Therefore our ig tually to accomplish this end. norance is an answer to objections against the conduct of Providence, in permitting irregularities, as seeming contradictory to this end. Now, since it is so obvious that our ignorance may be a satisfactory answer to objections against a thing, and yet not affect the proof of it; till it can be shown, it is frivolous to assert, that our ignorance invalidates the proof of religion, as it does the objections against it. Secondly, Suppose unknown impossibilities, and unknown relations, might justly be urged to invalidate the proof of religion, as well as to answer objections against it, and that, in consequence of this, the proof of it were doubtful; yet still, let the assertion be despised, or let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true, that moral obligations would remain certain, though it were not certain what would, upon the whole, be the consequences of observing or violating them. For these obligations arise immediately and necessarily from the judgment of our own mind, unless perverted, which we cannot violate without being self-condemned. And they would be certain, too, from considerations of interest. For, though it were doubtful what will be the future consequences of virtue and vice, yet it is however credible, that they may have those consequences which religion teaches us they will; and this credibility is a certaint obligation in point of prudence, to abstain from all wickedness, and to * Page 9, 10. + Page 3, and Part ii. chap. 6. live in the conscientious practice of all that is good. But, Thirdly, The answers above given to the objections against religion, cannot equally be made use of to invalidate the proof of it. For, upon supposition that God exercises a moral government over the world, analogy does most strongly lead us to conclude, that this moral government must be a scheme, or constitution, beyond our comprehension. And a thousand particular analogies show us, that parts of such a scheme, from their relation to other parts, may conduce to accomplish ends, which we should have thought they had no tendency at all to accomplish; nay, ends, which, before experience, we should have thought such parts were contradictory to, and had a tendency to prevent. And, therefore, all these analogies show, that the way of arguing made use of in objecting against religion, is delusive; because they show it is not at all incredible, that, could we comprehend the whole, we should find the permission of the disorders objected against, to be consistent with justice and goodness, and even to be instances of them. Now this is not applicable to the proof of religion, as it is to the objections against it ;* and therefore cannot invalidate that proof, as it does these objections. Lastly, From the observation now made, it is easy to see, that the answers above given to the objections against Providence, though, in a general * Sermon at the Rolls, p. 312. 2d Edit. way of speaking, they may be said to be taken from our ignorance, yet are by no means taken merely from that, but from somewhat which analogy shows us concerning it. For analogy shows us positively, that our ignorance in the possibilities of things, and the various relations in nature, renders us incompetent judges, and leads us to false conclusions, in cases similar to this, in which we pretend to judge and to object. So that the things above insisted upon, are not mere suppositions of unknown impossibilities and relations; but they are suggested to our thoughts, and even forced upon the observation of serious men, and rendered credible, too, by the analogy of nature. And, therefore, to take these things into the account, is to judge by experience, and what we do know; and it is not judging so, to take no notice of them. CONCLUSION. THE observations of the last chapter lead us to consider this little scene of human life, in which we are so busily engaged, as having reference, of some sort or other, to a much larger plan of things. Whether we are any way related to the more distant parts of the boundless universe into which we are brought, is altogether uncertain. But it is evident, that the course of things which comes within our view, is connected with somewhat past, present, and future beyond it. So that we are placed, as one may speak, in the middle of a scheme, not a fixed, but a progressive one, every way incomprehensible; incomprehensible, in a manner, equally with respect to what has been, what now is, and what shall be hereafter. And this scheme cannot but contain in it somewhat as wonderful, and as much beyond our thought and conception,† as any thing in that of religion. For, will any man in his * Page 154, &c. + See Part ii. chap. 2. senses say, that it is less difficult to conceive how the world came to be, and to continue as it is, with, out, than with, an intelligent Author and Governor of it? or, admitting an intelligent Governor of it, that there is some other rule of government more natural, and of easier conception, than that which we call moral? Indeed, without an intelligent Author and Governor of nature, no account at all can be given, how this universe, or the part of it particularly in which we are concerned, came to be, and the course of it to be carried on, as it is; nor any of its general end and design, without a moral Governor of it. That there is an intelligent Author of nature, and natural Governor of the world, is a principle gone upon in the foregoing treatise, as proved, and generally known and confessed to be proved. And the very notion of an intelligent Author of nature, proved by particular final causes, implies a will and a character. Now, as our whole nature, the nature which he has given us, leads us to conclude his will and character to be moral, just, and good; so we can scarce in imagination conceive, what it can be otherwise. However, in consequence of this his will and character, whatever it be, he formed the universe as it is, and carries on the course of it as he does, rather than in any other manner; and has assigned to us, and to all living creatures, a part and a lot in it. Irrational creatures act this their part, and enjoy and undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted them, * Page 139. |