But now

for their novelty than valuable for their correctness. suppose that the author of the work in question had himself given instructions in the subject of it, to a number of men who should form themselves into a school of lecturers on this work, continued by constant succession to our own time-would any commentator undertake to explain such a book, without availing himself of the labours of this school of lecturers? Not that he would consider their interpretations authoritative, or that he would suppose their tradition more trustworthy authority as to the doctrines of their master, than his own written statements; he might even think it more likely than not, that a number of ingenious men would in time have mixed up something of their own with what had been originally committed to them; and yet he might feel that such a set of lecturers possessed certain advantages towards the right understanding of the author commented on, and that he would not be justified in refusing to listen to them, and to listen with attention, though not with blind acquiescence.

But it may, perhaps, be said that the case of the Bible differs from that of a profane author, in that the readers of the former are promised the aid of the Spirit of God, to enlighten their understandings, and to communicate to them the true meaning of the written Word. It should be remembered, however, that the Ordinances of Christ's Church are no less truly his gift than the incomparably greater gift of his Holy Spirit. And no one can reasonably expect to receive from our Lord secret and supernatural assistance, if he neglect to avail himself of the aids which the same Lord, in the ordinary ways of his Providence, has furnished us with.

It remains for us now to consider whether, when we maintain that it is the office of the Church to teach religious truth, we are bound in consistency to maintain (as Romanists do) that she must teach on her own authority, and that her members are bound to accept her teaching without requiring from her any proofs; or, on the other hand, whether if we be convinced of the falsity of this latter dogma, we must resist all claims on the part of the Church to "authority* in controversies of Faith." We have admitted that the Scriptures seem to pre-suppose some

* We hope that you have not forgotten what we observed to you, p. 151, as to the two different meanings of the word "authority." We speak of authority as binding the conduct; as, for instance," the authority of an Act of Parliament," meaning thereby that a good subject is bound to obey an Act of Parliament, though not necessarily to

previous information on the part of those who read them; and we have spoken of the advantages of Church-teaching in communicating that preliminary information. But how are we to answer the Romanist, who urges that God must surely have provided some means which shall infallibly secure those truths from being lost or corrupted, the knowledge of which is, by our own confession, requisite to the right understanding of the Bible?

Perhaps we shall be better able to answer this question if we do not confine our attention to religious truth, but, on the contrary, examine first the manner in which we come to the knowledge of other kinds of truth. We shall then be better able to decide whether or not the manner in which we arrive at full information as to the doctrines of Christianity, differs essentially from that in which God has seen fit that we should obtain our knowledge on other subjects. And it will be found that there are several other branches of learning, with regard to which we must maintain the necessity of human teaching,-must hold that the learner is bound to receive such teaching with deference and submission,-while we also maintain that the learner must ultimately arrive at a point when he no longer depends on the mere testimony of his instructors, but becomes competent to pass an independent judgment on the truth of the statements made to him.

Let us then consider, in the first place, the manner in which we obtain our knowledge of a dead language; an example with which we purposely commence, because it appears to be an unfavourable one for our argument, it being a case where our knowledge seems wholly to depend on tradition and on the instruction of others. On reflection, however, we shall find some reason to believe that if a man were furnished with a sufficient quantity of writing in a language unknown to him, it would not be impossible for him to obtain a knowledge of its meaning without any help from others. The celebrated Halley published a translation of an Arabic manuscript, found in the Bodleian Library, the meaning of which he had made out without any previous knowledge of the language, and merely with the assistapprove of it: and we speak of authority as influencing the judgment; as, for instance, "the authority of a good historian," meaning thereby that he has claims to attention and deference, though of course no power to force men to submit to his decisions. It is in the latter sense, obviously, that the word is here used.

ance of a previous translation of a small portion of the manuscript; and our Oriental scholars are at present engaged, with more or less success, on a similar task, namely, the deciphering of the Assyrian inscriptions. There seems, then, some reason to think that, were every man, at present acquainted with the Greek language, to die without communicating his knowledge to others, and were every book destroyed which contained the interpretation of a Greek word or sentence, the ingenuity of the next generation would be sufficient to re-discover the language from the Greek works at present in existence. But be this as it may,

