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Where, then, shall we find this revelation, this Divinely-appointed standard for the regulation of human action? In discussing the sources of knowledge, we had occasion to classify the mental philosophers. In looking for the standard of right, we must classify the moral philosophers. The lines of demarcation do not coincide. The mental materialist may be the moral intuitionalist; and the mental intuitionalist may be the moral experimentalist. The con

fusion is indescribable. I have called it a mêlée.

Nevertheless, a threefold classification will sufficiently represent them all. It will include those who, in seeking a standard of morals, look respectively to the past, the present and the future. The first refer to the Divine Nature as the source of all things. The second look to the fitness of things as testified either by intuitions or by experience. The third consider the results in the farther or nearer future, as affecting self or others. If the question were one of pure science, these theories are neither contradictory nor inconsistent. Not only is it credible, that they all may be true; but it is incredible that, in a perfected creation, any one of them should fail. The standard of right must be one that harmonizes with the Divine Nature; that accords with the fitness of things, that favours the ultimate well-being of the obedient, and that answers to the perfect moral nature. Any one of the four tests, if correctly applied, would be sufficient;

since, theoretically, the results would be identical. Hath not the one God created all these things? But, on the other hand, an imperfect application of any or all of them might be disastrous, if not fatal. And our enquiry has to do with applied science. Here, if anywhere, the distinction between the speculative and the practical is essential. We may be thankful for theoretical truth, but we must have safe guid


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If, then, we turn to the Divine Nature, our search is hopeless. 'Canst thou by searching find out God, canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?' Delve as we may amid the mysteries, discovered but not explained, we can never reach the root of the Divine Nature,' nor grasp the eternal principle' of rectitude which is said to lie there. Our safety in this direction must be found in the fact that He Himself has translated the truth of His being into human language and embodied it in a human life. His law is the revelation of Himself.

A similar conclusion awaits us if we enquire as to the fitness of things. A statement of the case for intuitionalism must, here also, be taken from the Fernley Lecture for 1879: 'Our moral intuitions

are born

with us, but need to be deepened, defined and authorized by God's revelation of Himself in providence and grace.' (P. 3.) This revelation is afterwards described: How then, it may be asked, shall the Divine Being manifest His will to His creatures? There are only two ways. One is by establishing in their nature the same connection between the right and the happy which obtains in His own. The other is by superadding manifestations of His approval during probation and after it. As a necessary counterpart, He must also establish a similar connection between sin and

misery, and superadd manifestations of displeasure against sin.' (P. 15.) In what manner these arrangements secure the moral guidance of man, we must learn from a previous passage. We are told that 'pain plays an important part in the probation of all moral beings. It did so with Adam in Paradise.' No references are given to the passages of Scripture from which these statements are taken; but the Lecturer, insisting upon this association of the right with pleasure, and of wrong with pain, goes on to say that 'thus the very conditions of holy living afforded him an experimental confirmation of his intuitions both of good and evil. He already knew pleasure and pain: both mingled in his lot, though the one vastly preEponderated over the other. He had but to invert their proportions; he had but to ask himself what kind of life that would be in which a brief physical gratification should be the only set-off against the forfeiture of all other good, and he would have a practical and operative knowledge of wrong as distinguished from right.' (Pp. 13, 14.) Taking these passages together, the results are evident. Our intuitions need to be defined and authorized by Divine revelation. The Divine Being can manifest His will to His creatures only' by a twofold association, subjective and objective, of 'the right and the happy.' This association experimentally confirms the intuitions; and the resultant variations of pleasure and pain afford a practical and operative knowledge of wrong as distinguished from right. Intuitionalism, as thus modified,' not only utterly fails to furnish safe guidance, but it plunges us into a utilitarianism of the most selfish and the most sensuous description. The greatest personal pleasure becomes the token of the highest moral good. There is no help in this direction. But if we

turn from intuition to experience, our utmost personal observation must fail to secure such a knowledge of the relations of things as could ensure our safety. We must be content to sit at His feet Whose will has established all relationships, enacted all laws and constituted all fitness.

And if we enquire into the results of moral action, the same conclusion is inevitable. We cannot determine what shall ultimately prove to be the highest good, or what means will surely lead thereto. The apparently useful may not be the truly useful. Our ignorance and the perversion of our nature alike involve us in difficulty and in danger.

