Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryThe New York Times–bestselling authors of Miracle at Midway delve into the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor during WWII in “a superb work of history” (Albuquerque Journal Magazine). In the predawn hours of December 7, 1941, a Japanese carrier group sailed toward Hawaii. A few minutes before 8:00 a.m., they received the order to rain death on the American base at Pearl Harbor, sinking dozens of ships, destroying hundreds of airplanes, and taking the lives of over two thousand servicemen. The carnage lasted only two hours, but more than seventy years later, terrible questions remain unanswered. How did the Japanese slip past the American radar? Why were the Hawaiian defense forces so woefully underprepared? What, if anything, did American intelligence know before the first Japanese pilot shouted “Tora! Tora! Tora!”? In this incomparable volume, Pearl Harbor experts Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon tackle dozens of thorny issues in an attempt to determine who was at fault for one of the most shocking military disasters in history. |
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No doubt one reason is the irrational but undeniable glamour of defeat.
Americans like to win, but they remember and sympathize with their losers. There
is no Northern counterpart of Gone with the Wind. Another factor that keeps Pearl
Harbor ...
No doubt one reason is the irrational but undeniable glamour of defeat.
Americans like to win, but they remember and sympathize with their losers. There
is no Northern counterpart of Gone with the Wind. Another factor that keeps Pearl
Harbor ...
Page
Many also failed to understand the threat of ideological warfare, the insidious
campaign of words to sap the morale, cloud the reason, and weaken the will to
the point where physical defense became meaningless. Most isolationists were ...
Many also failed to understand the threat of ideological warfare, the insidious
campaign of words to sap the morale, cloud the reason, and weaken the will to
the point where physical defense became meaningless. Most isolationists were ...
Page
20 One cannot pin solely on the isolationist solons the entire blame for
congressional sins of omission and commission in relation to national defense for
a very important reason: They were in the minority. They raised their voices loud
and ...
20 One cannot pin solely on the isolationist solons the entire blame for
congressional sins of omission and commission in relation to national defense for
a very important reason: They were in the minority. They raised their voices loud
and ...
Page
One reason the policy lasted so long may have been ignorance of and
indifference to what was going on in Asia. For if anything jumps off the pages of
the Congressional Record for 1941 it is the almost total absence of debate or
comment ...
One reason the policy lasted so long may have been ignorance of and
indifference to what was going on in Asia. For if anything jumps off the pages of
the Congressional Record for 1941 it is the almost total absence of debate or
comment ...
Page
... armed forces, and a thousand miles from shore we could put out of business
any fleet assembled by a combination of all the powers on earth, for the reason
that they could not bring along with them the air arm with which to protect their
fleet.
... armed forces, and a thousand miles from shore we could put out of business
any fleet assembled by a combination of all the powers on earth, for the reason
that they could not bring along with them the air arm with which to protect their
fleet.
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LibraryThing Review
User Review - MasseyLibrary - LibraryThingThe previous book “At Dawn We Slept” was a re-creation of the apocalyptic events of December 7, 1941. This provocative sequel delves even further to examine the underlying causes of Pearl Harbor and ... Read full review
Pearl Harbor: the verdict of history
User Review - Not Available - Book VerdictPrange's twin volumes offer everything you always wanted to know about Pearl Harbor but were afraid to ask, plus pictures! Together, these tomes comprise an exhaustive study of the day that will live ... Read full review
Contents
Alerted to Prevent Sabotage | iii |
The Failure to Comprehend | iii |
An Important Man in an Important Post | iii |
Peculiar Complicated and Tense | iii |
Always Striving for Perfection | iii |
His Most Grievous Failure | iii |
The Last Critical Stages | iii |
It Is Inexplicable | iii |
He Had Supreme Responsibility | |
On Lines of National Policy | |
Looking in the Wrong Direction | |
ADVISERS PLANNERS AND CHIEFS | ii |
With Knives and Hatchets | ii |
Unsurmountable Obstacles | ii |
Crimination and Recrimination | ii |
To Help and Serve | ii |
Faults of Omission | ii |
Outside of Effective Contact | ii |
A Finger of Blame | ii |
Primarily a Failure of Men | ii |
The Pitfalls of Divided Responsibility | ii |
A Lack of Imagination | ii |
East Wind Rain | ii |
FIELD COMMANDERS AND OPERATORS | iii |
A Sentinel on Duty | iii |
THE VIEW FROM THE CROWS NEST | iv |
Blessed by the War God | v |
A Strategic Imbecility | xv |
A Mental Attitude | xxv |
In the Wake of the Pearl Harbor Disaster | xxxiv |
Remember Pearl Harbor | xliii |
Notes | liv |
Appendices | 46 |
The Pearl Harbor Investigations | 47 |
Japanese Proposals of November 20 1941 | 49 |
War Warning Messages of November 27 1941 | 50 |
Proposed Modus Vivendi | 51 |
Japans Bomb Plot Message | 54 |
The Hull Note of November 26 1941 | 55 |
Popov Questionnaire | 57 |
Selected Bibliography | 59 |
Index | 70 |
Image Gallery | 571 |
About the Authors | 598 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action Admiral alert American appeared armed Army asked attack August Barnes base believed Bloch Board British called carriers Chapter Chief command concerning congressional committee considered course danger December defense Department Diary direct dispatch East effect execute expected fact failure Fleet force going Government Hawaii Hawaiian hereafter cited Hull Ibid important intelligence interest Interview Islands January Japan Japanese Kimmel knew later letter major Marshall matter means military move Naval Navy Navy Department never November Oahu officer operation opinion Pacific Pacific Fleet peace Pearl Harbor Philippines planes position possible prepared President question ready reason received reconnaissance Record relations replied Representative responsibility Roosevelt Secretary Senator sent ships Short situation staff Stark Stimson surprise task thing thought told took United wanted warning Washington winds wrote York