or commencing at such a time; suppose six thousand years ago and you might think, what could it signify to date his being higher? If he did but exist soon enough for the office, it is sufficient. All the time run out before is of no consideration, having no relation to an office which was to commence after, and would still be but the selfsame temporal office, commencing at such a time. If I have hit your thought at length, I assure you it has cost me some pains; and I wish you would express yourself more clearly hereafter.

Now then let us apply this manner of reasoning to another purpose: by parity of reason we may argue, that the office of God the Father, commencing at the creation; I say, the office of sustaining, preserving, and governing the world, has no relation to the time past, being but just what it is, whether a longer or a shorter, or no time at all be allowed for any prior existence; nor is it at all more perfect for the eternal past duration of his being. But does not this argument suppose that the office is such as may be discharged by a finite creature, or one that began in time? Certainly. And is not that the very thing in question in this, and in the other case too? Undoubtedly. How then comes it to be taken for granted? Besides, is not a person of unlimited, that is, eternal powers and perfections, more capable of discharging an office, than any creature? Well then, by necessary consequence, the past duration of the person is of great moment in the case; and the office must be thought as much more perfect, for the eternal past duration of his being, as God's perfections excel those of his creatures ; and that is infinitely.

QUERY VIII.

Whether eternity does not imply necessary existence of the Son; which is inconsistent with the Doctor's Scheme? And whether the a Doctor hath not made an elusive, equi

a Reply, p. 227.

vocating answer to the objection, since the Son may be a necessary emanation from the Father, by the will and power of the Father, without any contradiction? Will is one thing, and arbitrary will another.

TO the former part of the Query you answer, that "simple and absolute eternity is the same with necessary or self-existence; which is no where supposed of the Son, "by Dr. Clarke." Here are several mistakes: for, first, the idea of simple eternity is not the same with that of necessary existence. Nor, secondly, is it the same with both necessary existence and self-existence, supposing it were the same with the former; because these two are not the same. The idea of eternity is neither more nor less than duration without beginning, and without end. Some have supposed it possible for God to have created the world from all eternity; and they use this argument for it; that whatever he could once do, he could always do. Not that I think there is much weight in the argument; but it is sufficient to show, that the ideas are distinct; and that, though eternity may, in sound reasoning, infer or imply necessary existence, as is intimated in the Query; yet the ideas are not the same: for if they were, it would be nonsense to talk of one inferring or implying the other. Then for the second point; it is very manifest that the ideas of necessary existence and self-existence (however they may be imagined with or without reason to imply each other) are not the same ideas. b Aristotle and the later Platonists supposed the world and all the inferior Gods (as Plato and the Pythagoreans, some supramundane deities) to proceed, by way of emanation, without any temporary production, from a superior cause: that is, they believed them to be necessary, but not self-existent. Something like this has been constantly believed by the Christian Church, in respect of the Aóyos: which shows, at least, that the ideas are different: and not only

b See Cudworth. Intellect. System, p. 250, &c.

you

so, but that, in the opinion of a great part of mankind, they do not so much as infer and imply each other; one may be conceived without the other. However, that is not the point I insist on now. All that I affirm at present is, that the ideas are distinct; and not the very same. After had laboured to confound these things together, you proceed to argue against the Son's being eternal. But what is that to the Query? I supposed Dr. Clarke (Reply, p. 227.) to understand the word eternal, as I or any other man should; and objected the inconsistency of acknowledging the eternity of the Son, and yet denying his necessary existence; which, eternity, I thought, inferred and implied. You admit my reasoning to be just, if the Doctor meant the same, by eternal, as I do. But if he meant by eternal, temporary, then my argument fails; as most certainly it must. But why are we thus imposed on with so manifest an abuse of words? What occasion is there for putting the epithets of simple, absolute, or metaphysical to the word eternal; which every one, that knows English, understands better without? Unless you suppose that there is an unlimited and a limited eternity, which is, in reality, an eternity, and no eternity. You proceed to dispute against the eternity of the Son; which though it be something foreign to the purport of the Query, yet being pertinent to the cause in hand, I shall here consider it. You argue that, if the Son be eternal, he is necessarily existing; which I allow and if necessarily existing, then self-existent; which I deny;

с

:

