Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind, Volume 2Bell & Bradfute, 1803 - Philosophy |
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Common terms and phrases
abfurd abſtract againſt ARISTOTLE attri attributes axioms becauſe believe Biſhop cafes called caufe cauſe ceive common fenfe conceive conception conclufion confcious confequence confider confifts conftitution conſciouſneſs defign demonftration diftinct diftinctly diftinguiſh diſcover Effay effence enthymeme EUCLID'S Elements evidence exift exiſtence expreffed faculties faid falfe falſe fame feems felf-evident fhall fhew fhould fides fignify figns fimple apprehenfion firft principles firſt fome fomething fpecies ftand fubject fuch fuppofe furely fyftem give greateſt himſelf human HUME ideas imagination impoffible individual itſelf ject judge judgment knowledge language laſt lefs likewife LOCKE MALEBRANCHE mathematical meaning ment mind moft moſt muft muſt nature neral notions obferve objects of fenfe objects of thought occafion operations paffions perceive perfons Philofophers poffible prefent proper names propofition purpoſe queftion reaſoning ſay ſcience ſeems ſenſe ſome ſpeak ſpecies teftimony thefe themſelves theſe things thofe thoſe tion true underſtanding univerfal uſe words
Popular passages
Page 130 - A great philosopher - has disputed the received opinion in this particular, and has asserted, that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them.
Page 204 - SINCE the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate ; it is evident, that our knowledge is only conversant about them.
Page 279 - Volition, it is plain, is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from any particular action.
Page 142 - ... that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them. As I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters...
Page 61 - We seem to treat the thoughts, that present themselves to the fancy in crowds, as a great man treats those [courtiers] that attend his levee. They are all ambitious of his attention. He goes round the circle, bestowing a bow upon one, a smile upon another; asks a short question of a third, while a fourth is honoured with a particular conference; and the greater part have no particular mark of attention, but go as they came. It is true, he can give no mark of his attention to those who were not there,...
Page 198 - We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident ; the second to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province, and the sole province, of common sense ; and therefore it coincides with reason in its whole extent, and is only another name for one branch or one degree of reason.
Page 87 - that the original principles of the mind, of which we can give no account, but that such is our constitution, are more in number than is commonly thought. But we ought not to multiply them without necessity. That trains of thinking which by frequent repetition have become familiar, should spontaneously offer themselves to our fancy, seems to require no other original quality but the power of habit.
Page 220 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.
Page 188 - Conscious they act a true Palladian part, And if they starve, they starve by rules of art. Oft have you hinted to your brother peer, A certain truth, which many buy too dear...
Page 37 - I am certain there are not two objects of this conception, but one only ; which is as immediate an object of my conception as any can be. Secondly, this one object which I conceive is not the image of an animal, it is an animal. I know what it is to conceive an image of an animal, and what it is to conceive an animal ; and I can distinguish the one of these from the other without any danger of mistake.