Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryThe New York Times–bestselling authors of Miracle at Midway delve into the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor during WWII in “a superb work of history” (Albuquerque Journal Magazine). In the predawn hours of December 7, 1941, a Japanese carrier group sailed toward Hawaii. A few minutes before 8:00 a.m., they received the order to rain death on the American base at Pearl Harbor, sinking dozens of ships, destroying hundreds of airplanes, and taking the lives of over two thousand servicemen. The carnage lasted only two hours, but more than seventy years later, terrible questions remain unanswered. How did the Japanese slip past the American radar? Why were the Hawaiian defense forces so woefully underprepared? What, if anything, did American intelligence know before the first Japanese pilot shouted “Tora! Tora! Tora!”? In this incomparable volume, Pearl Harbor experts Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon tackle dozens of thorny issues in an attempt to determine who was at fault for one of the most shocking military disasters in history. |
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... Defense published them in 1977 in a series of volumes entitled The Magic Background of Pearl Harbor . In footnoting these messages we have used the published source rather than the National Archives citations , both because those ...
... Defense published them in 1977 in a series of volumes entitled The Magic Background of Pearl Harbor . In footnoting these messages we have used the published source rather than the National Archives citations , both because those ...
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... defense of Oahu. Finally, this section covers Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, who as senior naval officer present drew much of the lightning of criticism. Part IV, “The View from the Crow's Nest ...
... defense of Oahu. Finally, this section covers Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, who as senior naval officer present drew much of the lightning of criticism. Part IV, “The View from the Crow's Nest ...
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... Defense Plan A Japanese diplomatic code A Japanese diplomatic code Monitoring Station National Archives Officer in Charge Office of Naval Intelligence Naval Operations Op-20-G Security Section, Naval Communications PA-K2 A Japanese ...
... Defense Plan A Japanese diplomatic code A Japanese diplomatic code Monitoring Station National Archives Officer in Charge Office of Naval Intelligence Naval Operations Op-20-G Security Section, Naval Communications PA-K2 A Japanese ...
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... defense in time to affect the issue? Should Congress have insisted upon investigating Japanese espionage in the United States? Would such an investigation have resulted in a recommendation to close the Japanese consulates, as the German ...
... defense in time to affect the issue? Should Congress have insisted upon investigating Japanese espionage in the United States? Would such an investigation have resulted in a recommendation to close the Japanese consulates, as the German ...
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... defense [sic] until it was too late to repair the consequences of their failure to do so.” 2 Was this a valid judgment? Did Truman's remark spring from a profound search for the root of the matter, or had he spread the responsibility so ...
... defense [sic] until it was too late to repair the consequences of their failure to do so.” 2 Was this a valid judgment? Did Truman's remark spring from a profound search for the root of the matter, or had he spread the responsibility so ...
Contents
Alerted to Prevent Sabotage | |
The Failure to Comprehend | |
An Important Man in an Important Post | |
Peculiar Complicated and Tense | |
Always Striving for Perfection | |
His Most Grievous Failure | |
The Last Critical Stages | |
It Is Inexplicable | |
He Had Supreme Responsibility | |
On Lines of National Policy | |
Looking in the Wrong Direction | |
ADVISERS PLANNERS AND CHIEFS | |
With Knives and Hatchets | |
Unsurmountable Obstacles | |
Crimination and Recrimination | |
To Help and Serve | |
Faults of Omission | |
Outside of Effective Contact | |
A Finger of Blame | |
Primarily a Failure of Men | |
The Pitfalls of Divided Responsibility | |
A Lack of Imagination | |
East Wind Rain | |
CONTENTS | |
FIELD COMMANDERS AND OPERATORS | |
A Sentinel on Duty | |
THE VIEW FROM THE CROWS NEST | |
Blessed by the War God | |
A Strategic Imbecility | |
A Mental Attitude | |
In the Wake of the Pearl Harbor Disaster | |
Remember Pearl Harbor | |
Image Gallery | |
Notes | |
Appendices | |
The Pearl Harbor Investigations | |
Japanese Proposals of November 20 1941 | |
War Warning Messages of November 27 1941 | |
Proposed Modus Vivendi | |
Japans Bomb Plot Message | |
The Hull Note of November 26 1941 | |
Popov Questionnaire | |
Selected Bibliography | |
Index | |
About the Authors | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action Admiral Kimmel air attack Air Force aircraft alert American Army and Navy Army Board asked August Barnes believed Bloch bomb plot British carriers Chapter Chief of Staff China Commander in Chief Congress congressional committee considered danger Dawn We Slept December declared defense Diary diplomatic dispatch East enemy fact failure Gerow going Government Hart Hawaii Hawaiian Department hereafter cited Honolulu Ibid intelligence intercepts Interview January Japan Japanese Japanese attack Kimmel and Short knew Knox Konoye MacArthur Marshall military Morgan Nagumo nation Naval District Navy Department Nomura November 27 Oahu officer operation Pearl Harbor attack Philippines planes position possible President radar RADM reason reconnaissance replied responsibility Roberts Commission Roosevelt sabotage Safford Secretary Senator ships situation Stark Stimson strategy submarine surprise task force testified thought Tokyo told Turner U.S. Navy U.S. Pacific Fleet United War Department warning Washington winds execute wrote Yamamoto