Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryTHE CONTROVERSIAL SEQUEL TO AT DAWN WE SLEPT -- A PROBING ANALYSIS OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF PEARL HARBOR, AMERICA'S MOST CATASTROPHIC MILITARY DEFEATThe monumental bestseller At Dawn We Slept was a landmark re-creation of the apocalyptic events of December 7, 1941. This provocative sequel delves even further to examine the underlying causes of Pearl Harbor and the revisionist theories that Roosevelt and other high officials knew about the attack.With the same imposing scholarship and narrative drive that distinguished its predecessor, Pearl Harbor uncovers the secret roles played by the president, his cabinet secretaries, admirals, and generals in the weeks before the attack. Based on more than forty years of research, extensive interviews, and an insider's knowledge of the military, this book poses an explosive and highly convincing new theory of America's entry into the Pacific War. Like the very best works of history, it not only expands but dramatically deepens our understanding of the events that were once the province of myth and rumor. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 82
Page xxx
... Officer Capt . W. S. DeLany Commander Task Force 9 War Plans Officer Capt . C. E. McMorris RADM P. N. L. Bellinger Gunnery Officer Chief of Staff Capt . William W. Smith Communications Aviation Officer Cmdr . W. A. Kitts , III Cmdr ...
... Officer Capt . W. S. DeLany Commander Task Force 9 War Plans Officer Capt . C. E. McMorris RADM P. N. L. Bellinger Gunnery Officer Chief of Staff Capt . William W. Smith Communications Aviation Officer Cmdr . W. A. Kitts , III Cmdr ...
Page 289
... officer is designed by training and indoc- trination not to be an intelligence officer . " 17 The congressional committee recommended that intelligence ser- vice be upgraded . In effect , they adopted Zacharias's concept of In ...
... officer is designed by training and indoc- trination not to be an intelligence officer . " 17 The congressional committee recommended that intelligence ser- vice be upgraded . In effect , they adopted Zacharias's concept of In ...
Page 336
... officer . " Thus he " had confidence " in him . 13 " Short was a very fine officer , " he said later . " There was no doubt about that . I liked Short . " 14 So did Admiral Arthur C. Davis , Kimmel's fleet aviation officer in 1941. He ...
... officer . " Thus he " had confidence " in him . 13 " Short was a very fine officer , " he said later . " There was no doubt about that . I liked Short . " 14 So did Admiral Arthur C. Davis , Kimmel's fleet aviation officer in 1941. He ...
Contents
We Were All Out There | 3 |
Too Deeply to Bury Their Hate | 34 |
To Avoid War with Japan | 66 |
Copyright | |
40 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History Gordon W. Prange,Donald M. Goldstein,Katherine V. Dillon Limited preview - 2014 |
Common terms and phrases
action Admiral alert American appeared armed Army asked attack August Barnes base believed Bloch British called Chapter command concerning congressional committee considered course danger December defense Department Diary direct dispatch duty East effect execute expected fact failure Fleet force going Government Hawaii Hawaiian hereafter cited Hull Ibid important intelligence interest Interview Islands January Japan Japanese Kimmel knew later least less Letter major Marshall matter means military move Naval Navy Navy Department never November Oahu officer operation opinion Pacific Pacific Fleet peace Pearl Harbor Philippines planes position possible prepared President question ready reason received Record relations replied responsibility Roosevelt Secretary seemed Senator sent ships Short situation Stark Stimson surprise task thing thought Tokyo told took United wanted warning Washington winds wrote York