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had life in himself, (or the power of raising the dead,) so should the other have too: and if the Father was primarily Judge of the world, in right of his prerogative as Father, the Son should have it in the exercise and execution, to manifest the equality. Now, here is no straining and forcing of texts, but the literal, obvious, natural interpretation. But the interpretation which you give is plainly forced, makes the context incoherent, and the whole passage inconsistent. For, be pleased to observe your sense of verse the 19th. The Son can do nothing but by commission from the Father: Why? then follows, “ For what things soever he doth, these also doth the 6 Son likewise.” Does it follow, because he 6 can do “ nothing of himself,” in your sense, that therefore he can do every thing which the Father does ? Where is the sense, or connection? Is he here limiting and lessening his own powers, as, upon your principles, he should have done, in answer to the charge of blasphemy? No; but he extends them to the utmost ; and, instead of retracting, goes on in the same strain, and says more than he had said before. To make good sense and coherence of the passage, upon your scheme, you must fill up the deficiency thus: The Son can do nothing but by commission; and commission he has, to do every thing that the Father doth : which, though it sounds harsh, and looks too familiar for a creature to pretend, yet might make the context coherent. However, since the interpretation I have before given is more natural and more obvious, argues no deficiency in the text, makes the whole coherent, and has nothing harsh or disagreeing in it, it ought to be preferred. For, after all, it must be thought very odd and strange for a creature to be commise sioned or empowered to do all things that the Creator doth; and to do them ópolws in the same manner, also I do not make any forced construction : for so the 20th verse, immediately following, interprets it; “ For the Fa" ther loveth the Son, and showeth him all things that 66 himself doth.” You endeavour indeed to make some advantage of this very text; alleging that “this power “ which the Son exercised, was given him, not by neces
sity, (which is no gift,) but by free love." But why must love imply freedom? Doth not God love himself? And if the love of himself be no matter of choice, why must the love of his Son, his other self, be represented otherwise ? You are forced to add to the text, to give some colour to your argument; and to call it free love, when the text says only, that the Father loveth. Thus far I have endeavoured to clear
the sense of St. John; and to vindicate it from your exceptions: which are not of so great weight, that you need be amazed at any man's thinking slightly of them. Hilary well observes, that the drift and design of our Saviour's words was to declare his equality of nature with the Father, and his Sonship, at the same time. s No inferior nature could be capable of having all things; nor could a Son have them but as communicated. So that, in the whole, it is directly opposite to such as either disown an equality of nature, or a real distinction; wherefore Hilary concludes triumphantly, both against Arians and Sabellians, in words very remarkable, which I shall throw into the tmargin.
But you add, as a recapitulation of what you had said upon this article: “ If therefore to be freely sent, and to “act in the name and by the authority of another, be, to “ assume an equality of honour and regard with that 6 other, by whom he was sent; we must for ever despair “ to understand the meaning of words, or to be able to “ distinguish between a delegated and a supreme unde“rived power,” (p. 97.) To which I make answer: if declaring himself to be the proper Son of that other, which
• Omnia habere sola natura possit indifferens; neque nativitas aliquid habere possit, nisi datum sit, p. 928.
+ Conclusa sunt omnia adversum hæretici furoris ingenia. Filius est, quia ab se nihil potest. Deus est, quia quæcunque Pater facit, et ipse eadem facit. Unum sunt, quia exæquatur in honore, eademque facit non alia. Non est Pater, quia missus est, p. 929.
He has more to the same purpose, p. 1015, 1251.
both the Jews and the Apostle understood to be the same with making himself equal with him: if his claiming to himself the same right, power, and authority which the other hath; and asserting that he is able to do whatever the other doth; and that the exercise of those powers is left to him, for this very end and purpose, that all men may honour the one even as they honour the other: if this be not assuming an equality of honour and regard with that other; we must for ever despair to understand the meaning of words, or to be able to distinguish between what is proper to a creature, and what to the Creator only.
As to what you hint concerning a delegated power, it is not to your purpose; unless you could prove that one person cannot be delegate to another, without being unequal, in nature, to him; which would prove that one man cannot be delegate to another manu; besides other absurdities. Acting by a delegated power does by no means infer any inferiority of nature, but rather the quite contrary; especially, if the charge be such, as no inferior nature could be able to sustain; or if the honour attending it, or consequent upon it, be too great for an inferior nature to receive; as the case is here. However, the divine administration, and wonderful oixovouía of the Three Persons, with their order of acting, is what we must not presume perfectly to understand; nor can any certain argument be drawn against the thing, from our imperfect and inadequate conceptions of it.
