Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryTHE CONTROVERSIAL SEQUEL TO AT DAWN WE SLEPT -- A PROBING ANALYSIS OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF PEARL HARBOR, AMERICA'S MOST CATASTROPHIC MILITARY DEFEATThe monumental bestseller At Dawn We Slept was a landmark re-creation of the apocalyptic events of December 7, 1941. This provocative sequel delves even further to examine the underlying causes of Pearl Harbor and the revisionist theories that Roosevelt and other high officials knew about the attack.With the same imposing scholarship and narrative drive that distinguished its predecessor, Pearl Harbor uncovers the secret roles played by the president, his cabinet secretaries, admirals, and generals in the weeks before the attack. Based on more than forty years of research, extensive interviews, and an insider's knowledge of the military, this book poses an explosive and highly convincing new theory of America's entry into the Pacific War. Like the very best works of history, it not only expands but dramatically deepens our understanding of the events that were once the province of myth and rumor. |
From inside the book
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Page 133
... situation . At the very least , Washington should have taken another close look at Hawaii's intel- ligence requirements . With so little heavy airpower remaining , Ha- waii's defenders needed every scrap of information to utilize their ...
... situation . At the very least , Washington should have taken another close look at Hawaii's intel- ligence requirements . With so little heavy airpower remaining , Ha- waii's defenders needed every scrap of information to utilize their ...
Page 251
... situation accurately as it appeared from the information avail- able to the War Department at that time and up until 7 December . ” 13 He wrote with remorseless logic : Short as a military commander was required to take the information ...
... situation accurately as it appeared from the information avail- able to the War Department at that time and up until 7 December . ” 13 He wrote with remorseless logic : Short as a military commander was required to take the information ...
Page 382
... situation better than did Stimson : I find that he failed in the light of the information which he had received adequately to alert his command to the degree of prepar- edness which the situation demanded ; and that this failure contrib ...
... situation better than did Stimson : I find that he failed in the light of the information which he had received adequately to alert his command to the degree of prepar- edness which the situation demanded ; and that this failure contrib ...
Contents
We Were All Out There | 3 |
Too Deeply to Bury Their Hate | 34 |
To Avoid War with Japan | 66 |
Copyright | |
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Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History Gordon W. Prange,Donald M. Goldstein,Katherine V. Dillon Limited preview - 2014 |
Common terms and phrases
action Admiral alert American appeared armed Army asked attack August Barnes base believed Bloch British called Chapter command concerning congressional committee considered course danger December defense Department Diary direct dispatch duty East effect execute expected fact failure Fleet force going Government Hawaii Hawaiian hereafter cited Hull Ibid important intelligence interest Interview Islands January Japan Japanese Kimmel knew later least less Letter major Marshall matter means military move Naval Navy Navy Department never November Oahu officer operation opinion Pacific Pacific Fleet peace Pearl Harbor Philippines planes position possible prepared President question ready reason received Record relations replied responsibility Roosevelt Secretary seemed Senator sent ships Short situation Stark Stimson surprise task thing thought Tokyo told took United wanted warning Washington winds wrote York