Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryTHE CONTROVERSIAL SEQUEL TO AT DAWN WE SLEPT -- A PROBING ANALYSIS OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF PEARL HARBOR, AMERICA'S MOST CATASTROPHIC MILITARY DEFEATThe monumental bestseller At Dawn We Slept was a landmark re-creation of the apocalyptic events of December 7, 1941. This provocative sequel delves even further to examine the underlying causes of Pearl Harbor and the revisionist theories that Roosevelt and other high officials knew about the attack.With the same imposing scholarship and narrative drive that distinguished its predecessor, Pearl Harbor uncovers the secret roles played by the president, his cabinet secretaries, admirals, and generals in the weeks before the attack. Based on more than forty years of research, extensive interviews, and an insider's knowledge of the military, this book poses an explosive and highly convincing new theory of America's entry into the Pacific War. Like the very best works of history, it not only expands but dramatically deepens our understanding of the events that were once the province of myth and rumor. |
From inside the book
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Page 291
... Oahu was quite probable . Other officers felt that such an attack was entirely possible but appeared to regard it as somewhat less probable than did Admiral Turner . I believe that Admiral Ingersoll and Stark were in this category ...
... Oahu was quite probable . Other officers felt that such an attack was entirely possible but appeared to regard it as somewhat less probable than did Admiral Turner . I believe that Admiral Ingersoll and Stark were in this category ...
Page 462
... Oahu were not alert on December 7 , 1941 - not when a Japanese task force could approach undiscovered to within 200 miles of Oahu ; not when twenty - five enemy submarines surrounded the island ; not when Japanese patrol planes could ...
... Oahu were not alert on December 7 , 1941 - not when a Japanese task force could approach undiscovered to within 200 miles of Oahu ; not when twenty - five enemy submarines surrounded the island ; not when Japanese patrol planes could ...
Page 484
... Oahu . " The intelligence available lending itself to an attack on Pearl Harbor was no more pronounced than that which would also have been available had Japan elected to attack , say Panama , " he wrote . 19 The majority report agreed ...
... Oahu . " The intelligence available lending itself to an attack on Pearl Harbor was no more pronounced than that which would also have been available had Japan elected to attack , say Panama , " he wrote . 19 The majority report agreed ...
Contents
We Were All Out There | 3 |
Too Deeply to Bury Their Hate | 34 |
To Avoid War with Japan | 66 |
Copyright | |
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Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History Gordon W. Prange,Donald M. Goldstein,Katherine V. Dillon Limited preview - 2014 |
Common terms and phrases
action Admiral alert American appeared armed Army asked attack August Barnes base believed Bloch British called Chapter command concerning congressional committee considered course danger December defense Department Diary direct dispatch duty East effect execute expected fact failure Fleet force going Government Hawaii Hawaiian hereafter cited Hull Ibid important intelligence interest Interview Islands January Japan Japanese Kimmel knew later least less Letter major Marshall matter means military move Naval Navy Navy Department never November Oahu officer operation opinion Pacific Pacific Fleet peace Pearl Harbor Philippines planes position possible prepared President question ready reason received Record relations replied responsibility Roosevelt Secretary seemed Senator sent ships Short situation Stark Stimson surprise task thing thought Tokyo told took United wanted warning Washington winds wrote York