will feel; he will feel ashamed, if at all, of his ancestors rather than himself; and will feel perhaps a discontented mortification at his present lot, mingled with bitter indignation at their mis-conduct.

Such, we fear, is but too much like the kind of feeling with which the subtle Tempter of Man leads some Christians to contemplate their present condition as resulting from the fall of our first parents. He would fain persuade us that we ought to feel, -and that we do feel,-penitent for the sin of Adam; and by this false and imaginary penitence, to lose sight of what we really may feel, and really ought to feel, for actual sins of our own.

Evils indeed, or dangers, may be felt, or may be apprehended, by us, as the consequence of another man's fault; but no metaphysical subtilties can bring us really to feel,-though they may bring us to fancy we feel,-any of that real remorse and personal self-abasement, for his sin, which we should, and may, feel for an actual transgression of our own.

The true lesson of humility which the history of Adam's fall is designed to teach us, is, self-distrust and watchfulness, combined with a disposition anxiously to look for, and meekly to rely on the promised assistance of the "Spirit which helpeth our infirmities." The history teaches us that even if Adam and Eve had never been, themselves, exposed to such a trial as they did undergo, we, their descendants, resembling them, of course, in character, and where we differ, not differing (naturally) for the better, should, in like circumstances, have yielded, as they did, to the wiles of the same Tempter, whom our unaided powers are insufficient to resist.

It may be worth while here to observe incidentally, that some preachers in describing the condition of Man before the Fall, are accustomed, inadvertently, to use a kind of language likely to convey to the unreflective hearer a notion which we presume they cannot intend. They describe not only the innocence, but the purity and holiness, of Man's original character, in such terms as might be understood to imply that frailty was introduced at the Fall, and did not exist till after the eating of the forbidden fruit. Now it is true that there is no danger of any one's believing, in the strict sense of that word, a contradiction in terms: and a moment's reflection must make it clear to the capacity of a child, that Adam could not have transgressed if he had not been frail in a certain degree, however less that degree of frailty than ours.

But still, such language may produce confusion and perplexity in the minds of learners; and may furnish adversaries with a plausible objection against our religion, as containing a self-contradiction. For that it is a self-contradiction to speak of the liability to yield to temptation having been originally produced by yielding to temptation-the cause by the effect,-no man in his senses can doubt. In whatever sense it is that man was said to be "created in God's image," and that all things that were made were pronounced "very good,"-whatever these expressions do mean, it is plain what they do not mean; they cannot mean (as the narrative proves) that our first parents were of such a character as to withstand temptation to disobedience.

Innocent indeed, they undoubtedly were, till they had sinned; for that is the very meaning of the word " innocent;" but it is worth remarking that even innocence was lost before the forbidden fruit had been actually tasted; for since we all know that sin consists, not in the outward bodily act, but in the intention of the mind, it is plain they had committed the sin as soon as the purpose of the act was fully formed.* A man is, morally, a murderer, at the moment he pulls the trigger of a gun with intent to assassinate; and that, not the less, even should he chance to miss his aim.

(5) It may be added, lastly, that there is not necessarily any real humility in a disparagement of the human understanding— the intellectual powers, as contrasted with the affections and other feelings. "The pride of human reason' " is a phrase very much in the mouth of some persons, who seem to think they are effectually humbling themselves by feeling (or sometimes by merely professing) an excessive distrust of all exercise of the intellect, while they resign themselves freely to the guidance of what they call the heart; that is, their prejudices, passions, inclinations, and fancies. But the feelings are as much a part of man's constitution as his reason. Every part of our nature will equally lead us wrong, if operating uncontrolled. If indeed a man employs his reason, not in ascertaining what God has revealed in Scripture, but in conjecturing what might be, or ought to be, the divine dispensations, he is employing his reason wrongly,

*This was known even to the heathen moralist by the light of nature:
"Nam scelus intra se tacitum qui cogitat ullum

Facti crimen habet."

and will err accordingly. But this is not the only source of error. He who, to avoid this, gives up the use of his reason, and believes or disbelieves, adopts or rejects, according to what suits his feelings, taste, will, and fancy, is no less an idolater of himself than the other; his feelings, &c. being a part of himself, no less than his reason. We may, if we please, call the one of these a "Rationalist," and the other an "Irrationalist;" but there is as much of the pride of self-idolatry in the one as in the other. The Greeks and Romans were indeed wretched idolaters, in their adoration of the beautiful statues of Jupiter and Minerva; but the Egyptians, who adored those of an ox and a hawk, were not the less idolaters. The Jews, relying on the decision of learned Rabbis, and the Pythagorean, who yielded implicit reverence to the dicta of the sage, did not more exalt Man into an oracle, in the place of God, than the Mussulmans, who pay a like reverence to idiots and madmen. Each part of our nature should be duly controlled, and kept within its own proper province: and the whole "brought into subjection to Christ," and dedicated to Him. But there is no real christian humility—though there be debasement -in renouncing the exercise of human reason, to follow the dictates of human feeling. The apostle's precept is, “in malice be ye children; but in understanding be ye men."

