of the orthodox to whom I allude, are not only pious but learned, of irreproachable moral character and acknowledged liberality, and are engaged in a course of active efforts in I their Master's cause. Among them are to be found all the most strenuons supporters of Bible Societies, Missionary Societies and Sunday-schools. Indeed, the American Missionary Society, you are aware, had its origin in this part of the country, where it still maintains its head-quarters, in the very focus of Unitarianism. All this is the more important, as New England is the "Officina Gentium" of Anerica, and is destined to supply much of the population, and impress its own features strongly on the character of the new States.

"With respect to the ministers, Mr. Dwight among the Congregationalists, and Dr. Jarvis among the Episcopalians, occupy stations of peculiar importance, and seem likely to effect much. The former is the son of Dr. Dwight, the late eminent Professor of Yale College, and is apparently of respectable talents and great activity. The latter is the son of Bishop Jarvis ; and I am disposed to believe the most learned, and, as respects most of the tuies of his responsible office, the man in America. He has a high standing in society, possesses great personal respectability, and was appointed some months since to the new and handsome Episcopal church in the most fashionable part of Boston. Many of the most respectable inhabitants of Boston have joined his congregation-not a few from Unitarian societies. Many families are divided in their religious sentiments; some of the members attending the Episcopal, others the Unitarian churches.

"The most portentous feature in the history of the present state of Unitarianisin in this country, is the strong hold it has obtained in Cambridge College, near Boston; the most extensive, and, in a literary point of view, the most respectable college in the Union; in which also a large proportion of the most influential persons of the nation are educated. Many parents are prevented by religious considerations from sending their children thither, but I wish I could say the objection was more general. This,

and perhaps Transylvania University at Lexington, are happily the only colleges under the influence of Unitarian sentiments. Yale College, Princeton, Columbia, and all the others that I am acquainted with, are opposed to them; and Yale College has the happiness of having its principal professors men of decided piety. But the noble theological institution at Andover, liberally endowed, formed for the express purpose of raising up able champions to contend earnestly for the faith at home, and accomplished missionaries to diffuse it abroad, blest with learned and pious professors ardently engaged in the great objects of their institution, presents perhaps the most cheering view. The only confident assurance, however, of the triumph of truth, is to be found in the promises of Him who has infallibly predicted its universal reception. I am glad I have done. It is a painful office to remark on what appear to be the doctrinal errors of others, when conscious of so many practical errors of our own. But I could not refuse your request."

SIR

Hackney, July 17, 1822. THE subject of prosecutions for opinions has been and so ably discussed in your work, that it would be mere repetition to argue the question generally; but I cannot refrain from expressing surprise and mortification to find that several of the Jury who lately convicted Mrs. Wright for the publication of theological writings, are members of a sect who have the reputation of an enlightened liberality above their fellowchristians. Lamentable as the fact is, here are professing Unitarians become the instruments of a bigoted, cruel policy, and assisting in the suppression of religious liberty; engaged in crushing others who are ready to suffer and are suffering for opinions which in their judgment are best calculated to promote the happiness of mankind. Stigmatize their publications as blasphemy and calumny, if you please; it is blasphemy and calumny against the written doctrines and opinions of other men, and in branding honest objectors to Christianity (for so I am bound to consider Mrs. Wright and others) with an unhesitating sentence

of guilt, and in consigning them to punishment, they have not only committed themselves and the Unitarian cause, but have excited feelings of sincere regret in every inheritor of the mild virtues of their great Master. No sooner, it will be said, do Unitarians breathe the air of religious freedom than they forget their long and arduous struggle with intolerance for their own emancipation, and take a ready part in riveting the chains of such as have still to contend for the same privileges.

Conscious as I am, however, that an unqualified desire to put down opinions by force, (be they what they may,) is a charge which these very individuals would blush to have imputed to them, it would be unjust to impugn their motives. No; the bugbear that has alarmed and influenced them and other good men in times of persecution, has been a superstitious veneration for legal forms, and a dread of giving offence to intolerant oppressors and instigators. The spirit of the laws, therefore, which are asserted to be founded upon principles of Christian charity, is absorbed in technicalities through a slavish subserviency to the sinister perversions and sophistries of religious and legal bigots; for whatever intimate connexion the legislature intended to establish between Christianity and the laws, and how firmly soever they would have grafted their religious enactments upon its principles, where are we to discover any traces of the humane liberality which is its true character, in their administration? Let conscientious Jurors ask themselves if Christ and his apostles ever instituted or enforced penal laws, or would have sheltered their doctrines under them. So completely at variance with these prosecutions were their doctrines and conduct, that they claimed to be subverters of the establishments of their day, which stood in need of such support. Judaism was part and parcel of the law of their land, as Christianity is said to be of ours, yet he did not scruple to expose its absurdities and to promulgate opposite opinions. True, he fell a victim to intolerant charges of blasphemy, such as now prevail; and, revolting as it may appear to those concerned in more recent condemnations, I can discover no difference in the cir

