of the two parties; or according to what is the intention of the party imposing the Oath, and is understood to be its intention by the party taking the Oath. And this is, accordingly, the Rule generally given. The Rule is stated by saying that the Oath is to be understood secundum animum imponentis. But here the question occurs, in the Oaths of office, and the like, Who are the Parties between whom the transaction takes place? Who is the Imposer of the Oath?

691. We reply, that in Oaths of Office, the Imposer is The State; which we have already described as a permanent Moral Agent; and which is, of course, capable of being Party to a Contract. The State is the Imposer of all such Oaths; for all Offices derive their Authority from the State, and

all Special Corporations derive, from the State, their power of making Laws; and therefore, the Authority of their Laws. Hence these Oaths, which express the conditions on which the authority, or the advantages of the Office, are assigned to the individual, express the conditions imposed upon him by the State.

692. The State, as we have said (470), is one and permanent, while the persons of whom it consists are many and transitory. The Intention of the State is expressed in the language of the Oath; and if there be, in this, anything which requires interpretation, the Laws and Legislative Proceedings which accompanied the enactment of the Oath may often aid in pointing out the right interpretation. But this is not the main source of interpretation. The State continues to exist after each such act of Legislation : and the State which to-day imposes the Oath, is not identical with the Legislature which, many years, perhaps centuries ago, enacted it. The State may itself interpret the Oath, by a Declaratory Act; and may often prefer this course to the substitution of a new and clearer Oath; on the ground of many inconveniences which attend the change of ancient and usual forms. There are also other ways, in which the State may give its interpretations of the Oaths which it imposes; as in the decisions of Courts of Law, and the like. But yet, if these interpretations be in apparent contradiction with the most obvious meaning of the words of the Oath, religious men and lovers of truth, especially if they have not fully considered the difficulties of such legislation, will be shocked with the incongruity; and the offence thus given to them, may be a reason for the State changing the form of the Oath.

693. There are cases in which even the silence and inaction of the State may be looked upon as implying, in some measure, its view of the meaning of an Oath. If an Oath contain clauses which plainly