by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking, and PART I. working in the Apostles: which Holy Ghost, was

a Comforter that came not of himself; but was sent, and proceeded from them both.

16.

men, how one person.

A multitude of men, are made one person, when a multitude of they are by one man, or one person, represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that multitude in particular. For it is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented, that maketh the person one. And it is the representer that beareth the person, and but one person: and unity, cannot otherwise be understood in multitude.

author.

And because the multitude naturally is not one, Every one is but many; they cannot be understood for one; but many authors, of every thing their representative saith, or doth in their name; every man giving their common representer, authority from himself in particular; and owning all the actions the representer doth, in case they give him authority without stint otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how far he shall represent them, none of them owneth more than they gave him commission to act.

be many men

Voices.

And if the representative consist of many men, An actor may the voice of the greater number, must be consi- made one by dered as the voice of them all. For if the lesser plurality of number pronounce, for example, in the affirmative, and the greater in the negative, there will be negatives more than enough to destroy the affirmatives; and thereby the excess of negatives, standing uncontradicted, are the only voice the representative hath. And a representative of even number, especially Representawhen the number is not great, whereby the con- the number tradictory voices are oftentimes equal, is therefore is even, unoftentimes mute, and incapable of action. Yet in

tives, when

profitable.

PART I. 16.

Negative voice.

some cases contradictory voices equal in number, may determine a question; as in condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemn not, do absolve; but not on the contrary condemn, in that they absolve not. For when a cause is heard; not to condemn, is to absolve: but on the contrary, to say that not absolving, is condemning, is not true. The like it is in a deliberation of executing presently, or deferring till another time for when the voices are equal, the not decreeing execution, is a decree of dilation.

Or if the number be odd, as three, or more, men or assemblies; whereof every one has by a negative voice, authority to take away the effect of all the affirmative voices of the rest, this number is no representative; because by the diversity of opinions, and interests of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute person, and unapt, as for many things else, so for the government of a multitude, especially in time of war.

Of authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have before defined to be him, that owneth the action of another simply. The second is he, that owneth an action, or covenant of another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a certain time. And these authors conditional, are generally called SURETIES, in Latin, fidejussores, and sponsores; and particularly for debt, prædes; and for appearance before a judge, or magistrate, vades.

PART II.

OF COMMONWEALTH.

CHAPTER XVII.

OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION

OF A COMMONWEALTH.

17.

of common

cular security:

THE final cause, end, or design of men, who natu- PART 11. rally love liberty, and dominion over others, in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in The end which we see them live in commonwealths, is the wealth, partiforesight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent, as hath been shown in chapter XIII, to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and observation of those laws of nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters.

to be had from

nature:

For the laws of nature, as justice, equity, mo- Which is not desty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others, as we the law of would be done to, of themselves, without the terror of some power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to

17.

PART II. partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the laws of nature, which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely; if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have lived by small families, to rob and spoil one another, has been a trade, and so far from being reputed against the law of nature, that the greater spoils they gained, the greater was their honour; and men observed no other laws therein, but the laws of honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry. And as small families did then; so now do cities and kingdoms which are but greater families, for their own security, enlarge their dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and fear of invasion, or assistance that may be given to invaders, and endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open force, and secret arts, for want of other caution, justly; and are remembered for it in after ages with honour.

Nor from the

conjunction of

families:

Nor is it the joining together of a small number a few men or of men, that gives them this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an invasion. The multitude sufficient to confide in for our security, is not determined by any certain number, but by

17.

comparison with the enemy we fear; and is then PART II. sufficient, when the odds of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of war, as to move him to attempt.

great multi

directed by one

And be there never so great a multitude; yet if Nor from a their actions be directed according to their parti- tude, unless cular judgments, and particular appetites, they can judgment: expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help but hinder one another; and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing whereby they are easily, not only subdued by a very few that agree together; but also when there is no common enemy, they make war upon each other, for their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation of justice, and other laws of nature, without a common power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all mankind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need to be any civil government, or commonwealth at all; because there would be peace without subjection.

continually.

Nor is it enough for the security, which men And that desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one judgment, for a limited time; as in one battle, or one war. For though they obtain a victory by their unanimous endeavour against a foreign enemy; yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they must