assuredly such is not the way in which languages are ordinarily learned. The knowledge of the meaning of the common Greek words has been preserved by tradition; and each new student obtains his knowledge either from oral instruction, or from lexicons, which may be considered as the embodiment of that tradition. And yet, as the student advances, when, by the perusal of Greek writers, he can judge of the sense in which they employed different words, he finds himself become gradually competent to form an independent opinion on the correctness of the explanations with which his instructors had furnished him. He can judge whether the key, with which he had been supplied, fits the lock exactly, though he might have found it difficult, or perhaps impossible, to construct a key for himself. And an accomplished scholar, if called on to pass judgment on the precise meaning of a Greek word, would do so, not by counting up the testimony on both sides of the question, but by examining for himself the different passages where it was employed. Thus, though his knowledge had been originally obtained by tradition, he becomes by degrees able to correct that tradition. And, in point of fact, a good Greek scholar of our islands would not feel bound to submit his judgment on the interpretation of an ancient Greek author, to that of a native of Athens; though, as far as mere tradition is concerned, the modern Greek has obvious advantages over him.

Let us now proceed to another illustration, which, indeed, we had occasion to employ also in the last Caution. In the science of mathematics we observed that it is possible that an individual might make out for himself all that is known, without any help from others. And yet, were there no mathematical teaching, it is probable that not one in a million would have even a moderate

acquaintance with the science. Again, even in mathematics, it is necessary that the learner should receive with docility the lessons of his teacher; if he were to try to show his cleverness by cavilling and endeavouring to find out objections to what he was taught, (and that before he perfectly understood it,) it is very likely that he would make no progress in the science at all. And there are some of the higher parts of mathematics of which the first principles are so difficult, that the learner often finds it convenient to take them for granted, for a time, on the authority of his teacher, and only comes thoroughly to understand them by the practice of the rules founded on them. But then, as long

as the learner only believes on the authority of his teacher, so long he can be said to know nothing of mathematics: his knowledge of the science only begins when he can understand the force of the proofs offered him, and when he can make out demonstrations for himself.

The same science serves well to illustrate the double meaning of the word "authority," which we have before alluded to. Thus we say that Sir Isaac Newton is a high authority in mathematics; and we should expect a student to commence reading his great work, the Principia, with a full persuasion beforehand, that the demonstrations about to be offered him would prove satisfactory; and with a disposition, in case he came to one which did not at first seem to him to be valid, to believe that the fault did not lie in Sir Isaac's proof, but in his own imperfect understanding of it.

Now and then, indeed, some crack brained mathematician does publish to the world his conviction that the so-called demonstrations of the Principia are all mere sophisms; but he only gets laughed at for his pains, and Sir Isaac's authority remains unshaken. But yet, for all that, if a man, being asked why he believed in the truth of a certain proposition of the Principia, were to reply that he believed it on the authority of Sir Isaac Newton, and if he imagined that no other proof was necessary, we should at once know that he was no mathematician, and that he understood nothing of the nature of mathematical evidence.

You will, perhaps, think that we have wandered from our subject in this disquisition on the manner in which we obtain our knowledge of Greek or of mathematics. But what we wish to impress on you is, that the mode in which God has appointed that we should obtain our knowledge of religious truth, does not

differ essentially from that in which we become acquainted with other kinds of truth. It is true (as is urged by Romanists and half-Romanists) that it has been ordained by Providence that, in religious matters, we should be indebted for our knowledge to the instruction of others, and to information handed down to us by those who went before us; and it is true, moreover, that the furnishing such instruction to his disciples, is a point for which the Founder of our religion has, in the institution of his Church, carefully provided. But then it is also true that it is the general rule of God's Providence to make us dependent upon others, not only for much of our happiness, but also for the greater part of our knowledge; and that, even in those subjects in which it is possible for unassisted individuals to make the greatest discoveries. If, therefore, we infer that because the Church is the appointed means for conveying to us religious instruction, therefore Church-teaching can in no case be disputed; we may just as fairly conclude that no mathematician is at liberty to doubt any of the theorems communicated to him by those who first instructed him. But if, in other subjects, the fact that we commence with the passive reception of information from others, does not exclude the necessity of our own minds being afterwards actively engaged in the search for truth, surely that subject forms no exception which is best worthy of occupying our thoughts, and on which the search for truth best repays investigation.

We believe that it is of considerable importance that you should keep steadily before your minds this resemblance on which we have been commenting, between the manner of acquiring religious and other kinds of truth. And you will find this particularly useful in answering objections. Thus, for example, Romanists assume that because we require proof of the doctrines propounded to us by the Church, we must be perpetually wavering and hesitating in our faith; doubting and disbelieving these doctrines until they have been actually demonstrated to us. But we can at once perceive the unsoundness of this assumption, by considering any of the parallel cases we have brought before your notice. We have seen (p. 397) that it is a learner's business to require proof from a mathematical instructor, and not to be satisfied until he has obtained convincing proof: