among the common people, which the learned not only disbelieve but laugh at; but it has solemn Services, in which known falsehoods of this kind are deliberately asserted in the lessons read, and even implied in the prayers offered to God; and relics are shown and devoutly worshipped in their churches as genuine, which are probably all spurious, and which cannot possibly be all true, inasmuch as the same relic is said to be in several different churches; and pretended miracles are put forward, which must proceed, in many cases, from deliberate and calculating imposture. And there are many practices among the people which the more enlightened often plainly see to be superstitious, and yet connive at, as producing, on the whole, a good effect, and done with a pious intention.

Now, all this was not the mere consequence of Priestcraft: for, though some of the frauds alluded to may have been, from the first, practised solely for the sake of getting money or power into the hands of the priests, yet in many others, no doubt, the end aimed at was right in itself, and, in many more, seemed right and laudable to those who took dishonest means for compassing it.

You may often have noticed how apt thoughtless people are to save themselves trouble by deceiving children into compliance with their will. They keep a child from straying into dark lanes by stories about ghosts and hobgoblins, or they persuade him to leave the room by (falsely) promising him a sugarplum elsewhere, and so forth. Such lies (besides being wrong) always bring more trouble in the end than they save for the present. Still they Do save present trouble; and so those in charge of children are tempted to practise such deceit; which they commonly excuse by saying that it is "all for the child's good,” and that "children cannot be managed otherwise."

Now, when the people were brought into the condition of children, and left without rational instruction in religious matters, it was natural to think of treating them as children are too often treated, and deceiving them for their good.

The priests found the multitude ready of themselves (as ignorant persons are) to believe marvellous tales and romantic adventures, and fancy they were surrounded by miracles and wonders; and it is probable that many of the false legends were originally stories that sprang up at first (as strange stories will)

among the people themselves, partly from mistake, and partly from pure fancy.

Now, when the clergy perceived that the belief of such fictions made the people apparently more devout, they thought them, at worst, but innocent illusions, which had a good effect on those who could not know better; and so the mischief went on, till, at last, the devotion of the people (such as it was) was really, to a great extent, built upon the belief of such falsehoods; and there was real danger that, if that support were taken from it, all sense of religion would be destroyed in their minds.

Now, truth is a steady thing, and acts steadily through the reason by the weight of evidence. But when you work on men's fancies and feelings alone, you work on a part of our minds which flags and becomes sluggish, when not continually roused by fresh and fresh excitement; just as a drunkard is tempted to drink more deeply every day, from finding that his constitution needs the stimulant more and more.

Hence, when once the clergy had begun to work on the people in this way, they found themselves tempted to go on, and invent new legends and miracles when the old had lost their interest, while many who would have scorned to invent such things, yet thought themselves justified in tolerating them, from a dread of unsettling men's minds," and shaking their faith in the truths of religion, by exposing the falsity of what had been mixed up with them.

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Here, then, again, in the case of pious frauds, the thing to be guarded against is that corrupt inclination, natural to all men, of sacrificing what we know to be true to what may seem expedient, and "doing evil that good may come." We must stand clear of Popish frauds and Jesuitical falsehoods-not merely because they are Popish and Jesuitical, but because they are frauds and falsehoods.

4. Again, the way in which human authority is put, by the Church of Rome, in the place of divine, is another error which some persons trace entirely to Priestcraft; whereas the truth is, that it springs quite as much from a craving after infallibility on the part of the people,-as we hope to show you plainly in the next Number.

April, 1851.

103

No. VI.

WE

E Protestants are accustomed to think and speak of the way in which the Church of Rome requires implicit submission to all its teaching, as a mere piece of priestcraft,-a tyranny of the priests over the people; and to wonder how the people can be so slavish as to submit to such tyranny. But we should remember that this tyranny could never have been established at first, if the people had not been, themselves, disposed to submit to it. After it was once set up, people might be frightened and forced into outward submission; but it certainly was not set up originally by force. It grew up, like many other corruptions, in several other churches, as well as the Romish, out of the soil of human nature.

The truth is, that there is a strong tendency in human nature to save itself from the trouble of inquiry and the uneasiness of doubt. We do not like to be left for a moment in uncertainty or suspense; we are impatient of the labour of examining things for ourselves; we are alarmed at the danger of mistake, and uneasy under the sense of personal responsibility; and so we are disposed beforehand to accept a guide in religion, who shall confidently claim the power of conducting us with unerring skill, and who shall tell us that we have nothing to do but follow him. The Church of Rome, then, only took advantage of men's natural disposition, by offering itself as such a guide. That church was, long ago, the most conspicuous church in Europe, and, therefore, naturally drew men's eyes towards itself; and seemed to bid fairest for having that authority which they were eager to find somewhere.

Now it would, no doubt, be a great convenience if we had no need (whether in religion or in other matters) to examine each point separately, and make up our minds upon a great number of things, but only to settle one point once for all,-who is the proper guide in such matters?-and then follow his directions in each instance. This would be a great convenience, if we

could find the right guide more easily and surely, than we could find the right way without him.

But, even then, we should have first to find our guide, and satisfy ourselves that he was competent to direct us. And it is plain that we could, in no case, be more certain of going right in following a guide, than we were of his ability and willingness to conduct us aright. For no building can be more firm than the foundation it rests on.

If a traveller, for example, tells us something about France or Spain, which he says he witnessed in those countries, we cannot believe the facts on his word, more firmly than we believe that he is an honest man and was really there. Everything will depend on the reasons we may have for trusting his veracity. If we cannot be very sure of that, we cannot be very sure of the truth of what he tells us.

So also, in the case of the Church of Rome, no one can reasonably believe what that Church teaches, on its word, who is not first satisfied that the Church of Rome has authority to declare, absolutely, what Christ's religion is. If that be doubtful, then everything that Church teaches is (so far) equally doubtful. And if we cannot be infallibly certain that the Church of Rome is an infallible guide, we cannot be infallibly certain of anything on its word.

If, for example, a man believes the Church of Rome to be infallible, because the Lord said to Peter: "Upon this rock I will build my Church," and because he thinks-that, in that text Christ promised to make Peter and his successors infallible; and because he thinks, further, that the Bishops of Rome are the successors of Peter, meant in the promise; it is plain that he cannot be more certain of that Church's infallibility, than he is of the correctness of his judgment upon each and all of those matters on which he grounds his belief in the Church's infallibility. He cannot be infallibly sure that the Popes are unerring guides, unless he be first infallibly sure, not only that all Christ said was true, but also that Christ really made this promise; and that the meaning he puts upon it is correct; and that the Popes are the legitimate successors of Peter; and that the present Bishop of Rome is a lawful Pope.

And so, on whatever grounds a man builds his faith in the

infallibility of the Church of Rome, he must first be infallibly sure of them, before he can reasonably think himself infallibly sure of what is built upon them. And it is plain that, in making up his mind about the infallibility of his guide, a man cannot reasonably rely upon that very guide, as if he were already proved infallible. Here, then, is at least one point, in which we must, of necessity, exercise our private judgment, whether we think ourselves fit for such a task or not; while, upon the correctness of our judgment in this point, the whole security of our faith and practice, in following the guide whom we have chosen, must depend.

Now what corrupt human nature anxiously craves for is, to be infallible ourselves,-and that without any trouble or difficulty. Many Roman-catholics, indeed, conceal from themselves and others, that this is really what they seek, by saying that all they ask for is an infallible guide.

But it is plain that this is not all they really seek; because they are dissatisfied with the guidance of the Holy Scripture, which they themselves acknowledge to be infallible.

They say the Scripture is not sufficient, because they cannot be certain that it is the word of God, or again of its true meaning, but by being assured of these things by the Church.

In saying this, indeed, they, on their own principles, run into great inconsistency; because, if they cannot know the Scripture to be the Word of God, except the Infallible Church tells them so, the question is obvious,-How, then, does the Church know the Scriptures to be the Word of God? If they cannot tell the true meaning of Scripture, without the explanation of the Infallible Church, how does the Church discover the true meaning of Scripture? The Church must, plainly, know these things before it propounds them to the faithful; and therefore it must be possible to know them by some other means besides the declaration of the Church.

This, they will say, is by a divine inspiration granted to the Pope and other governors of the Church. But how are we to prove this inspiration? Is it by an appeal to Scripture itself? —that is, to the very book whose divine authority, and whose meaning, can only be known by the aid of the Church? By first assuming the very thing to be proved! or, by what Paul