nature adopted by the ancients as "the anticipation of the mind," the method suggested by himself as "the interpretation of nature." He says that it is no part of his scheme to attempt to rival the old masters; they worked in their way, he professes to work in his—each may throw light on the other. As for himself, he assumes the character of a guide merely. Though not liking those who assert that nothing whatever can be known, he infinitely prefers them to those who dogmatize on nature as on some well-investigated subject, and declares that such men have inflicted the greatest injury on philosophy and learning. He says the more ancient Greeks, whose writings have perished, held a more prudent mean between the arrogance of dogmatism and the despair of scepticism.

The following must be accepted as a mere skeleton, and not as the actual language of Bacon.

Book I.

Aphorisms on the interpretation of nature and the empire of man.

1. Man understands as much of nature as his observations permit him, and neither knows nor is capable of more.

2. Effects are produced by the means of instruments and helps, which the understanding requires no less than the hand. 3. Knowledge and human power are synonymous.

4. Man, whilst operating, can only apply or withdraw natural bodies; nature internally performs the rest.

5. The mechanics, mathematicians, physicians, alchymists, and magicians, become practically versed in nature.

6. Things which have never been performed cannot be performed without employing hitherto untried means.

7. The creations, whether of the mind or hand, are deductions from a few well-known matters, and are nothing like so numerous as they appear in books.

8. The effects already discovered are rather due to chance and experiment than to science.

9. The cause of defect in the sciences is undue reliance on the human mind, and neglect of its helps.

10. The subtility of nature is far beyond that of the senses or the understanding.

11. The present sciences are useless for the discovery of effects; the present system of logic for the discovery of the sciences.

12. The tendency of our logic is rather to make existing error inveterate than to discover truth.

13. The syllogism not being applied to principles, is of no avail in intermediate axioms. It forces assent, not things.

14. Words are the signs of notions; propositions consist of words; the syllogism consists of propositions. If the notion is confused, there is no solidity in the superstructure. Genuine induction is our only hope.

15. We have no sound notions either in logic or physics. The words substance, weight, &c., convey no clear notions; they are ill-defined.

16. The words man, heat, &c., do not deceive us materially, yet even these are sometimes confused by the mutability of matter, &c.

17. There is the same degree of licentiousness and error in forming axioms as in abstracting notions.

18. We must penetrate the more secret and remote parts of nature, and not be content, as hitherto, with what lies immediately below the surface.

19. There are but two ways of investigating and discovering truth, viz.: I. That now in use, which constructs its general axioms relying on the senses and particular instances, and from those axioms, as indisputable truths, derives its intermediate axioms. II. The other yet unattempted way, constructs its axioms from the senses and particulars, ascending step by step, till it finally arrives at the most general axioms. This is the true way.

20. As the mind has a tendency to generalise when left to itself, the understanding naturally adopts the first method.

21. The unaided understanding is unequal to the task of vanquishing the obscurity of things.

22. Whereas the latter method is thorough, the former merely touches cursorily the limits of experiment and particulars.

23. Between certain idle dogmas and the facts of nature the difference is not slight.

24. Axioms resulting from arguments cannot assist in the discovery of new effects. But axioms regularly extracted from particulars do.

25. Existing axioms, being derived from slender experience and but few particulars, are necessarily defective. When found so, resort is commonly had to frivolous distinctions instead of amendment.

26. By the term "Anticipation of nature," we intend the human reasoning which we apply to nature; and by the term "Interpretation of nature," that reason which is properly deduced from things.

27. Anticipations are powerful in producing unanimity. If men were uniformly mad they might agree tolerably well.

28. Anticipations are more readily assented to than interpretations.

29. In sciences founded on opinions and dogmas, anticipations and logic should be used, if the wish is to force assent rather than things.

30. No great progress could be made in learning by anticipations.

31. No great progress could be made in the sciences by engrafting new matter on the old. Unless we wish to revolve for ever in a circle, an instauration must be made from the very foundations.

37. The sceptics assert that nothing can be known; we say that but little can be, by the existing system; they destroy

the authority of the senses and understanding; we invent and supply them with assistance.

39. Idols of the tribe; idols of the den; idols of the market; and idols of the theatre, as we call them, are the four species of idols which beset the human mind.

40. The doctrine of idols bears the same relation to the interpretation of nature, as that of the confutation of sophisms does to common logic.

41. By the expression "The idols of the tribe," is intended man's reliance on his senses as the standard which is common to all, whence arise errors common to the human race.

42. By "Idols of the den," is intended those errors which, in addition to the former, are peculiar to individuals, and result from personal capacity, training, &c.

43. By "Idols of the market," is intended the confusion of ideas arising from the infirmity of language and the ill-use or understanding of terms.

44. By "Idols of the theatre," is intended the erroneous dogmas and axioms of the different systems of philosophy, which have or which may find favour with man.

45. One of the idols of the tribe is that all celestial bodies move in perfect circles, an error resulting from the tendency of the human understanding to undue generalisation, and neglect of the fact that many things in nature are sui generis.

46. When the mind has once accepted a proposition as fact, it fights in defence of that assumed fact, struggles to reconcile inconsistent facts, and rejects those that it cannot reconcile. Hence the vitality of superstitions and scientific fallacies.

47. The fewer the mental impressions the greater is the strength of each, and the more dogged the tenacity of its pos

sessor.

48. The activity of the human understanding induces the attempt to comprehend matters beyond its grasp, e.g., the cause of things not causable: failing, it falls back to what is actually less advanced, viz. :-final causes; for they are clearly more

allied to man's own nature than the system of the universe. In this way philosophy has been wonderfully corrupted.

49. Each human understanding being tinctured by the will and passions of the individual, is imbued and corrupted by his failings in innumerable and sometimes in imperceptible ways.

50. But by far the greatest impediment and aberration of the human understanding proceeds from the dulness, incompetency, and errors of the senses; since whatever strikes the senses preponderates over everything, however superior, which does not immediately strike them. Hence contemplation mostly ceases with sight; and very scanty, or perhaps no regard, is paid to invisible objects.

51. The human understanding is, by its own nature, prone to abstraction, and to suppose that which is fluctuating to be fixed. But it is better to dissect than abstract nature.

52. Such are the "idols of the tribe."

53. The "idols of the den" derive their origin from the peculiar nature of each individual's mind and body; as also from education, habit, and accident. They are various and manifold. The following are some of those that exert the greatest power in polluting the understanding.

54. Men who, having a pet science or hobby, apply themselves to philosophy in general, and the contemplation of universal nature, wrest and corrupt everything by their preconceived fancies; thus, Aristotle, whose favourite subject was logic, made his natural philosophy little more than useless and disputatious.

55. Philosophers and scientists may be divided into two classes the dominant faculty of the one is to detect differences of things, that of the other, resemblances. Each class readily falls into excess, by catching either at nice distinctions or shadows of resemblance.

56. With some, antiquity, with others novelty, is everything; but few can preserve the just medium so as neither to tear up what the ancients have correctly laid down, nor to despise the just innovations of the moderns.

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