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should terminate, but that is not correct: free will cannot exist alone, nor can we think of free will without objects in relation to which its freedom exists. Free will cannot exist without action, and in every action of the will there must be a trinity; there must be will, power, and means. To prove that the will is free in itself, it is said that it can as freely will to go to the moon as it can will to go from one room to another. But a moment's reflection will enable us to see that the two cases are not similar, nor is there any comparison between them; in the former the will is not free, in the latter it is; man does not possess the means of going to the moon, therefore the will is not free to go there; but he does possess the means of going from one room to another, therefore the will is free to go there. Hence willing to go to the moon furnishes us with no instance of free will; it shews that the will has the power of willing, but it does not shew that it is free.

For the will to be free it must not be in bonds; its determinations must not be confined or enclosed within itself, but they must come out and be liberated by exercise upon external objects, and in no other way can the will be free. If it were possible for the will to will in itself, man would not be conscious of its operations, it being in the thought and in relation to external things that he becomes conscious of its existence. The will cannot will in itself independently of the things which are extraneous to it—that is, of the things which are willed, any more than the eye can see itself, or see in itself independently of external objects. In the instance of willing to go to the moon, the will is not alone, for the thought is active, and the memory is called into requisition. In the first place we must employ the understanding, and in the second place we must call forth the idea or form of the moon, which is deposited in the memory; we cannot will unless there be an object, nor can we will the object without thinking about it, and even then the will may not be free in relation to the object, or free to do what it wills. The supposition of the will being free to will to go to the moon, gives no idea of free will whatsoever; it is true it gives an idea of a will, and also of willing, but it gives no idea of free will; the will never being free except in the practice of what it wills. Willing is only being, but doing is existing; and the will has freedom only when and where it can exist. Though the instance of willing to go to the moon furnishes us with no idea of free will, yet we are not to conclude on that account that man does not possess free will; but, as said, he has not the power of going, nor the means of getting there, therefore it is not an instance of free will-the will is not free to do what it cannot do. The poor man might will to become rich, but not having the means he is not free; yet we

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are not to suppose that because he cannot become rich by virtue of willing, that he does not possess free will; he is free in his own power and in his own means, and give him the means of becoming wealthy, then his will will be free to accomplish its end. When the will possesses the power and means needful for the accomplishment of any object, then it is free to effect it, but it is not free without them.

The will may will imaginary objects, but that is not free will; for the will to regale itself in wild reverie, or sport in imagination, is not free will. Free will has relation to action; and when we predicate liberty of it, we must mean liberty of acting. The thought may be engaged in the formation of all kinds of grotesque and distorted images, and the will may be active in relation to these; but they are only imaginary entities they never can exist actually, and free will exist in relation to them.

The action of the will itself is not denied by the sceptic, if the existence of the will be admitted at all; and if this be not admitted, there can be no dispute either about its liberty or its power. The sceptic denies the liberty of the will because it has not always the power and means to effect what it wills; and not seeing the difference between the will and its power and means, he concludes, because he has not the requisite power and adequate means for the accomplishment of his object, that he is not a subject of free will at all, but only a creature of circumstances. Thus, he denies free will because he cannot effect his purposes under all circumstances, when nevertheless what he wills may be an impossibility. It is evident that the objection of the sceptic is made to the action of the will, and not to the will itself; for the existence of the thing to which the effect is denied must be admitted, or the action and effect would not be predicable of it, either affirmatively or negatively. For the will to be free implies that it is free to do something, and not to revolve within itself and effect nothing; but its liberty is in its freedom of thinking and acting, and thus in operating in the performance of uses, and thereby furthering the end for which man was created. The exercise of the will in freedom was the design of the Creator, in order that effects might be produced, and states formed in man as the result thereof, and thus, by the formation of orderly habits, heavenly life might be obtained, and the end of man's being realised. But this could not possibly be effected by the will in itself, or by its action in the mind only, but in the body in actions and words, the will not being free unless its determinations can come forth, and this can be done only in the body. Were this not the case, free will would not be a practical doctrine, but only a mere speculative

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principle, and man would not be responsible for its determinations, because they would be incapable of doing either good or evil. origin of evil, and the fall of man, are attributed to the determinations of the will; therefore free will must have been a practical doctrine then; and as it was then, so it is now. There is an origin of evil every time that the will determines to commit sin, because that is an evil which never existed before, either with that will or any other. As it was in the beginning with the origin of evil, so it is now, and so it ever will be. It originates now in the same way that it did at first; so that we have no need to look back to bygone days, and unknown men, for the origin of evil; nor have we any need to look out of ourselves, all this being useless; but we need only look into ourselves, and attend to the determinations of the will, and the whole secret will be revealed to us. By examining our minds in the light of truth, we may discover that Adam, Eve, and the serpent are there, and also the tree of life, and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, every part of the Divine word being practical when rightly understood.

