Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryThe New York Times–bestselling authors of Miracle at Midway delve into the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor during WWII in “a superb work of history” (Albuquerque Journal Magazine). In the predawn hours of December 7, 1941, a Japanese carrier group sailed toward Hawaii. A few minutes before 8:00 a.m., they received the order to rain death on the American base at Pearl Harbor, sinking dozens of ships, destroying hundreds of airplanes, and taking the lives of over two thousand servicemen. The carnage lasted only two hours, but more than seventy years later, terrible questions remain unanswered. How did the Japanese slip past the American radar? Why were the Hawaiian defense forces so woefully underprepared? What, if anything, did American intelligence know before the first Japanese pilot shouted “Tora! Tora! Tora!”? In this incomparable volume, Pearl Harbor experts Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon tackle dozens of thorny issues in an attempt to determine who was at fault for one of the most shocking military disasters in history. |
From inside the book
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Page
They were expected to endure any privation necessary to achieve the national
expansionist aims about which they had no say. In contrast, the United States
was a racially mixed society with a thriving economy and a bone-deep belief in
the ...
They were expected to endure any privation necessary to achieve the national
expansionist aims about which they had no say. In contrast, the United States
was a racially mixed society with a thriving economy and a bone-deep belief in
the ...
Page
In some respects, the military was overenthusiastic—they expected miracles of
the B-17 four-engine bomber—but all too often resisted new ideas. The misuse of
radar on Oahu was a case in point. Moreover, the aircraft carrier did not really ...
In some respects, the military was overenthusiastic—they expected miracles of
the B-17 four-engine bomber—but all too often resisted new ideas. The misuse of
radar on Oahu was a case in point. Moreover, the aircraft carrier did not really ...
Page
Congress has no direction or control of operations of the Navy or Army, and
should not be expected to have.” This was undeniably true. Walsh also pointed
out that the initiative for the two-ocean navy came largely from Congress. Barkley
...
Congress has no direction or control of operations of the Navy or Army, and
should not be expected to have.” This was undeniably true. Walsh also pointed
out that the initiative for the two-ocean navy came largely from Congress. Barkley
...
Page
... expected of him. To so acknowledge means acknowledging that the system by
which the Navy produces officers is at fault. Kimmel's story is widely believed
among career men in the Navy. 13 Yet that same system produced brilliant
leaders ...
... expected of him. To so acknowledge means acknowledging that the system by
which the Navy produces officers is at fault. Kimmel's story is widely believed
among career men in the Navy. 13 Yet that same system produced brilliant
leaders ...
Page
34 Toland suggested that Roosevelt let the attack proceed because he expected
that “the Pacific Fleet would not only stem any Japanese attack with little loss to
U.S. shipping but deal a crushing blow to Kido Butai itself.” 35 With this remark ...
34 Toland suggested that Roosevelt let the attack proceed because he expected
that “the Pacific Fleet would not only stem any Japanese attack with little loss to
U.S. shipping but deal a crushing blow to Kido Butai itself.” 35 With this remark ...
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LibraryThing Review
User Review - MasseyLibrary - LibraryThingThe previous book “At Dawn We Slept” was a re-creation of the apocalyptic events of December 7, 1941. This provocative sequel delves even further to examine the underlying causes of Pearl Harbor and ... Read full review
Pearl Harbor: the verdict of history
User Review - Not Available - Book VerdictPrange's twin volumes offer everything you always wanted to know about Pearl Harbor but were afraid to ask, plus pictures! Together, these tomes comprise an exhaustive study of the day that will live ... Read full review
Contents
Alerted to Prevent Sabotage | iii |
The Failure to Comprehend | iii |
An Important Man in an Important Post | iii |
Peculiar Complicated and Tense | iii |
Always Striving for Perfection | iii |
His Most Grievous Failure | iii |
The Last Critical Stages | iii |
It Is Inexplicable | iii |
He Had Supreme Responsibility | |
On Lines of National Policy | |
Looking in the Wrong Direction | |
ADVISERS PLANNERS AND CHIEFS | ii |
With Knives and Hatchets | ii |
Unsurmountable Obstacles | ii |
Crimination and Recrimination | ii |
To Help and Serve | ii |
Faults of Omission | ii |
Outside of Effective Contact | ii |
A Finger of Blame | ii |
Primarily a Failure of Men | ii |
The Pitfalls of Divided Responsibility | ii |
A Lack of Imagination | ii |
East Wind Rain | ii |
FIELD COMMANDERS AND OPERATORS | iii |
A Sentinel on Duty | iii |
THE VIEW FROM THE CROWS NEST | iv |
Blessed by the War God | v |
A Strategic Imbecility | xv |
A Mental Attitude | xxv |
In the Wake of the Pearl Harbor Disaster | xxxiv |
Remember Pearl Harbor | xliii |
Notes | liv |
Appendices | 46 |
The Pearl Harbor Investigations | 47 |
Japanese Proposals of November 20 1941 | 49 |
War Warning Messages of November 27 1941 | 50 |
Proposed Modus Vivendi | 51 |
Japans Bomb Plot Message | 54 |
The Hull Note of November 26 1941 | 55 |
Popov Questionnaire | 57 |
Selected Bibliography | 59 |
Index | 70 |
Image Gallery | 571 |
About the Authors | 598 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action Admiral alert American appeared armed Army asked attack August Barnes base believed Bloch Board British called carriers Chapter Chief command concerning congressional committee considered course danger December defense Department Diary direct dispatch East effect execute expected fact failure Fleet force going Government Hawaii Hawaiian hereafter cited Hull Ibid important intelligence interest Interview Islands January Japan Japanese Kimmel knew later letter major Marshall matter means military move Naval Navy Navy Department never November Oahu officer operation opinion Pacific Pacific Fleet peace Pearl Harbor Philippines planes position possible prepared President question ready reason received reconnaissance Record relations replied Representative responsibility Roosevelt Secretary Senator sent ships Short situation staff Stark Stimson surprise task thing thought told took United wanted warning Washington winds wrote York