until all our guns on the left were silenced, our work much damaged, and our loss of men considerable. On the night of the 11th they began their second parallel, about 300 yards nearer to us. The troops being much weakened by sickness, as well as by the fire of the besiegers, and observing that tne enemy had not only secured their flanks, but proceeded in every respect with the utmost regularity and caution, I could not venture so large sorties as to hope from them any considerable effect, but otherwise, I did everything in my power to interrupt this work by opening new embrasures for guns and keeping up a constant fire from all the howitzers and small mortars that we could man. On the evening of the 14th they assaulted and carried two redoubts that had been advanced about 300 yards for the purpose of delaying their approaches, and covering our left flank, and during the night included them in their second parallel, on which they continued to work with the utmost exertion. Being perfectly sensible that our works could not stand many hours after the opening of the batteries of that parallel, we not only continued a constant fire with all our mortars and every gun that could be brought to bear upon it, but a little before daybreak on the morning of the 16th, I ordered a sortie of about 350 men, under the direction of Lieut.-Colonel Abercrombie, to attack two batteries which appeared to be in the greatest forwardness, and to spike the guns. A detachment of Guards with the 80th company of Grenadiers, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Lake, attacked the one, and one of light infantry, under the command of Major Armstrong, attacked the other, and both succeeded in forcing the redoubts that covered them, spiking 11 guns, and killing or wounding about 100 of the French troops, who had the guard of that part of the trenches, and with little loss on our side. This action, though extremely honourable to the officers and soldiers who executed it, proved of little public advantage, for the cannon having been spiked in a hurry, were soon rendered fit for service again, and before dark the whole parallel and batteries appeared to be nearly complete. At this time we knew that there was no part of the whole front attacked on which we could show a single gun, and our shells were nearly expended. I, therefore, had only to choose between preparing to surrender next day, or endeavouring to get off with the greatest part of the troops, and I determined to attempt the latter. ... In this situation, with my little force divided, the enemy's batteries opened at daybreak. The passage between this place and Gloucester was much exposed, but the boats having now returned, they were ordered to bring back the troops that had passed during the night, and they joined us in the forenoon without much loss. Our works, in the mean time, were going to ruin, and not having been able to strengthen them by an abattis, nor in any other manner but by a slight fraizing, which the enemy's artillery were demolishing wherever they fired, my opinion entirely coincided with that of the engineer and principal officers of the army, that they were in many places assailable in the forenoon, and that by the continuance of the same fire for a few hours longer, they would be in such a state as to render it desperate, with our numbers, to attempt to maintain them. We at that time could not fire a single gun; only one 8-inch and little more than 100 Cohorn shells remained. A diversion by the French ships of war that lay at the mouth of York River was to be expected. Our numbers had been diminished by the enemy's fire, but particularly by sickness, and the strength and spirits of those in the works were much exhausted, by the fatigue of constant watching and unremitting duty. Under all these circumstances, I thought it would have been wanton and inhuman to the last degree to sacrifice the lives of this small body of gallant soldiers, who had ever behaved with so much fidelity and courage, by exposing them to an assault which, from the numbers and precautions of the enemy, could not fail to succeed. I therefore proposed to capitulate ; and I have the honour to enclose to your Excellency the copy of the correspondence between General Washington and me on that subject, and the terms of capitulation agreed upon. I sincerely lament that better could not be obtained, but I have neglected nothing in my power to alleviate the misfortune and distress of both officers and soldiers. The men are well clothed and provided with necessaries, and I trust will be regularly supplied by the means of the officers that are permitted to remain with them. The treatment, in general, that we have received from the enemy since our surrender has been perfectly good and proper, but the kindness and attention that has been shown to us by the French officers in particular their delicate sensibility of our situation - their generous and pressing offer of money, both public and private, to any amount has really gone beyond what I can possibly describe, and will, I hope, make an impression on the breast of every British officer, whenever the fortune of war should put any of them into our power. Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis, Correspondence (edited by Charles Ross, London, 1859), I, Appendix, 510-512 passim. 215. CHAPTER XXXV- PEACE "The Sudden Change of Sentiments" (1781-1782) BY KING GEORGE THIRD Throughout the war there was a vigorous opposition in Parliament which protested against the justice and expediency of the contest; and after France and Spain both declared war on England, in 1778 and 1779, this opposition strengthened. The defeat of Cornwallis was practically the end of hostilities; and the wrath of the king is shown in this correspondence. - For George III, see No. 130 above. - Bibliography of the treaties of 1782 and 1783: Winsor, Narrative and Critical History, VII, 165– 174; Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, ch. xxi, V, 228-276; Channing and Hart, Guide, § 141. IT Windsor, June 13th, 1781. 