There are individuals who maintain that man has not free will, but that he is altogether influenced by circumstances, so that he is a mere creature thereof. There are others who, whilst they profess the doctrine of free will, express such vague and romantic notions concerning it, that it would be impossible for novitiates to derive therefrom any definite idea; and if they relied upon such, their thoughts, when reflecting upon the subject, would as a consequence bécome confused. For instance, it is sometimes remarked, that there are circumstances which surround us over which we have no control, as, that a man has no choice as to whether he shall be born in a Christian or heathen country,—in a dark or enlightened age, of good or evil parents; nor, consequently, whether he shall be brought up in a true or false religion, or with virtuous or vicious habits. Such statements, though their tendency is to narrow the limits of the scope of free will, nevertheless do not in any way invalidate that important doctrine; for before birth the fœtus (allowing the existence of this) is not a subject of free will, nor has it any consciousness, therefore the terms have no application to it. Inasmuch as these objections are urged against free will, and before birth it does not exist, they simply amount to this: nothing cannot choose where or by whom it shall begin to exist, or nothing cannot choose when it shall become something. These are parallel statements, because all that is said is concerning what has no existence, or of nothing. When the will exists, then we may speak of it in relation to transpiring circumstances; but before it exists, we cannot predicate anything of it, and that for a most obvious reason.

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It is true that there are many circumstances over which man has no control, therefore these cannot be objects of his free will; for instance, he has no power to prevent the present depression of trade, nor has he power to remove it now it exists; but we are not to conclude on that account that his will is not free. Man's free will being circumscribed by his powers, and the prevention or removal of the obstructions to the prosperity of trade and commerce being beyond his power, he is not free in respect to either, neither of them coming within the province of his free will. Though man has not the power to remove the present depression of trade, yet he can do his duty during its existence as freely as he could before it occurred. It on no account follows that because

man cannot control circumstances he cannot use his free will in relation to them. It is not the province of free will to control circumstances, but to control man's actions, and regulate his life.

That man is free to will and to act in the circumstances in which he is placed, is well known to magistrates, who have in their hands the administration of the law; and that he is free to act in a moral and spiritual point of view, is equally well known to those who believe and practise the teaching of the Divine Word; and as man is responsible in the eyes of magistrates in regard to civil laws, so he is in the sight of God responsible in regard to spiritual laws; hence, in the same Divine Book which contains the moral and spiritual codes, it is declared"Blessed are they that do His commandments;" (Rev. xxii. 14.) and that "every one shall be rewarded according to his works." (Matt. xvi. 27.)

Even in nunneries and prisons the inmates are free to the extent of their prescribed laws; and though they cannot walk abroad, because they have not the means, still they are free within their limits, and they can choose or refuse to obey their laws. So also it is in hell. The infernals, although in misery and abject slavery, are free to act according to prescribed laws; they are not compelled, but are free to obey or disobey, as is evident from the circumstance of their frequent violation of them. Their having to suffer the consequences attending the violation of their laws is no argument against their free will. It is the same in this world; man has to take the consequences of the violation of the laws of the community to which he belongs. This is his responsibility, which exists wherever man exists, the doctrine of responsibility being only the doctrine of consequences. Man has a will in his constitution, as shown in Part I. of this Essay; and wherever he may be, or in whatsoever circumstances he may be placed, it is free according to his power and means; or he is free to will, to think, and to act, according to the possibility of the case.

S. S.

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EDWARD IRVING.

Ir is with more profound interest than we find it easy to express, that we have perused the biography, lately published by Mrs. Oliphant, of the gifted preacher Edward Irving. Like many, probably, of our readers, we were familiar with the name of Irving, as that of a preacher famed for his eloquence, and also as the founder of a sect, since more generally called by his name than by that, adopted by its members, of "Catholic Apostolic Church." Moreover, from an article published some years since upon the subject, in one of the Quarterly Reviews, we had derived the impression that he was himself imposed upon, and not imposing on others, in his acceptance and proclamation to the world, of the restoration to the church in question, as results of immediate Divine Inspiration, of the gifts of prophecy and speech in unknown tongues, which the Acts of the Apostles and some of the Epistles bear witness to as possessed by the Christian Church at that day. That this impression, in favour of Irving's personal sincerity, is abundantly confirmed by the work before us, is little to say; we may add that we have never risen from perusal of the life-history of any man, with feelings of deeper and warmer sympathy, love, and reverence, albeit blent with inevitable, though it may well be misplaced, compassion, than those which a closer acquaintance with him in these pages has awakened, and must, we think, irresistibly awaken in the heart of every sincere and liberalhearted Christian. "Saint and martyr," with affectionate reverence, his biographer calls him; and we can easily believe that men have died at the stake with no more in them of the true martyr-spirit—the spirit which can sacrifice all earthly objects to its allegiance to its Heavenly Master-than sustained this man through trials and obloquy far more torturing than any death by fire, to one of his loving and deeply susceptible nature.

It is almost impossible to imagine a heart and life more sincerely dedicated, more rapt in devotion to the service of the Great Master, than his would appear to have been; with a faith and self-abnegation only the more touching, because it was that very faith, in its partial blindness, which led to inevitable shipwreck of all his pious earthly hopes and aspirations; stranding him in grand poetic justice on the shores of that heaven which it was his mistake to have looked to realize below.

"The Life of Edward Irving, by Mrs. Oliphant. London: Hurst and

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