And thus, whichever way we turn, the search is hopeless. The theories are good, and speculatively true; but practically they are all insufficient and unsafe. To the Creator, without doubt, the Divine, the fitting, the useful and the good are all one and the same. To angels, possibly, they may be equally so. But to fallen men they are all apparently and frequently diverse. Therefore, we have no alternative but to yield ourselves to the guidance of the Living Teacher, and accept His will as made known to us in His words. We may ponder these words and may perceive that they harmonize with what we otherwise know, or think we know, of the Divine, the fitting and the useful. We may thus be constrained to acknowledge that 'the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just and good.' But this acknowledgment can only be a subordinate testimony, and not a coordinate authority.

If, then, we recall the three questions awhile ago proposed, we may record the answers. 'Rightness,' 'rectitude,' 'righteousness' and the like imply conformity with a dulyauthorized standard. The Will of the Creator, expressive of His Na

ture, is the only standard of morality for His creatures. The Word of God, making known His will, is the only safe standard for mankind.

If then holiness, for man, is separation from sin to Divine service; if sin is lawlessness; if the only law for the creature is the will of the Creator; and if for mankind safe guidance can be found only in the law of God as revealed in His Word, then we must turn to the Bible for its guidance. What is that law to which right conforms, and which sin transgresses?

To this question I can find no other answer than that which the Master Himself gave, and which His Apostles repeated and enforced : Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.' This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.' What His Apostles understood by this teaching is very evident.

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'All the law is fulfilled in one word, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."" 'If ye fulfil the royal law according to the Scripture, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," ye shall do well.' 'If there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Love worketh no ill to his neighbour; therefore love is the fulfilment of the law.' 'He that loveth....hath fulfilled the law.' And that this is in full harmony with the Divine Nature is certain; for 'God is love.' That which is the supreme characteristic of the Divine life is by Himself declared to be the supreme law of the human life. I am, therefore, constrained once more to affirm my unshaken belief in the absolute supremacy of Love. Perhaps time will not be altogether lost if the

arguments which have been advanced against this belief are carefully considered.

Mr. Randles, in December, 1879, contributed to this Magazine an article on The Righteousness of God. He therein quoted from The London Quarterly for January, 1879, an objection which has more than once been brought forward. We were reminded that in St. John's Gospel the statement""God is light," takes precedence of the statement "God is love." That light denotes holiness, or the love of the right, the whole context shows.' So the reviewer says. Now, the argument which is supposed to arise from what is called 'precedence,' I utterly fail to appreciate. If there were any opposition between the two statements, I do not know what advantage would arise to either from the fact that one occurs in the first chapter of the Epistle and the other in the third. But I repudiate the idea that there is any opposition. The assertion that 'light denotes the love of the right,' is one of very many into which the reviewer was unwittingly betrayed. If the assertion were true, then his objection falls to the ground; for light is love, and 'God is light' be comes only a particular in the general truth, God is love.' But 'light' is not the love of anything. St. John does not so confound things that differ. Indeed, as against Mr. Randles and the reviewer whom he thus quotes, I will appeal to the Fernley Lecturer for 1879. Mr. French there tells us plainly that 'truth is holiness as light.' Referring to this same Epistle of St. John, he says that this symbol is a revelation of the holiness of God. It denotes the right, but the right considered as a mental conception, the self-derived standard of all Divine decrees and of all creaturely obedience.' The italics are mine, the words are his. And that Mr. French is right and the



reviewer wrong, is, I think, evident from the utterances of Christ recorded by the same Apostle in his Gospel. There, too, we read: 'I am the Light of the world'; and also: 'I am the Truth.' So God is truth, and wherever He manifests Himself He is and makes known truth. And no one denies or doubts that this truth is the expression of His own perfection -the same perfection which, when contrasted with creaturely sin, we call His holiness; the perfection which He has summed up in the one unfathomable attribute-which is both nature and attribute' Love.

Much, however, will depend upon the meaning which is attached to this word. In reply to the Scripture passages which identify love with the requirements of law, Mr. Randles says: Love to God and man as the principle which impels to the choice and performance of all moral duties, secures the fulfilment of the law. But it is not the very will and deed of law-fulfilling.' I answer that the words of Scripture could not be more definite or stronger than they are. 'Love is the fulfilment-the pleroma

of the law.' So strictly is it the fulfilment, that he that loveth [present] hath fulfilled'-not, will fulfil-the law. So emphatic a denial of Scripture teaching as that which Mr. Randles seems to put forward, would be painfully startling, were it not that he himself supplies the explanation. He has given us his definition of 'love.' It is 'goodwill towards its object, with delight therein and desire for communion with, or possession of, its object.' 'Benevolence'-which is, I suppose, identical with goodwill-is also defined as that which tends to seek the happiness of others.' Mr. Randles, probably, would combine the two for a full definition of love.' supposition is warranted by the fact that he compares righteousness with

benevolence when he is contending
against the supremacy of love.

