Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryThe New York Times–bestselling authors of Miracle at Midway delve into the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor during WWII in “a superb work of history” (Albuquerque Journal Magazine). In the predawn hours of December 7, 1941, a Japanese carrier group sailed toward Hawaii. A few minutes before 8:00 a.m., they received the order to rain death on the American base at Pearl Harbor, sinking dozens of ships, destroying hundreds of airplanes, and taking the lives of over two thousand servicemen. The carnage lasted only two hours, but more than seventy years later, terrible questions remain unanswered. How did the Japanese slip past the American radar? Why were the Hawaiian defense forces so woefully underprepared? What, if anything, did American intelligence know before the first Japanese pilot shouted “Tora! Tora! Tora!”? In this incomparable volume, Pearl Harbor experts Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon tackle dozens of thorny issues in an attempt to determine who was at fault for one of the most shocking military disasters in history. |
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... direct experience have attained “senior citizen” status. Yet the subject continues to fascinate. Why? No doubt one reason is the irrational but undeniable glamour of defeat. Americans like to win, but they remember and sympathize with ...
... direct experience have attained “senior citizen” status. Yet the subject continues to fascinate. Why? No doubt one reason is the irrational but undeniable glamour of defeat. Americans like to win, but they remember and sympathize with ...
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... direct involvement produced heavy stresses and apparent inconsistencies . Some resolved the conflict by flight into unreality . " Let's ignore it and maybe it will go away " might have been the motto of those who convinced themselves ...
... direct involvement produced heavy stresses and apparent inconsistencies . Some resolved the conflict by flight into unreality . " Let's ignore it and maybe it will go away " might have been the motto of those who convinced themselves ...
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... direct part in the tragedy of December 7. “ The operations at Pearl Harbor were an executive function , and responsibility for them was lodged in the departments . Congress has no direction or control of operations of the Navy or Army ...
... direct part in the tragedy of December 7. “ The operations at Pearl Harbor were an executive function , and responsibility for them was lodged in the departments . Congress has no direction or control of operations of the Navy or Army ...
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... direct interest . After Pearl Harbor , the American public had been particularly angry when they reflected upon the policy of shipping scrap iron and other strategic materials to Japan . Even in 1941 , when Congress's interest in ...
... direct interest . After Pearl Harbor , the American public had been particularly angry when they reflected upon the policy of shipping scrap iron and other strategic materials to Japan . Even in 1941 , when Congress's interest in ...
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... direct danger to the United States : “ It is conceded that no successful attack could be made on this country without landing armed forces , and a thousand miles from shore we could put out of business any fleet assembled by a ...
... direct danger to the United States : “ It is conceded that no successful attack could be made on this country without landing armed forces , and a thousand miles from shore we could put out of business any fleet assembled by a ...
Contents
Alerted to Prevent Sabotage | |
The Failure to Comprehend | |
An Important Man in an Important Post | |
Peculiar Complicated and Tense | |
Always Striving for Perfection | |
His Most Grievous Failure | |
The Last Critical Stages | |
It Is Inexplicable | |
He Had Supreme Responsibility | |
On Lines of National Policy | |
Looking in the Wrong Direction | |
ADVISERS PLANNERS AND CHIEFS | |
With Knives and Hatchets | |
Unsurmountable Obstacles | |
Crimination and Recrimination | |
To Help and Serve | |
Faults of Omission | |
Outside of Effective Contact | |
A Finger of Blame | |
Primarily a Failure of Men | |
The Pitfalls of Divided Responsibility | |
A Lack of Imagination | |
East Wind Rain | |
CONTENTS | |
FIELD COMMANDERS AND OPERATORS | |
A Sentinel on Duty | |
THE VIEW FROM THE CROWS NEST | |
Blessed by the War God | |
A Strategic Imbecility | |
A Mental Attitude | |
In the Wake of the Pearl Harbor Disaster | |
Remember Pearl Harbor | |
Image Gallery | |
Notes | |
Appendices | |
The Pearl Harbor Investigations | |
Japanese Proposals of November 20 1941 | |
War Warning Messages of November 27 1941 | |
Proposed Modus Vivendi | |
Japans Bomb Plot Message | |
The Hull Note of November 26 1941 | |
Popov Questionnaire | |
Selected Bibliography | |
Index | |
About the Authors | |
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Common terms and phrases
action Admiral Kimmel air attack Air Force aircraft alert American Army and Navy Army Board asked August Barnes believed Bloch bomb plot British carriers Chapter Chief of Staff China Commander in Chief Congress congressional committee considered danger Dawn We Slept December declared defense Diary diplomatic dispatch East enemy fact failure Gerow going Government Hart Hawaii Hawaiian Department hereafter cited Honolulu Ibid intelligence intercepts Interview January Japan Japanese Japanese attack Kimmel and Short knew Knox Konoye MacArthur Marshall military Morgan Nagumo nation Naval District Navy Department Nomura November 27 Oahu officer operation Pearl Harbor attack Philippines planes position possible President radar RADM reason reconnaissance replied responsibility Roberts Commission Roosevelt sabotage Safford Secretary Senator ships situation Stark Stimson strategy submarine surprise task force testified thought Tokyo told Turner U.S. Navy U.S. Pacific Fleet United War Department warning Washington winds execute wrote Yamamoto