Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryThe New York Times–bestselling authors of Miracle at Midway delve into the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor during WWII in “a superb work of history” (Albuquerque Journal Magazine). In the predawn hours of December 7, 1941, a Japanese carrier group sailed toward Hawaii. A few minutes before 8:00 a.m., they received the order to rain death on the American base at Pearl Harbor, sinking dozens of ships, destroying hundreds of airplanes, and taking the lives of over two thousand servicemen. The carnage lasted only two hours, but more than seventy years later, terrible questions remain unanswered. How did the Japanese slip past the American radar? Why were the Hawaiian defense forces so woefully underprepared? What, if anything, did American intelligence know before the first Japanese pilot shouted “Tora! Tora! Tora!”? In this incomparable volume, Pearl Harbor experts Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon tackle dozens of thorny issues in an attempt to determine who was at fault for one of the most shocking military disasters in history. |
From inside the book
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Page
Gordon Prange considered this book the most highly personal of his work. In his
other volumes, the chronology and momentum of events assisted him; here he
relied largely upon his own thoughts and analyses. The undersigned have ...
Gordon Prange considered this book the most highly personal of his work. In his
other volumes, the chronology and momentum of events assisted him; here he
relied largely upon his own thoughts and analyses. The undersigned have ...
Page
Chapter 31 deals with what Prange considered the root of the problem in the
United States—the failure of all concerned to believe that a Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor was possible, much less that it could succeed. Pearl Harbor had
results ...
Chapter 31 deals with what Prange considered the root of the problem in the
United States—the failure of all concerned to believe that a Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor was possible, much less that it could succeed. Pearl Harbor had
results ...
Page
If a torpedo exploded on contact, this was considered a real feat. The armed
forces had to wring the last minute of life out of obsolescent ships, planes, and
ordnance, because for years appropriations had been frustratingly sparse. The
United ...
If a torpedo exploded on contact, this was considered a real feat. The armed
forces had to wring the last minute of life out of obsolescent ships, planes, and
ordnance, because for years appropriations had been frustratingly sparse. The
United ...
Page
The seas around the home islands gave the Japanese a sense of claustrophobia
, and they considered themselves surrounded by menacing enemies, not the
least of which was the United States. The necessity to break out of this imaginary
...
The seas around the home islands gave the Japanese a sense of claustrophobia
, and they considered themselves surrounded by menacing enemies, not the
least of which was the United States. The necessity to break out of this imaginary
...
Page
... and converted two battle cruisers, Lexington and Saratoga, to aircraft carriers,
then considered to be instruments of defense rather than offense. Moreover, the
United States pledged itself not to increase existing fortifications of Guam, Tutuila,
...
... and converted two battle cruisers, Lexington and Saratoga, to aircraft carriers,
then considered to be instruments of defense rather than offense. Moreover, the
United States pledged itself not to increase existing fortifications of Guam, Tutuila,
...
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LibraryThing Review
User Review - MasseyLibrary - LibraryThingThe previous book “At Dawn We Slept” was a re-creation of the apocalyptic events of December 7, 1941. This provocative sequel delves even further to examine the underlying causes of Pearl Harbor and ... Read full review
Pearl Harbor: the verdict of history
User Review - Not Available - Book VerdictPrange's twin volumes offer everything you always wanted to know about Pearl Harbor but were afraid to ask, plus pictures! Together, these tomes comprise an exhaustive study of the day that will live ... Read full review
Contents
Alerted to Prevent Sabotage | iii |
The Failure to Comprehend | iii |
An Important Man in an Important Post | iii |
Peculiar Complicated and Tense | iii |
Always Striving for Perfection | iii |
His Most Grievous Failure | iii |
The Last Critical Stages | iii |
It Is Inexplicable | iii |
He Had Supreme Responsibility | |
On Lines of National Policy | |
Looking in the Wrong Direction | |
ADVISERS PLANNERS AND CHIEFS | ii |
With Knives and Hatchets | ii |
Unsurmountable Obstacles | ii |
Crimination and Recrimination | ii |
To Help and Serve | ii |
Faults of Omission | ii |
Outside of Effective Contact | ii |
A Finger of Blame | ii |
Primarily a Failure of Men | ii |
The Pitfalls of Divided Responsibility | ii |
A Lack of Imagination | ii |
East Wind Rain | ii |
FIELD COMMANDERS AND OPERATORS | iii |
A Sentinel on Duty | iii |
THE VIEW FROM THE CROWS NEST | iv |
Blessed by the War God | v |
A Strategic Imbecility | xv |
A Mental Attitude | xxv |
In the Wake of the Pearl Harbor Disaster | xxxiv |
Remember Pearl Harbor | xliii |
Notes | liv |
Appendices | 46 |
The Pearl Harbor Investigations | 47 |
Japanese Proposals of November 20 1941 | 49 |
War Warning Messages of November 27 1941 | 50 |
Proposed Modus Vivendi | 51 |
Japans Bomb Plot Message | 54 |
The Hull Note of November 26 1941 | 55 |
Popov Questionnaire | 57 |
Selected Bibliography | 59 |
Index | 70 |
Image Gallery | 571 |
About the Authors | 598 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action Admiral alert American appeared armed Army asked attack August Barnes base believed Bloch Board British called carriers Chapter Chief command concerning congressional committee considered course danger December defense Department Diary direct dispatch East effect execute expected fact failure Fleet force going Government Hawaii Hawaiian hereafter cited Hull Ibid important intelligence interest Interview Islands January Japan Japanese Kimmel knew later letter major Marshall matter means military move Naval Navy Navy Department never November Oahu officer operation opinion Pacific Pacific Fleet peace Pearl Harbor Philippines planes position possible prepared President question ready reason received reconnaissance Record relations replied Representative responsibility Roosevelt Secretary Senator sent ships Short situation staff Stark Stimson surprise task thing thought told took United wanted warning Washington winds wrote York