Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryTHE CONTROVERSIAL SEQUEL TO AT DAWN WE SLEPT -- A PROBING ANALYSIS OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF PEARL HARBOR, AMERICA'S MOST CATASTROPHIC MILITARY DEFEATThe monumental bestseller At Dawn We Slept was a landmark re-creation of the apocalyptic events of December 7, 1941. This provocative sequel delves even further to examine the underlying causes of Pearl Harbor and the revisionist theories that Roosevelt and other high officials knew about the attack.With the same imposing scholarship and narrative drive that distinguished its predecessor, Pearl Harbor uncovers the secret roles played by the president, his cabinet secretaries, admirals, and generals in the weeks before the attack. Based on more than forty years of research, extensive interviews, and an insider's knowledge of the military, this book poses an explosive and highly convincing new theory of America's entry into the Pacific War. Like the very best works of history, it not only expands but dramatically deepens our understanding of the events that were once the province of myth and rumor. |
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Page xiv
... military . From its founding , the United States feared the idea of a professional military class , and put its trust in the " civilian soldier . " The regular army and navy were tolerated rather than honored . With a few notable ...
... military . From its founding , the United States feared the idea of a professional military class , and put its trust in the " civilian soldier . " The regular army and navy were tolerated rather than honored . With a few notable ...
Page 209
... military situ- ation permitted . " 64 Neither Stimson nor Knox can be blamed for the attack on Pearl Harbor or for the events leading up to it . They did not formulate foreign policy , nor were they experts in the military and naval ...
... military situ- ation permitted . " 64 Neither Stimson nor Knox can be blamed for the attack on Pearl Harbor or for the events leading up to it . They did not formulate foreign policy , nor were they experts in the military and naval ...
Page 274
... military interest in these voluminous exchanges of messages between Tokyo and the Japanese diplomatic and consular missions abroad , " he wrote . 26 One wonders how he arrived at such a conclusion . A large volume of routine business ...
... military interest in these voluminous exchanges of messages between Tokyo and the Japanese diplomatic and consular missions abroad , " he wrote . 26 One wonders how he arrived at such a conclusion . A large volume of routine business ...
Contents
We Were All Out There | 3 |
Too Deeply to Bury Their Hate | 34 |
To Avoid War with Japan | 66 |
Copyright | |
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Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History Gordon W. Prange,Donald M. Goldstein,Katherine V. Dillon Limited preview - 2014 |
Common terms and phrases
action Admiral alert American appeared armed Army asked attack August Barnes base believed Bloch British called Chapter command concerning congressional committee considered course danger December defense Department Diary direct dispatch duty East effect execute expected fact failure Fleet force going Government Hawaii Hawaiian hereafter cited Hull Ibid important intelligence interest Interview Islands January Japan Japanese Kimmel knew later least less Letter major Marshall matter means military move Naval Navy Navy Department never November Oahu officer operation opinion Pacific Pacific Fleet peace Pearl Harbor Philippines planes position possible prepared President question ready reason received Record relations replied responsibility Roosevelt Secretary seemed Senator sent ships Short situation Stark Stimson surprise task thing thought Tokyo told took United wanted warning Washington winds wrote York