3. Another case may be, when the terms of a proposition are understood, but are so connected or divided, as to make a proposition manifestly repugnant. A triangle is a square, A globe is not round, or the like. Such propositions we reject; not because we do not understand them, but because we do; and understand them to be false. Sometimes indeed a contradiction lies concealed under the words it is couched in, till it be resolved into plainer. For instance: this proposition, The existence of a first cause is demonstrable, a priori: as it lies under these terms, it seems reducible to case the second; as being sound without sense. But resolve it into this; There is a cause prior to the first; and then the i repugnancy appears. So again: Necessity of existence is antecedently (in order of nature) the cause or ground of that existence. These are only so many syllables. But put it thus: A property is, in order of nature, antecedent to, and the ground and cause of the subject which supports it; and the contradiction is manifest. Once more: Necessity absolute and antecedent (in order of nature) to the existence of the first cause must operate every where alike. This proposition seems to fall under case the second. But let it be resolved into plainer words; and then it will appear that this is the proper place for it. 4. A fourth case is, when the terms of the proposition carry ideas with them, seemingly, but not plainly repugnant. For example: God certainly foreknows events depending on uncertain causes. The omnipresent substance is not extended. Propositions of this kind may be, and are assented to; because there may be a greater appearance of repugnancy on the opposite side of the question; or, because there is not reason sufficient for suspending as sent. 5. A fifth case is, when a proposition is formed in ge ὁ ̓Αλλ' οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ, αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων, καὶ γνωριμωτέρων συνίσταται, τοῦ δὲ ἀγεννήτου οὐδὲν προϋπάρχει. Clem. Alex. Strom. p. 696. neral terms, and reaches not to minute particulars. "The "pure in heart shall see God." The phrase of seeing God conveys some idea, but general only; not particular, precise, or determinate. "At God's right hand are plea sures for evermore." God's right hand, and pleasures, we have only general confuse ideas of: yet ideas we have; and we assent as far as our ideas reach. Having no more than a general confuse perception, our faith in such points can rise no higher, or reach no farther; nor can more be expected of us. 6. A sixth case is, when the terms of a proposition convey ideas, but ideas of pure intellect; such as imagination can lay no hold of. Philosophers have illustrated this by the instance of a chiliagon and a triangle. We understand what is meant by a figure of a thousand sides, as clearly as we do what is meant by one of three only: but we imagine one more distinctly than the other. This instance belongs more properly to distinct and confuse imagination, than to the purpose it is brought for. Ideas of numbers, in the abstract, are properly ideas of pure intellect and so are, or should be, our ideas of our own souls, of angels, of God: we may understand several things of them; but imagination has very little to do in such matters. However, our not being able to imagine, provided we do but understand, is no hindrance to our assent, in propositions of this kind. 7. The last and easiest case is, when the terms convey full and strong ideas to the understanding and imagination also. For instance: The man Christ Jesus ate, drank, slept, was crucified, died, and was buried, &c. Here, all is easy, clear, and plain, even to those who love not to think upon the stretch, or to be under any pain in assenting. Now for the application of the foregoing particulars to the point in hand. Those articles of faith, which the Church has called mysteries, belong not to case the first or second, wherein no assent can be given: or if they do, they are no articles of faith, but so many sounds or syl lables. It is to be hoped, they come not under case the third: for plain contradictions are certainly no mysteries, any more than plain truths; as is justly observed by the learned k Dr. Clarke. For the same reason, they fall not under case the seventh, where every thing is supposed distinct, clear, and particular as can be desired. Whatever is plainly reducible to any of the four cases now mentioned, is either no matter of faith at all, or no mystery. There remain three cases; where the ideas are either seemingly repugnant, or such as reach not to particulars, or such as imagination has no concern with. Assent may be given in all these cases, as hath been already observed; and so, possibly, here we may find articles of faith and, if some gentlemen will give us leave, after we have thus explained what we mean by the term, we will call such articles mysteries. For example: The belief of three Persons, every one singly God, and all together one God, seems to fall under case the fourth: the ideas are seemingly, not really, repugnant. We