25 min. pt. 7 a.m. T is difficult to express which appears more strongly, the manly fortitude of the great majority last night in rejecting the hacknied question of a Committee for considering the American war, or the impudence of the minority in again bringing it forward; for whoever the most ardently wishes for peace must feel that every repetition of this question in Parliament only makes the rebels and the Bourbon family more desirous of continuing the war, from the hopes of tiring out this country. We have it not at this hour in our power to make peace; it is by steadiness and exertions that we are to get into a situation to effect it; and with the assistance of Divine Providence I am confident we shall soon find our enemies forced to look for that blessing. Among our many misfortunes I feel one satisfaction— that we have but one line to follow; therefore, at least, diffidence and perplexity cannot attend us; and we have the greatest objects to make us zealous in our pursuit, for we are contending for our whole consequence, whether we are to rank among the great Powers of Europe, or be reduced to one of the least considerable. He that is not stimulated by this consideration does not deserve to be a member of this community. . . . [Dec. 15, 1781.] THE account of the very great majority on the first motion on the Army Estimates last night gives me much pleasure, and shews the country gentlemen begin to see that, though internal continental opperations in North America are not advisable, the prosecution of the war can alone preserve us from a most ignominious peace, which, when once concluded, would certainly occasion much greater internal uneasiness than any difficulties at present to be contended with. . . . [Feb. 26, 1782.] . . . Undoubtedly the House of Commons seem to be wild at present, and to be running on to ruin, that no man can answer for the event of any question. I certainly till drove to the wall [will] do what I can to save the empire, and, if I do not succeed, I will at least have the self-approbation of having done my duty, and of not letting myself be a tool in the destruction of the honour of the country. [March 17, 1782.] I AM Sorry to find by Ld. North's note that the majority this morning did not exceed nine; it looks as if the House of Commons is going lengths that could not have been expected. I am resolved not to throw myself into the hands of Opposition at all events, and shall certainly, if things go as they seem to lead, know what my conscience as well as honour dictates as the only way left for me. . . . [March 19, 1782.] . . . After having yesterday in the most solemn manner assured you that my sentiments of honour will not permit me to send for any of the leaders of Opposition and personally treat with them, I could not but be hurt at your letter of last night. Every man must be the sole judge of his feelings; therefore whatever you or any man can say on that subject has no avail with me. . . . [March 27, 1782.] . . . At last the fatal day has come which the misfortunes of the times and the sudden change of sentiments of the House of Commons have drove me to of changing the Ministry, and a more general removal of other persons than I believe ever was known before. I have to the last fought for individuals, but the number I have saved, except my Bedchamber, is incredibly few. You would hardly believe that even the Duke of Montagu was strongly run at, but I declared that I would sooner let confusion follow than part with the governor of my sons and so unexceptionable a man: at last I have succeeded so that he and Ld. Ashburnham remain. The effusion of my sorrows has made me say more than I had intended, but I ever did and ever shall look on you as a friend, as well as a faithful servant. W. Bodham Donne, editor, The Correspondence of King George the Third with Lord North (London. 1867), II, 376-420 passim. 216. A Protest against the Breach of the Instructions of Congress (1782) BY CHARLES GRAVIER, COUNT DE VERGENNES (ANONYMOUS TRANSLATION) Vergennes was French Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Congress had instructed the envoys to make no terms to which he did not agree. This piece is his protest at the breach of these instructions by the envoys, who were nevertheless justified by Congress. - Bibliography: Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 349–364. YOU will surely be gratified, as well as myself, with the very extensive advantages which our allies, the Americans, are to receive from the peace; but you certainly will not be less surprised than I have been at the conduct of the commissioners. According to the instructions of Congress, they ought to have done nothing without our participation. I have informed you that the king did not seek to influence the negotiation any further than his offices might be necessary to his friends. The American commissioners will not say that I have interfered, and much less that I have wearied them with my curiosity. They have cautiously kept themselves at a distance from me. Mr. Adams, one of them, coming from Holland, where he had been received and served by our ambassador, had been in Paris nearly three weeks, without imagining that he owed me any mark of attention, and probably I should not have seen him till this time if I had not caused him to be reminded of it. Whenever I have had occasion to see any one of them, and inquire of them briefly respecting the progress of the negotiation, they have constantly clothed their speech in generalities, giving me to understand that it did not go forward, and that they had no confidence in the sincerity of the British ministry. Judge of my surprise when, on the 30th of November, Dr. Franklin informed me that the articles were signed. The reservation retained on our account does not save the infraction of the promise, which we have mutually made, not to sign except conjointly. I owe Dr. Franklin the justice to state, however, that on the next day he sent me a copy of the articles. He will hardly complain that I received them without demonstrations of sensibility. It was not till some days after that, when this minister had come to see me, I allowed myself to make him perceive that his proceeding in this abrupt signature of the articles had little in it which could be agreeable to the king. He appeared sensible of it, |