Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryTHE CONTROVERSIAL SEQUEL TO AT DAWN WE SLEPT -- A PROBING ANALYSIS OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF PEARL HARBOR, AMERICA'S MOST CATASTROPHIC MILITARY DEFEATThe monumental bestseller At Dawn We Slept was a landmark re-creation of the apocalyptic events of December 7, 1941. This provocative sequel delves even further to examine the underlying causes of Pearl Harbor and the revisionist theories that Roosevelt and other high officials knew about the attack.With the same imposing scholarship and narrative drive that distinguished its predecessor, Pearl Harbor uncovers the secret roles played by the president, his cabinet secretaries, admirals, and generals in the weeks before the attack. Based on more than forty years of research, extensive interviews, and an insider's knowledge of the military, this book poses an explosive and highly convincing new theory of America's entry into the Pacific War. Like the very best works of history, it not only expands but dramatically deepens our understanding of the events that were once the province of myth and rumor. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 85
Page 296
... knew everything about us . We knew little about them . This was a problem of all our intelligence agencies . " 60 However , the Japanese were not omniscient . They did not know that the United States had broken their diplomatic codes ...
... knew everything about us . We knew little about them . This was a problem of all our intelligence agencies . " 60 However , the Japanese were not omniscient . They did not know that the United States had broken their diplomatic codes ...
Page 393
... knew little about the AWS . He " made no formal requests for information , " but occasionally Short would tell him " something about it . " Frequently some of his own subordinates would contact the Army and let him " know the situation ...
... knew little about the AWS . He " made no formal requests for information , " but occasionally Short would tell him " something about it . " Frequently some of his own subordinates would contact the Army and let him " know the situation ...
Page 442
... knew that one of the tasks before the outbreak of war was guarding against a possible surprise attack by Japan . He knew that the only effective means of detecting a surprise raiding force in adequate time to combat it was by distant ...
... knew that one of the tasks before the outbreak of war was guarding against a possible surprise attack by Japan . He knew that the only effective means of detecting a surprise raiding force in adequate time to combat it was by distant ...
Contents
We Were All Out There | 3 |
Too Deeply to Bury Their Hate | 34 |
To Avoid War with Japan | 66 |
Copyright | |
40 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History Gordon W. Prange,Donald M. Goldstein,Katherine V. Dillon Limited preview - 2014 |
Common terms and phrases
action Admiral alert American appeared armed Army asked attack August Barnes base believed Bloch British called Chapter command concerning congressional committee considered course danger December defense Department Diary direct dispatch duty East effect execute expected fact failure Fleet force going Government Hawaii Hawaiian hereafter cited Hull Ibid important intelligence interest Interview Islands January Japan Japanese Kimmel knew later least less Letter major Marshall matter means military move Naval Navy Navy Department never November Oahu officer operation opinion Pacific Pacific Fleet peace Pearl Harbor Philippines planes position possible prepared President question ready reason received Record relations replied responsibility Roosevelt Secretary seemed Senator sent ships Short situation Stark Stimson surprise task thing thought Tokyo told took United wanted warning Washington winds wrote York