Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryThe New York Times–bestselling authors of Miracle at Midway delve into the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor during WWII in “a superb work of history” (Albuquerque Journal Magazine). In the predawn hours of December 7, 1941, a Japanese carrier group sailed toward Hawaii. A few minutes before 8:00 a.m., they received the order to rain death on the American base at Pearl Harbor, sinking dozens of ships, destroying hundreds of airplanes, and taking the lives of over two thousand servicemen. The carnage lasted only two hours, but more than seventy years later, terrible questions remain unanswered. How did the Japanese slip past the American radar? Why were the Hawaiian defense forces so woefully underprepared? What, if anything, did American intelligence know before the first Japanese pilot shouted “Tora! Tora! Tora!”? In this incomparable volume, Pearl Harbor experts Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon tackle dozens of thorny issues in an attempt to determine who was at fault for one of the most shocking military disasters in history. |
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... Roosevelt knew the Japanese were headed for Pearl Harbor and deliberately withheld information from the Army and Navy on Oahu to ensure the attack would come in unopposed. Prange could not credit this thesis, and in this volume took ...
... Roosevelt knew the Japanese were headed for Pearl Harbor and deliberately withheld information from the Army and Navy on Oahu to ensure the attack would come in unopposed. Prange could not credit this thesis, and in this volume took ...
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... Roosevelt's critics—that he had ordered the carriers out of Pearl Harbor to save them from the Japanese attack he wanted and expected—is based upon twin misconceptions. Few outside of the naval air arm itself realized the potential of ...
... Roosevelt's critics—that he had ordered the carriers out of Pearl Harbor to save them from the Japanese attack he wanted and expected—is based upon twin misconceptions. Few outside of the naval air arm itself realized the potential of ...
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... Roosevelt, with his outspoken sympathy for embattled Britain, had a commitment to the British to go to war on their behalf? As no incident of sufficient importance to warrant a declaration of war on Germany had happened in the Atlantic ...
... Roosevelt, with his outspoken sympathy for embattled Britain, had a commitment to the British to go to war on their behalf? As no incident of sufficient importance to warrant a declaration of war on Germany had happened in the Atlantic ...
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... Roosevelt became President. He took a personal interest in the sea service; nevertheless, he did not press for a big Navy. Always a master of the possible, he tacked to catch the prevailing winds. And the little breezes of public ...
... Roosevelt became President. He took a personal interest in the sea service; nevertheless, he did not press for a big Navy. Always a master of the possible, he tacked to catch the prevailing winds. And the little breezes of public ...
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... Roosevelt was a consistent , valiant fighter for a strong army and navy , hamstrung by a recalcitrant , tightfisted Congress . Consider military and naval appropriations for the fiscal years 1937 through 1941. In every year , the Bureau ...
... Roosevelt was a consistent , valiant fighter for a strong army and navy , hamstrung by a recalcitrant , tightfisted Congress . Consider military and naval appropriations for the fiscal years 1937 through 1941. In every year , the Bureau ...
Contents
Alerted to Prevent Sabotage | |
The Failure to Comprehend | |
An Important Man in an Important Post | |
Peculiar Complicated and Tense | |
Always Striving for Perfection | |
His Most Grievous Failure | |
The Last Critical Stages | |
It Is Inexplicable | |
He Had Supreme Responsibility | |
On Lines of National Policy | |
Looking in the Wrong Direction | |
ADVISERS PLANNERS AND CHIEFS | |
With Knives and Hatchets | |
Unsurmountable Obstacles | |
Crimination and Recrimination | |
To Help and Serve | |
Faults of Omission | |
Outside of Effective Contact | |
A Finger of Blame | |
Primarily a Failure of Men | |
The Pitfalls of Divided Responsibility | |
A Lack of Imagination | |
East Wind Rain | |
CONTENTS | |
FIELD COMMANDERS AND OPERATORS | |
A Sentinel on Duty | |
THE VIEW FROM THE CROWS NEST | |
Blessed by the War God | |
A Strategic Imbecility | |
A Mental Attitude | |
In the Wake of the Pearl Harbor Disaster | |
Remember Pearl Harbor | |
Image Gallery | |
Notes | |
Appendices | |
The Pearl Harbor Investigations | |
Japanese Proposals of November 20 1941 | |
War Warning Messages of November 27 1941 | |
Proposed Modus Vivendi | |
Japans Bomb Plot Message | |
The Hull Note of November 26 1941 | |
Popov Questionnaire | |
Selected Bibliography | |
Index | |
About the Authors | |
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Common terms and phrases
action Admiral Kimmel air attack Air Force aircraft alert American Army and Navy Army Board asked August Barnes believed Bloch bomb plot British carriers Chapter Chief of Staff China Commander in Chief Congress congressional committee considered danger Dawn We Slept December declared defense Diary diplomatic dispatch East enemy fact failure Gerow going Government Hart Hawaii Hawaiian Department hereafter cited Honolulu Ibid intelligence intercepts Interview January Japan Japanese Japanese attack Kimmel and Short knew Knox Konoye MacArthur Marshall military Morgan Nagumo nation Naval District Navy Department Nomura November 27 Oahu officer operation Pearl Harbor attack Philippines planes position possible President radar RADM reason reconnaissance replied responsibility Roberts Commission Roosevelt sabotage Safford Secretary Senator ships situation Stark Stimson strategy submarine surprise task force testified thought Tokyo told Turner U.S. Navy U.S. Pacific Fleet United War Department warning Washington winds execute wrote Yamamoto