If it be objected, that there is a supremacy of order lodged in one more than in the other; let that be rightly understood, and I shall not gainsay it. The Father, as Father, is supreme; and the Son, as Son, subordinate. We pretend not to make the Son the first, but the second Person of the Godhead. Whatever inequality of honour such a supremacy of one, and subordination of the other necessarily imply, while the nature or essence is supposed equal, it may be admitted : but I am not apprised that they infer any; because, though there are two Persons, there is but one x undivided nature; which makes the case widely different from that of one man (a distinct and separate being), acting under another.
u See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, p. 59.
What follows, of your answer to the present Query, is only ringing changes upon the old objection, drawn from your imaginary sense of individual substance. And here you let your thoughts rove, and abound much in flight and fancy; conceiving of the Trinity, after the manner of bodies, and reasoning from corporeal and sensible images. A blind man would thus take his notion of colours, perhaps, from his hearing or feeling; and make many fanciful demonstrations against the doctrine of vision; which would all vanish, upon the opening of his eyes. Were we as able to judge of what may, or may not be, in relation to the modus of the divine existence, as we are to judge of common matters, lying within the sphere of our capacity, there might then be some force in the objections made against the doctrine of the Trinity from natu
* Unius autem substantiæ, et unius status, et unius potestatis, quia unus Deus. Tertull. contr. Prax. c. 2. Unius divinitatis Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus. Id. de Pud. c. 21.
Ε.νι τω Θεώ και τα παρ' αυτού λόγω υια, νουμένω άμερίστα, πάντα υποτίσακται. Athenag. Leg. c. xv. p. 64.
Unam et eandem omnipotentiam Patris ac Filii esse cognoscas; sicut unus atque idem est cum Patre Deus et Dominus. Orig. Tapi agz. I. i. c. 2.
Ου γαρ άλλην δόξαν πατήρ, και άλλην υιός έχει, αλλά μίαν και την αυτήν. Cyrill. Catech. vi. p. 77. ed. Ox.
“ο εν εαυτό τον πατέρα έχων, πάσαν περιέχει την πατρικής εξουσίας και δύναμιν, και δε όλον έχων (πατέρα) και την εξουσίαν αυτού πάντως έχει. Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. I. i.
14. Totum Pater, totum possidet Filius : unius est quod amborum est, quod unus possidet singulorum est; Domino ipso dicente; Omnia quæcunque habet Pater, meu sunt; quia Pater in Filio, et Filius manet in Patre. Cui, affectu non conditione, charitate non necessitate, decore subjicitur, per quem Pater semper honoratur. Denique inquit: Ego et Pater unum sumus. Unde non diminutiva, sed religiosa, ut dixi, subjectione est Filius Patri subjectus: cum originalis perpetuique regni una possessio, coæternitatis omnipotentiæ. que una substantia, una æqualitas, una virtus majestatis augustæ, unito in lumine una dignitas retinetur. Zen. Veronens. cit. a Bull. D. F. p. 266.
ral reason: but since many things, especially those relating to the incomprehensible nature of God, may be true, though we cannot conceive how; and it may be only our ignorance, which occasions some appearing inconsistencies; we dare not reject a doctrine so well supported by Scripture and antiquity, upon so precarious a foundation as this; that human understanding is the measure of all truth: which is what all objections of that kind, at length, resolve into.
This being premised, let us next proceed to examine your pretences, that I may not seem to neglect any thing you have, that but looks like reasoning. The Query had intimated, that the Son derives his essence and power in a manner ineffable. Against which you object thus: “But “ is it not self-evident, that, let the manner of the Son's
generation or derivation be ever so ineffable, if any “thing was generated, or derived, it must be a distinct in“dividual substance?" No; but we think it sufficient to say, that it must be a distinct individual Person. All the difficulty here lies in fixing and determining the sense of the words individual substance. Would you but please to define the terms, we should soon see what we have to do. But you go on :
“ It could not be part of the Father's “substance; that is absurd: and to say, it was the
whole, is so flagrant a contradiction, that I question “ whether there can be a greater in the nature and rea“son of things. Can the same individual substance be “ derived, and underived? Or, can there be a communica“tion, and nothing communicated? For, it is supposed, “ that the whole essence, or substance, is communicated to “ the Son, and yet remains whole and uncommunicated, in “ the Father; which is evidently to be, and not to be, at “the same time.” This is your reasoning, founded only on your mistake and misapprehension: by Father's substance, as it seems, you understand the Father's Hypostasis, or Person; and are proving, very elaborately, that the Father never communicated his own Hypostasis, or Person, either in whole or in part. You should first have