cumstances which could have led à Jury of our day to interpose between Christ and his persecutors. The samé influence and the same apprehensions would have operated and induced those who do not hesitate to contravene his direct precepts now, to have convicted the vilified Author of Christianity himself then, as an innovator and disturber of the public peace; for those they have condemned under laws professedly Christian, have been accused only of decrying one set of opinions and upholding others; in fact, of fol lowing his example.

"But what could we do and how could we act otherwise," they exclaim, "bound as we were to be ruled by the law as it stands, and sworn to return a verdict according to evidence? We readily subscribe to the arguments used for the defence, and should rejoice if these prosecutions and restraints upon discussion were abandoned; but if persons will be so imprudent as to incur the penalties, we, as Jurymen, cannot be expected to follow the dictates of our feelings at the expense of our oaths."

This is the kind of justification which has made many a worthy man lend himself to the vilest conspiracies against liberty, virtue and the religion of Christ; scarcely conscious that he is supporting a spurious Christianity by means the most unchristian. But the answer is plain. There is no inconsistency in adhering to the Jurors' oath, and construing the laws reasonably and justly as the laws of Christians. Be guided by your own understanding of the evidence, instead of allowing assumed tendencies and legal mysteries to distract and bewilder. Interpret the motives of the accused liberally and fairly. In short, do as you would be done unto; and whether the blasphemer be Jew or Pagan, deal with him as you would have those ofganized, systematic blasphemers, the Christian Missionaries, treated by the true believers of another faith. Try them by their motives, and let the malice charged against them appear incontestably, instead of convicting by inference and upon the judgment and injunctions of other men. Where there is not the most satisfactory proof of moral guilt, it is impossible a truly conscientious Juror can assent to a verdict of guilty.

guilty, therefore, of an accident or misadventure would be absurd, and to punish him for happening to be the innocent, unintentional and unconscious means of evil to another, the height of injustice.

But the Judge quoted an Act of Parliament, and instanced the case of a brick falling on a man's head from the hand of a bricklayer, to shew that he thereby incurred the guilt of manslaughter.

He did so; at the same time ours may or may not be a parallel case, and the use and office of a Jury is to discriminate in these matters between good and bad intentions, and between crime and accident. A brick may be thrown with an intention to kill, which would be murder; with a degree of carelessness for the safety of others, which would properly constitute manslaughter, and call for punishment. On the other hand, the brick might drop from the labourer's hod by mere accident; or, by rebounding from a spot of apparent safety, and, flying in pieces, reach a person coming in the way unexpectedly. In either of these latter cases I should acquit, and I, therefore, cannot conscientiously do otherwise in the case before us.

Well, I should like to bring in a verdict that will satisfy the court.

I trust we shall first think of satisfying ourselves.

But you know the Judge said the law is clear, and that our verdict must be Guilty.

He did so; but I trust there are not many of us disposed to defer quite so much to his Lordship's directions as to forget the purpose for which we are appointed; viz. to determine for ourselves-this the prisoner has a right to expect of us.

There is no need, however, to run counter to the Judge's opinion; for he tells us that all the circumstances shall be taken into account, and that the punishment will be lenient.

Very true; and I am glad of this opportunity of discussing the duties and asserting the rights of Juries in a case where the result is not of sufficient importance to influence our decision, and particularly as no political or party feeling is involved in the question, which, with us, seems to be merely whether our own opinion or

the Judge's direction is to govern the verdict, for there can be no other motive than deference to the Judge for giving this boy over to be punished, while we are all convinced he does not deserve it.

Besides, I have always understood the laws to be founded in reason, and intended to afford protection as well as to inflict punishment; but if substantial justice and the spirit of the laws are to be made subservient to technical constructions, then the Jury should consist of lawyers.