Now, it is at least desirable, and,
as I think, essential, that in the
discussion of theological truth every
term should carry with it the mean-
ing which is attached to it in
Scripture. Thus, at other times,
the perpetuity of conscious existence
may, perhaps, be called 'immortality';
but not in theology. Elsewhere, if
philosophers so desire it, the merely
subjective activity of the conscious
self may be called 'life'; but not in
theology. The Scriptures never so
recognise it. 'Faith' may some-
times mean 'bare credence'; but
evangelical faith is an operative prin-
ciple. And so is it with 'love.'
Men may frame a thousand defini-
tions; but when we speak of it as
manifested by God and enjoined
upon man, we must learn its mean-
ing from Scripture. And here the
definition given by Mr. Randles is
utterly at fault. I am afraid that it
would scarcely satisfy, if rigidly
applied in daily life. Love is not
merely benevolence' or goodwill, or
'a tendency to seek the happiness of
another.' Mr. Randles would have
found himself corrected if he had
carefully considered the teaching of
It is true
Life, Light and Love.
that Mr. French begins by defining
'Love denotes
love as rectitude.
the same principle (the right), as it
calls forth the Divine complacency.'
Immediately it is added, that 'love
in God is complacency in rectitude.'
(P. 7.) Afterwards, love, for man,'
is 'complacency in God as the stan-
This makes love
dard of rectitude.

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manifest itself in the form of emotion.' (P. 36.) These quotations, I admit, favour the view given by Mr. Randles. And similarly it is said: "The commandment is expressed in terms of the most central of our faculties, in terms of feeling. It does not say "Thou shalt know," or "Thou shalt do," but "Thou shalt 2 к 2



love"-that is, "Thou shalt feel." (P. 46.) And the argument proceeds on the assumption that 'love' is 'feeling.' But when we return to the exposition of what love really is, we find that love is not merely emotion, nor is it merely contemplative.' (P. 37.) It does energise both feeling and intellect; but it does something more. 'There are those who seek to replenish their hearts from the fountain of life, but forget to make them fountains in their turn.. This is not the type of love Divine.' (P. 39.) This is the element which Mr. Randles has overlooked. 'Love,' as manifested by the Divine Life and enjoined upon the creature, always works. Good will and good wishes, a man may have or feel; but if he gives not when he can, how dwelleth the love of God in him?' He that keepeth' My commandments, 'he it is that loveth Me.' 'This is the love of God, that we keep His commandments.' Love always works, but works no ill. To quote Mr. French again: 'It is not an idle, enervating habit of soul. It begins in contemplation, steadfast and prolonged, itself sometimes an arduous


employment. It issues in activity, benevolent and fruitful, and sets the faculties at work to find out modes of operation.' (P. 42.) So certain is it that he that loveth hath fulfilled the law.' The true love, then, in things Divine or human, is not merely 'emotion,' or 'feeling,' or 'sensibility,' or 'desire for communion or possession.' It is a mighty energy which, gathering up and girdling into unity all the powers of the most perfect nature, combines them in the promotion of another's weal. This is the law which, as Mr. French admits, "has its prototype in the fellowship of the Holy Trinity.' It is, to repeat my own words, the law of his own life, the law of all life, wherever life is, from the primordial cell to the crowned Man on creation's throne.' Every creature of God, with moral life or without, with conscious life or without angel, man, living thing or plant-finds the perfection of its own being in promoting the general good. And it is for this love that I am constrained to claim supremacy in the government of the


(To be concluded.)

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THE history of the English Reformation has been approached by so many paths, and has presented itself under so many, and even contrary, aspects to the minds of historians, that it is hard to conceive, even with the singular illustrations it has derived from the MS. treasures of the Record Office, of the Vatican, and of the rich

libraries of the Continent-not to speak of the side-lights which have been thrown upon it from contemporary history and biography-that any new and original view could be obtained of the stirring and often terribly exciting drama. Yet it must be confessed that the author of the present history has produced a picture

*History of the Church of England from the Abolition of the Roman Jurisdiction. By Richard Watson Dixon, M.A., Vicar of Hayton, Hon. Canon of Carlisle.

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