faithful should be armed against the temptations of the Babylonians, and learn, in due time, what answer they should return to those idolaters, in their own tongue. XLVI. The following words of Sophocles are not unlike this dictate of Divine revelation: "He who made "the heaven and the extensive earth, is one Godtruly one."* These lines of Pythagoras, or of Orpheus, quoted by Justin, bear a still closer resemblance to the language of Scripture. 66 Say'st thou, I am a God, I am Divine? XLVII. The Apostle also teaches, in Rom. i. 20. that ever since the creation of the world, the invisible things of God are clearly perceived, being understood by the things that are made, and, in particular, his eternal power and godhead. We have elsewhere vindicated this passage from the perverse interpretations of heretics. We only remark at present, that the reasoning of the Apostle would have no force, if any other Creator of the world besides the one eternal and omnipotent Deity either existed, or could exist. XLVIII. Further, that the act of creating is so peculiar to God that no creature can be admitted to any * Εῖς ταῖς ἀληθείαισιν, εἴς εστι Θεος, ὃς οὐρανὸν τέτευχε και γαίαν μετα ૠછુàv. + Lib. de Monarchia. † Ει τῖς ἐρεῖ, Θεός εἰμι παρὶξ ἑνὸς, οὗτος ὀφείλει Κόσμον ἴσον τοῦτω στήσας εἰπεῖν, ἐμὸς οὗτος. A learned man has translated this distich into Latin thus: Huic similem tentato, suum quem dicere possit. § The Author here refers to what he had formerly said, Dissert. iv. Sect. 16. et seq. T. VOL. I. 21 9. share in it, may be demonstrated in the following manner. Creation is the production of a thing by the mere command of him that creates. If, therefore, we imagine that God communicates this privilege to any creature, that at his (the creature's) command, a certain other thing may exist, that thing would either exist without any co-operation on the part of God for effecting its existence, either by willing or commanding it to be, and would be wholly indebted for its existence to the fiat of the commanding creature; or it would exist in consequence of God's willing and commanding its existence, in concert with the creature which is supposed to create. Now, each of these ideas is most dishonouring to God, and involves a manifest contradiction. If the former is asserted, it is alleged that God wills that a creature may exist which does not depend upon himself in its operations, and that, by the mere and absolute command of this creature, something may exist even without his consent; than which, nothing more absurd can be conceived. If the latter is preferred, it is not properly the creature which is supposed to create, that would in reality create; since his command is not sufficient to give existence to the thing: but God would create at the command of that creature, upon whose willing the existence of something, God is supposed to will and command the same thing. This, however, is not only contrary to the hypothesis, but also makes God dependent, in his operations, on the will of a creature. Since these imaginations are extremely derogatory to the dignity of the Supreme Being, we must, of necessity, conclude, that the act and the power of creating are incommunicable to any creature. XLIX. It is impossible, besides, even to imagine any kind of instrument of creation strictly so called. The reason is, not merely that every instrument requires some matter and subject on which it may operate in a way adapted to its capacity, while creation strictly taken supposes the absence of all pre-existent matter; but, chiefly, because creation is effected by the mere command and will of him who creates; which excludes every other concurring cause, whatever be its nature and kind, agreeably to the expression which we lately quoted from Isaiah: "I spread abroad the earth by myself."i L. From the preceding reasonings, it indisputably follows, that the same Godhead which belongs to the Father, belongs also to the Son and the Holy Spirit. Although, for reasons which we have elsewhere assigned, the creation is, in the Creed, attributed to the Father, the sacred writings ascribe it also to the Son and the Holy Ghost. Each of these persons, it is clear, is frequently styled God. But, if, while they are called God, they have not made the heavens and the earth, they must necessarily be numbered among those gods who" shall perish from the earth, and from under these "heavens ;" i—which it would be blasphemous to allege. LI. No man of piety will deny, that the world which God has created, is a most extensive theatre erected for the display of the Divine perfections, and that mortal men are unable to ascertain its exact dimensions. 66 Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a "balance ?" "If heaven above can be measured, and "the foundations of the earth searched out beneath, I i Is. xliv. 24. › Jer. x. 11. * Is. xl. 12. "will also cast off all the seed of Israel for all that they "have done, saith the LORD." Yet that the world is infinite, or, which is the same thing, that its extent is without bounds, no sober-minded person will affirm. God attributes to himself that power of measuring the waters and the heavens, which he denies to man; but the universe could not be measured even by God himself, unless its quantity had bounds and limits. LII. The distinction betwixt infinite and indefinite might be admitted on this subject, provided it were ingenuously and properly explained. The world might be allowed to be indefinite with regard to us, as we are incapable of precisely assigning the bounds and measures of the universe; though we know in general, that it hath bounds and limits, and therefore is not infinite. LIII. But, after you have affirmed, "that our under 66 standing is able to conceive no bounds in the world, "and that this is owing not to the weakness of the hu"man mind, but to the positive idea of the world, in “which we can imagine no bounds; and that, since "this idea of the world has not arisen from our preju"dices, and can be traced to no other quarter, it neces 66 66 sarily follows, that God has impressed it upon our minds, and consequently, that it is true, and gives a just representation of the nature of the world:"-After you have even said, "We know that this world, or this "universe of corporeal substances, has no limits to its "extent:"-After you have deliberately hazarded all these assertions, to subjoin, in order to escape the odium of so extravagant an opinion, "that you would rather "call the world indefinite than infinite, that the term infinite may be reserved for God only,"-this is to amuse the reader in a manner contrary to all the laws 1 Jer. xxxi. 37. of candour. If the idea of the world as having no imaginable limits be true, and be divinely impressed on our minds,-if we know that it has no bounds to its extent, why have we recourse to subterfuges? Why do we meanly resort to evasions? Why do we not give every thing its appropriate name? Why not speak as we think, and call that which has no bounds or limits, infinite? Why do we seek a dishonourable and cowardly retreat, in the word indefinite? Let us speak roundly and properly. Nothing remains but sound, "and the graces of language." * 66 66 LIV. That is infinite," says Aristotle, " to which, whatever quantity is assigned it, you may always assign something further."† Now surely, the authors of the new philosophy give us an account of the world, which, this definition of what is infinite, exactly suits; for they affirm that whatever limits of the world be supposed, they always stretch beyond them, and conceive a further extension. Since, then, they boldly assert the thing, why do they, childishly and in a manner unworthy of men, cavil about the term infinite? LV. Let us examine the thing itself. And, lest our arguments should be treated with supercilious contempt, because they are ours, let these candid gentlemen be obliging enough to allow us to make use, for a little, in this contest, of weapons with which we are furnished by the celebrated Cocceius, a name neither odious nor inconsiderable in their esteem. This writer reasons in the following manner. + LVI. “Melissus the Samnian, a disciple of Par"menides, whom Aristotle refutes, affirmed, that the * Τα δ' άλλα κομπος, και λόγων ευμορφίαι. + Natur. Auscul. lib. iii. cap. 9. In Gen. i. sect. 16. |