You are quite right: it is not necessary that Jurors should be lawyers to enable them to form a correct estimate of evidence, or to come at the true intent and meaning of a plain Act of Parliament; they are, therefore, taken promiscuously from the mass of citizens, on the reasonable presumption that twelve men, so impannelled, must be a fair sample of the intellect and probity belonging to the community; and all that is required of them is, that the guilty conduct of an accused person shall appear from the evidence so plain, as to leave no doubt in the mind of any one of the twelve before they venture to pronounce him guilty.

But admitting that the Judge, from his greater experience, may occasionally throw light upon any part of the evidence that may seem obscure, you would not reject his explanations, merely because they came from the bench.

Certainly not; but I should always guard against being influenced by his or any other opinion when opposed to my own, and should value his explanations of evidence, and quotations of law, only so far as I myself might be convinced of the correctness of the one, and of the reasonable application of the other.

What makes the Judge's directions at present so extraordinary too, is, that he himself allows that no one can impute any criminal design to the lad, and the witnesses give him so excellent a character, that really I for one should be very glad to save him from prison if it can be done.

Well, he is in your hands, and if this be your impression, what should hinder you from acting upon it? It is wholly our affair, and surely we who

are appointed to try the accusation should feel no difficulty in saying must not, when it is dictated by our deliberate judgment?

I see that is our proper course-the Jury, and the Jury only, are the persons to decide the question of guilt, and had we exercised our own judgment upon the evidence from the first, we should not have hesitated about acquitting him; but the Judge's charge confounded us.

The boy thought no more of doing mischief, than as though his piece had been pointed against a rock. His friends should not have entrusted fire-arms in the hands of one with so little experience; and I am persuaded, that if punishment is due any where, it is to them.

I cannot help remarking, that if premeditation is necessary to crime, that it was completely disproved in this instance by the witnesses themselves, who proved the fact; and the impression upon my mind, when the evidence closed, was, that we must acquit him; but when the Judge laid it down as the law, and charged us so positively to bring him in guilty, I thought we could not do otherwise.

Well, I confess my impression was the same throughout the trial, and the Judge's charge really surprised me; but being in possession of his exposition of the law, I am still not satisfied about acquitting him.

Then, Gentlemen, what is the use of our hearing evidence? If that is not to guide us, we may as well wait here during the next trial, and let the Judge send us directions for our verdict when it is over. I would really advise those who are so anxious to please the Judge, to take their hats, tell him they are content to leave all to him, and are satisfied he can do quite as well without a Jury.

But are we not to attend to the Judge's construction of the laws?

When the Judge quotes an Act of Parliament which he considers applicable to any class of crimes, he addresses himself to the Jury for their information; he being more conversant with the laws of course than we can be, but it is the Jury who are to apply it practically and specifically, and their verdict is to be founded upon their own construction and application of the law to the charge laid in

the indictment, always keeping in view that it is malicious intention which constitutes crime in law, as well as in morals and common sense.

True; and I am quite of opinion that neither the Act quoted by the Judge, nor the punishment annexed to the crime of manslaughter, can apply to this boy's case, which is one of accident and not of crime. The indictment charges him with feloniously killing, to which the Act and. the Indictment relate; now the evidence proves that it was purely accident, which I think you, Gentlemen, will not call felony, however the lawyers may construe the word.

I agree with you, and I think it would be doing an injustice to the boy to convict him; he is a well-disposed boy now, but we all know he would get no good in prison.

But the law is answerable for that; and, as I said before, we have nothing to do with the consequences.

So unreasonable a construction of the law and of the duties of Jurors, cannot excuse us all for subjecting a well-disposed lad (which every witness allowed him to be) to the contamination of a prison, satisfied as we are, that he is not deserving of punishment.

Well, as so many are for an acquittal, I will consent to a verdict of Not Guilty; but I am afraid the Judge will not approve of it.

He may not; and it would be certainly more pleasant if we could perform what we conceive to be our duty without differing in opinion with the Judge or any one, because his and our motives may be equally good; but I cannot avoid expressing a hope, that this determination to think and act for ourselves will lead him to dispense with the word must in his future addresses to Juries, although the law and the evidence may appear perfectly clear to him; because we are the persons to try, and there are generally individuals in every pannel who will consider such positive language from the bench as derogating from the true character of Juries, and interfering with their province.

Viewing the matter in this light, there appears to me an impropriety in the application of the term directions to a Jury.

In my opinion there is. As the word