out of general and ambiguous terms, that so we may come up the closer, and fall directly to the point in question. You tell me, in answer to the former part, that the divine "attributes of the Son are not individually the "same with those of the Fatherb." By which you mean, that they are not divine: and so here you have discovered, that the Doctor does not understand divine, as others do in this controversy; and as a candid and ingenuous reader might be apt to understand him. You add, that "they (the attributes of the Son) are notwith"standing, more than faint resemblances; the Son being "the brightness of his Father's glory, and the express "image of his Person." I allow that this text does set forth a great deal more than a "faint resemblance :" but you have not shown that your hypothesis supposes so much; and therefore the quoting of this text is only arguing against yourself. The inference we draw from this text, consonant to all antiquity, is, that the resemblance between Father and Son is complete and perfect; and that therefore they do not differ as finite and infinite, since that supposition would set them at an infinite distance from any such perfect and complete resemblance. You observe farther, that there can be but one "intelli"gent being" (the same with you, as person) "absolutely "infinite in all respects," (p. 55.) which, though an assertion of great importance, you are pleased barely to lay down, without the least tittle of proof, or so much as pretence to it. Nay, you admit in your Notes, that there may be two infinite beings, in the sense of immense; that is, two beings omnipresent, or infinitely extended. And why not as well two Persons infinitely perfect in all other

b Page 64.

e One infinite, in the sense of immense, does not (by taking up all space) exclude (necessarily) another immense, any more than it excludes any finite. For if a finite being doth not exclude (God) from a finite place, it is plain that an infinite, that is, an immense being, cannot exclude him from infinite, that is, from immense place. So that perhaps it is no such absolute impossibility, as some have thought it, to suppose two distinct immense beings. Note, p. 56.

respects, as well as presence? For, to use your own way of arguing in that very place, if finite power, wisdom, goodness, &c. do not exclude infinite; it is plain that infinite power, wisdom, goodness, &c. of one, do not exclude the infinite power, goodness; &c. of another. Besides, that two, infinite in all respects, are as easily conceived as two, infinite in any: and therefore here you seem, by your too liberal concessions, to have unsaid what you had said before; and to have unravelled your own objection. You are aware, that an adversary may take advantage of what you say; and endeavour, lamely, to prevent it, by telling us, (p. 56.) that though it be possible to suppose two distinct immense beings, yet it is impossible there should be two immense beings of the same individual nature; for so, they must coincide, and be but one Person. But what if those who assert the same individual nature, in more persons than one, understand the words in a larger sense than you here take them in? It is very certain they do not understand the phrase of the same individual nature, as you, who make it equivalent to the same Person, understand it: for they assert more persons than one to have the same individual nature. In the mean while, what a wonderful discovery is this, which you have laid such a stress on; that two persons cannot be one person, without coinciding and making one person. This is all that you have really said; and very true it is; only I am at a loss to find out the pertinency of it. To conclude this head: as to infinite, in the sense of extension, (into length, breadth, and height,) you will give me leave to suspend my judgment. I do not find either that it is asserted in Scripture, or generally maintained by the Fathers; but that it is liable to many difficulties, in point of reason, more than I am, at present, able to answer. See what a d late thoughtful writer has said, and what Cudworth had before collected on that sub

Impartial Inquiry into the Existence and Nature of God, by S. C. part ii. c. 1, 2, 3.

• Intellectual System, p. 828-834.

ject. In my humble opinion, such intricate questions are too high for us, and are what our faculties were not made for. However that be, you and I need not differ. For if you can admit the possibility of two infinite extended beings, you can have nothing considerable to object against the one infinity of three infinite Persons, which I assert, and without determining the modus of it.

