DISSERTATION III. ON SAVING FAITH. 1. HAVING introduced ourselves to the subject, by saying as much as seemed necessary to our purpose, respecting the Authors and the Authority of the Creed, and also respecting Fundamental Articles in general, let us now proceed to take a nearer view of the several articles which this summary contains; beginning in this Dissertation with the expression, I BELIEVE. This single phrase supplies a copious subject of discourse. It comprises four topics, and those, too, of very great moment. 1st, The ACT of believing itself, or SAVING FAITH. 2dly, The special APPROPRIATION of that act to the mind of every Christian, so that each believer believes for himself. It is not said, WE BELIEVE, but I BELIEVE. 3dly, The CONSCIOUSNESS of that act, by which every believer may and ought to be conscious and assured of his own faith. 4thly, The PROFESSION with the mouth, of that faith which dwells and operates in the heart. We shall illustrate each of these in order. II. SAVING FAITH, the nature of which we are now about to explain, is not any one particular act or habit of the soul; nor ought it to be limited to any one faculty of the human mind. It is complex, and consists of various acts; which, without the least confusion, pervade one another, and, by a delightful co-operation, mutually promote and assist each other. It implies a change of the whole man. It is the source of every part of the spiritual life. It is, in fine, the holy energy and activity of the whole soul, exercising itself towards God in Christ. The entire extent of this principle, therefore, can hardly be distinctly comprehended under any one conception. III. Let none consider it strange, that we include so many ingredients under the name of one Christian grace. As when men speak of life, they intend by that word a principle, which, diffusing itself through the whole soul and its various faculties, communicates its virtue also to the body, and extends its influence to all the actions of the living person; so when we speak of faith, which is a most fertile source of every part of the spiritual life, we understand by this term, a principle which pervades all the faculties of the soul, and is the proper mean of uniting them to Christ, and of thus quickening, and making them holy, and happy. IV. Many things, both natural and moral, are almost universally allowed to extend themselves through the whole soul, and not to admit of being restricted to any one faculty. In things natural, we have an instance in Free-will, or Free-choice; which, as choice is referred principally to the understanding, as free, rather to the will: so that, as Bernard somewhere speaks," man is his own free-man, with respect to his "will; his own judge, with respect to his reason." In things moral, we may mention the divine image and original righteousness; which are to be viewed as re * Liberum arbitrium. siding neither in the understanding only, nor in the will only, but as adorning each of these faculties. v. Would not every difficulty be removed, and would not the whole controversy which is agitated among Divines with regard to the seat of faith, be settled, were we to deny, as we can justly do, that the understanding and the will are really distinct, either from the soul, or from one another? What else is the understanding, but the soul understanding and knowing? What is the will, but the soul willing and desiring? We must by no means consider the soul as a substance which is brutish and irrational in itself, and becomes intelligent and rational only in consequence of some other thing being superadded to it. As to the notion of those who allege that the understanding is derived from the soul by a kind of emanation, it is scarcely possible to conceive how this can take place. If the soul, in its own proper and formal nature, does not include the power of reasoning, it cannot produce it; for it is vain to expect from a cause, that which it neither formally nor eminently contains. But if the soul possesses, of itself, the power of reasoning, there is no necessity for some other faculty being superadded to that power, of which the soul is thus already possessed. The same remarks apply to the will. It is not really distinct from the soul, any more than the understanding. The will is the soul itself, so far as the soul is a substance which God has endowed with an original capacity to desire what is good. As both these faculties are formally, not really or essentially, distinct from the soul, so they are only formally distinct from one another. If the will be so separate from the understanding as, considered in itself, to be blind, it is impossible to show in what manner it can perceive, and thus rationally desire, an object which the understanding exhibits as good. For what reason, let me ask, should we make a real difference betwixt these two powers? Is it because their objects are different? The object of both is, in fact, the same, namely, a true good; though in the manner of considering it there is a diversity,-while the understanding contemplates the good as true, and the will desires the same true object, as it is good. And is there not a far greater difference betwixt the objects of the understanding, as a speculative and as a practical faculty ; which, however, philosophers generally agree in regarding as one and the same power of the mind?-Is it because their acts are different? But every diversity of acts does not infer a diversity of power. Simple apprehension, surely, differs from judging and reasoning; which are, nevertheless, acts of the same faculty. Since it appears, then, that the faculties of understanding and will cannot be separated from each other, let it not be thought strange, that we should consider faith as subsisting in both.11 VI. It seems proper, in the mean time, to remark that, amongst the various acts of faith which we are about to describe, there is one which holds the principal place, and in which, as it unites us to Christ and justifies us, we apprehend the essence and formal nature of faith to consist. This must be carefully attended to, particularly in the matter of justification; lest several expressions of love which, in different ways, are involved in the exercise of faith, should be rashly numbered among the causes of our justification. VII. It must also be kept in view, that several things which, for the sake of accuracy, we shall distinctly and 11 See NOTE XI. particularly explain, are, in various forms, mutually interwoven in the exercise of faith. Whilst the whole soul is exerting itself in this work of God, many operations are, conjunctly, and without an adherence to any certain method, directed towards God and Christ; which the believer earnestly engaged in the work itself, has neither leisure, nor in many instances inclination, nor sometimes even the power, to arrange distinctly in their proper order. That we may understand, however, the more thoroughly, the whole nature and exercise of faith, it is proper for us to attend to its natural progress. a VIII. The first attainment which faith includes or supposes, is the KNOWLEDGE of the truths believed. This appears, in opposition to the absurd doctrine of Popish doctors, 1st, From express passages of holy writ, which make mention of faith in such terms as manifestly intimate, that knowledge is involved in its nature and exercise. 2dly, From the very nature of faith itself, which unquestionably signifies an assent given to truth which God has revealed, and therefore necessarily presupposes the knowledge of these two things: 1. That God has revealed some truth: 2. What it is, to which it assents, as a truth divinely revealed. It is absurd to say, that a person assents to any truth of which he is utterly ignorant, and respecting which he does not know that any testimony worthy of credit exists. 3dly, From the manner in which faith is produced in the elect. This is done, externally, by the preaching and hearing of the Gospel, which reveals what ought to be believed, and manifests the truth to every man's con a Isaiah liii. 11. John xvii. 3. compared with Hab. ii. 4. John vi. 69. 2 Tim. i. 12. b Rom. x. 17. |