• ̓Αλλὰ μή τις, τὸ ἀεὶ, πρὸς ὑπόνοιαν ἀγεννήτου λαμβανέτω, ὡς οἴονται οἱ τὰ ψυχῆς αἰσθητήρια πεπηρωμένοι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἦν, οὔτε τὸ ἀεὶ, οὔτε τὸ πρὸ αἰώνων, ταύ Tóvisı rõ áysvváty. Alex. Ep. apud Theod. I. i. c. iv. p. 17. This was said in opposition to the Arians, who were willing to confound the idea of eternity and of necessary existence with self-existence. The learned Doctor cites this passage directly against himself. (Script. Doctr. p. 283. alias 250.) It was intended, and is diametrically opposite to the Doctor's leading principle, or rather fallacy, which runs through his performance, viz. That the Son cannot be strictly and essentially God, unless he be self-existent, or unoriginate in every sense.

and you cannot prove. You go on to a new consideration; which, put into syllogism, stands thus.

Whatever has a principium is not eternal: the Son has a principium, the Father being principium Filii-Therefore, &c.

The middle term, principium, is equivocal, and bears two senses; wherefore the syllogism consists of four terms. If principium be understood in respect of time, the minor is not true: if it be taken in any other sense, the major is not true: so that both cannot be true. You might, in the same way, argue that the sun's light is not coeval with the sun; nor thought coeval with the mind, supposing the mind to think always. For in both cases a principium is admitted; but no priority in respect of time. You add, that there is a reasonable sense in which the Son may be said to be eternal. I hope there is: but not your sense; which is just as reasonable as to say, an angel is eternal, only because you determine not the time when he came into being. I should think it most reasonable to use words according to their obvious and proper signification; and not to fix new ideas to old words, without any warrant for it. In this way of going on with the abuse of words, we shall hardly have any left full and express enough to distinguish the catholic doctrine by. It was once sufficient, before the rise of Arianism, to say, the Son is God: but by a novel sense put upon it, the word God was made ambiguous. To that were added, truly and really; to be more expressive: but the dArians found out a sense for these terms too; and could gravely say, that the Son was truly, really God. God by nature, one might think, is full and strong enough: but you are stealing away the sense of that expression from us. can add no more, but eternally and substantially God; and yet, I perceive, unless we put in simply, absolutely, metaphysically, or the like, even these words also may

a See Socr. E. Hist. 1. ii. c. 19. p. 82. Theod. l. i. c. 28.

We

lose their force and significancy. But to what purpose is all this? Might you not better say plainly, that the Son is not eternal; not by nature; nor truly God; in a word, not God? No; but Scripture reclaims; and the whole. Catholic Church reclaims; and Christian ears would not bear it. So then, it seems, it is highly necessary to speak orthodoxly, whatever we think; to strip the words of their sense, and to retain the sound. But to proceed.

As to the latter part of the Query, I am to expect no clear or distinct answer: because "what is meant by a "necessary emanation by the will of the Father, you un"derstand not; nor what again by the difference of will, "and arbitrary will," p. 52. Had you but retained in mind what you must have observed when you read the ancients, you could not have been at a loss to apprehend my meaning. You may please to remember, that one of the principal arguments made use of by the e Arians against the Catholics was this:

"Either the Father begat the Son with his consent "and will, or against his will and consent." If the former, then that act of the will was antecedent to the Son's existence; and therefore he was not eternal: the latter was plainly too absurd for any Christian to own.

The Catholics took two ways of answering the dilemma. One, which was the best and safest, was, by 8 retorting upon the Arians the dilemma, thus: "Was God "the Father God, with or against his will?" By this short question, that so famous objection of the Arians was heffectually silenced.

e See Athanas. Orat. contr. Arian. 2, 3, 4. Hilary, p. 1184. Ġreg. Nyss. p. 625. Petav. de Trin. p. 128.

f Interrogant (Ariani) utrum Pater Filium volens an nolens genuerit; ut si responsum fuerit quod volens genuerit, dicant, prior est ergo voluntas Patris; quod autem nolens genuerit, quis potest dicere? August, contr. Serm. Arian. 1. i. p. 626. Bened. ed.

Athanas. Orat. iii. p. 611. Bened. ed. Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xxxv. p. 565. August. de Trin. 1. xv. c. 80. p. 994.

h Vicissim quæsivit ab eo, utrum Deus Pater volens an nolens sit Deus: ut si responderet, nolens, sequeretur illa miseria quam de Deo credere magna