You proceed to observe, that "the Son's office and "character doth not require infinite powers:" to which I shall only say, that it may, for any thing you know; so that this is only guessing in the dark. Last of all, you come to interpret Dr. Clarke; supposing him to mean by divine powers, all divine powers relating to the Son's character. If he meant so, he might easily have said so: and yet if he had, he had still left us in uncertainties as much as ever; to muse upon a distinction which he has no ground for; and which, when admitted, will make no man wiser. You "hope the Querist is so good a phi"losopher as to perceive, (though he doth not consider "it,) that absolute infinite perfections include and infer supremacy and independency. and independency. And therefore, when "Dr. Clarke excepted supremacy and independency, he "plainly, in reason and consequence, excepted absolute "infinite powers.

Now I am persuaded, that Dr. Clarke would have thought it hard measure to have been charged by his adversaries with this so plain consequence, plain consequence, which you here so freely lay upon him. The Querist was aware that the Doctor's words might bear an orthodox sense; namely, that to the Son are communicated all things belonging to the Father, excepting only what is personal; that is, excepting that he is not the first in order; not supreme, in that sense, nor unoriginate. The Doctor well knew that his words might bear this construction; and perhaps would not have took it well of any, but a friend, that should have tied down a loose and general expression to a strict particular meaning; and then have loaded it with consef Script. Doctr. p. 298.

quences too shocking to be admitted in plain and express terms. But to proceed. You seem to be much offended at the Querist for asking, "whether all divine powers can "be communicated to a creature, infinite perfection to a "finite being?" This, you say, is "an evident contra"diction, which ought not to have been put by one scho"lar upon another." But, after this rebuke, you will please to hearken to the reason of the case. The difficulty, you know, with the Querist was, how to come at the Doctor's real sense, couched under general and ambiguous expressions; that so the controversy might be brought to a point; and it might be seen plainly what was the true state of the question: which, as appears now, is only this; whether God the Son be a creature or no. The Doctor talked of the Son's having divine powers, and all divine powers. It was very proper to ask you, whether he hereby meant infinite powers or no; and withal to show, if you should not answer directly, that he could not mean it, consistently with the Arian hypothesis; which he seemed, in other parts of his performance, to espouse. You will not yet say directly, that the Son's perfections are finite, nor deny them to be infinite: so hard a thing it is to draw you out of your ambiguous terms, or to make you speak plainly what you mean. All you are pleased to say is, that the powers or perfections of the Son are not absolutely infinite: as if infinity were of two sorts, absolute and limited; or might be rightly divided into infinity, and not infinity. Instead of this, I could wish that words may be used in their true and proper meaning. If you do not think the perfections of the Son are infinite, and yet are unwilling to limit them; let them be called indefinite, which is the proper word to express your meaning; and then every reader may be able to understand us, and may see where we differ. We are both agreed that the Doctor, by divine powers, did not mean infinite powers. Now let us proceed to the next Query.

QUERY XI.

Whether if the Doctor means by divine powers, powers given by God (in the same sense as angelical powers are divine powers) only in a higher degree than are given to other beings; it be not equivocating, and saying nothing: nothing that can come up to the sense of those texts before cited, a or to these following?

Applied to the one God.

Thou, even thou, art Lord alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their hosts, the earth, and all things that are therein, &c. Neh. ix. 6.

In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. Gen.

i. 1.

To God the Son.

All things were made by him, John i. 3. By him were all things created: he is before all things, and by him all things consist, Coloss. i. 16, 17.

Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the works of thine hands, Heb. i. 10.

IF the Doctor means, by divine powers, no more than is intimated in this Query, I must blame him first for equivocating and playing with an ambiguous word; and next for restraining and limiting the powers of the Son of God; not only without, but against Scripture; and consequently for giving us, not the "Scripture Doctrine of "the Trinity," but his own. That there is no ground, from the texts themselves, for any such limitation as is now supposed, is tacitly implied in the Doctor's own confession, that the Son is excluded from nothing but absolute supremacy and independency: "So naturally does "truth sometimes prevail, by its own native clearness "and evidence, against the strongest and, most settled "prejudices." Indeed the thing is very clear from the texts themselves cited above; especially when strengthened with those now produced under this Query. That the Son was and is endowed with creative powers, is plain from these texts, and others which might be added;