know what we mean, in saying every one, as clearly as if we said any one, is God; a Person having such and such essential perfections. We see not perfectly how this is reconciled with the belief of one God, as we see not how prescience is reconciled with future contingents. Yet we believe both, not doubting but that there is a connection of the ideas, though our faculties reach not up to it. Omnipresence, I think, is another mystery, and falls chiefly under case the fifth. We have a general confuse idea of it, and mean something by it. The particular manner how it is, we have no notion of; and therefore are not obliged to believe any particular modus. Fix upon this or that, there are appearing repugnancies and inconsistencies; and so far, this is reducible to case the fourth, as well as fifth. The incarnation of the Son of God is another mystery, and comes under case the fourth and fifth. There are k Reply, p. 38. some seeming, not real repugnancies; and the ideas we have of it are general and confuse, not particular nor special. Such as our ideas are, such must our faith be; and we cannot believe farther than we conceive, for believing is conceiving; confusely, if ideas are confusely; generally, if general; distinctly and adequately, if distinct and adequate. The generation of the Son of God is another mystery. Ideas we have of it, and know what we mean by it. But being spiritual, imagination can lay no hold of them; being general and confuse, we cannot reach to particulars; and being seemingly repugnant, we cannot make out the entire connection. Equality of nature (which is part of the notion) is a general idea, and well understood; reference to a head or fountain is general too, but more confuse, and besides, figurative; eternal reference very confuse, as the idea of eternity necessarily must be; inseparability is general, obscure, negative; and we know but very imperfectly what the union of spiritual things means. Nevertheless we understand enough (though we can imagine little) to make it properly an article of belief; and no man can reasonably pretend to reject it, as having no meaning, or carrying no idea at all with it. We assent as far as our ideas reach, for we can do no more: we believe in part, what is revealed in part; our faith keeping pace with our ideas, and ending where they end. The simplicity of God is another mystery, of which we have some, but a very imperfect, general, and obscure idea. It may fall under case the fifth and sixth. Scripture says little of it: we have took it chiefly from metaphysics, which are short and defective. When we come to inquire, whether all extension, or all plurality, diversity, composition of substance and accident, and the like, be consistent with it, then it is that we discover how confuse and inadequate our ideas are. And hence it is, that while all parties admit the divine simplicity, in the general, yet when they come to be pressed with it in dispute, they often give different accounts of it; and easily so ex plain and state the notion, as to make it suit with their particular schemes. To this head belongs that perplexing question, (beset with difficulties on all sides,) whether the divine substance be extended or no. And if extension be admitted, ingenious thoughtful men will divide again, upon another question, whether infinite or no; some thinking it very absurd for any attribute of God not to be infinite; others thinking it no less absurd to admit any infinite extension, number, or the like, at all. They that suppose the divine substance extended, lest they should be obliged to conceive it as a point only; and lest they should admit that any thing can act where it is not, are, when pressed with difficulties about aliquot parts, forced to admit that any part of that substance, how great soever, or of whatever dimensions, must be. conceived only as a point, in proportion to the whole: from whence it follows, that, unless the world be infinite, all that acts (of that infinite substance) in the world, is but a point; and so the whole substance, except that point, either acts not at all in the world, or acts where it is not. But to pro ceed. Self-existence is another mystery, of which we know little and the learned are hardly agreed whether it be a negative or positive idea. Yet every body believes it in the gross, confusedly and undeterminately. It is manifest, on one hand, that the first cause has no cause; neither itself (much less any property of itself) nor any thing else: and yet it may seem very wonderful how any thing should exist without a reason a priori; that is, without a cause for it 1. To name no more: eternity itself is the greatest mystery of all. An eternity past, is a thought which puzzles all our philosophy; and is too hard for the sharpest wits to reconcile. The nunc stans of the schools (though older than the schools) has been exploded; and yet succession 1 Οὐ γὰρ δέχεται λογισμὸς εἰδέναι πῶς οἷόν τε οὐσίαν εἶναι, μήτε παρ' ἑαυτῆς, μήτε παρ' ἑτέρου τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσαν. Chrys. Hom. xxv. tom. i. p. 298. |