The error we have been adverting to is worthy of notice, only from the plausibility it derives from the authority of some persons who really do possess cultivated intellectual powers; and who therefore, when they declaim against the pride of human reason, are understood not to be disparaging an advantage of which they are destitute.* They appear voluntarily divesting themselves of what many would feel a pride in; and thus often conceal from others, as well as from themselves, the spiritual pride with which they not only venerate their own feelings and prejudices, but even load with anathemas all who presume to dissent from them. It is a prostration, not of man's self before God, but of one part

It may be observed by the way, that the persons who use this kind of language (which is that of a large proportion of the Tract-party), never do, in fact, divest themselves of any human advantages they may chance to possess. Whatever learning or argumentative powers any of them possess (and some of them do possess much) we have always found them ready to put forth, in any controversy they may be engaged in, without showing much tenderness for an opponent who may be less gifted. It is only when learning and argument make against them, that they declaim against the pride of intellect; and deprecate an appeal to reason when its decision is unfavourable. So that the sacrifice which they appear to make, is one which in reality they do not make, but only require (when it suits their purpose) from others.

of himself before another. This kind of humiliation is like the idolatry of the Israelites in the wilderness: "The people stripped themselves of their golden ornaments that were upon them, and cast them into the fire; and there came out this calf."

It is important to observe that there is, under an outward and apparent difference, a close substantial resemblance between those who exalt the most highly the claims of Church-tradition, and some of their most vehement opponents. To decry private judgment and the pride of intellect, and appeal to the consent of the orthodox Fathers and the decisions of the Church, at the same time deciding who is orthodox, and what is the Church, according to our own judgment, and by the exercise of our own intellect; or, on the other hand, to decry Tradition, and appeal professedly to Scripture as the standard and rule of faith, but in reality making the standard our own interpretation of Scripture; these are in fact but two different forms of what may be called " selfidolatry." And there are persons who, unconsciously, fall into this latter error; who profess to appeal to Scripture as their rule of faith, and final decider of all controversies, but denounce (as the Gnostics of the earlier ages did) any one whose views differ from their own-though he may be, perhaps, a diligent and learned student of the Sacred Writings,-as "not knowing the Gospel," -as blind-carnal-unconverted-"not understanding the things that be of God," &c.

"And where is the difference," it may be asked, "between taking for our rule of faith, the Scriptures, or our own interpretation of them? since the mere words of Scripture cannot be any guide unless we attach some meaning to them; and what meaning can we attach, except that which appears to us the true one ?" Thus insidiously does self-estimation, and reverence for one's own party, creep in under the disguise of veneration for God's Word! we would answer, it is true that in taking Scripture for our own guide, we must be led by what appearsaccording to the best of our judgment—to be the sense of Scripture: but when making an appeal to Scripture in any discussion with another, we must refer him to the words of Scripture, and to the sense in which he can be brought to understand them. It is a very plain case for the application of that much-praised, though little-practised rule, of doing as we would be done by. Would you think it reasonable for another man to insist on your adopt

ing his sense of Scripture, when it appeared to you not to be the true one, and denounce you, if you refused, as not knowing the Gospel? You can have no right then to deny him the same freedom of judgment which you claim for yourself.

Will you reply, "He is wrong, and therefore I ought not to adopt his views; but I am right, and therefore he ought to adopt mine?" Suppose this to be, in truth, the actual state of the case; are you infallible, that you can presume positively to pronounce this; and gifted with such miraculous proofs of infallibility as both authorize you to "judge another's servant," and bind him to acquiesce in your judgment?

Since our great Master, who not only knew the sense of Scripture, but also "knew what was in Man," pronounced no more against the Sadducees than, “Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures," it surely becomes a fallible mortal, to say only, “I think ye do err." But we certainly do often hear expressions which seem to imply (being intelligible on no other supposition) that those who use them make their appeal, not, really to Scripture as it meets the eye of every reader, but to their own interpretation of it. For instance, it has been said that, "in any difficulty, a far more safe and certain guide is provided for us, than all the wit or wisdom of man could furnish. The promise is, that the wayfaring man, though a fool, shall not err therein,' and this promise is made doubly sure by the means provided for its accomplishment. Your heavenly Father will give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him?' Here, then, is an interpreter incomparably beyond all that man could devise: a sure, an unerring guide: One; not a thousand conflicting authorities; and one too, obtained by asking.' And again, that “what we call 'Scripture,' is a collection of the writings of the Apostles, given by them authoritatively, as inspired by the Holy Ghost. If we believe their genuineness, and the truth of this pretension, we are then immediately in the Divine presence ;—we are listening to God himself;-we are perfectly free from all tincture or vicinity of error."

Now, does the Romish Church claim more than to be " perfectly free from all tincture of error?" And can any one who professes to be thus "perfectly free," deny that he claims infallibility? Admitting (as we do) that Scripture is a guide in itself infallible,-i. e. that we cannot be misled (as in the works